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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became
apparent that the way organizations conduct business activities within and between
themselves would be forever altered. Specifically, the way the firms share and distribute
goods became an important area of interest to ensure the security of their supply chain
partners and ultimately, society in general. Supply chain security (SCS) is defined as
activities that protect supply chains from damage, terrorism, and contraband.
This dissertation adds to an emerging knowledge base – SCS efforts. More
specifically, this dissertation attempts to address three key areas concerning SCS: 1)
understand what type of SCS activity taxonomy exists; 2) understand what is driving
those taxonomy categories to exist; and 3) understand what, if any, relationship between
the SCS taxonomy categories and organizational performance exists. To gain this
knowledge, inductive and deductive techniques were utilized. First, in-depth semistructured interviews with 19 executives across a variety of industries concerning SCS
issues were conducted to help frame the research and develop research hypotheses.

Through content analyzing the interview transcripts, it became salient that institutional
environmental pressures were what respondents indicated were the causes of security
activities. As such, Institutional Theory was used as a theoretical framework for the
dissertation. Second, a survey method was used to collect data concerning supply chain
security activities, pressures that cause them, and organizational performance.
In the empirical examination of SCS, it was found that three categories of security
exist. The taxonomy that emerged had three categories that were named Security Pros,
Follow-the-Leaders, and Necessary Evils.
The next part of the empirical examination was to determine which, if any, of the
identified drivers impact the SCS categories. Using multiple discriminant analysis, it was
determined that customers and societal pressures are significant in impacting the SCS
categories.
Finally, a multiple analysis of variance was conducted to determine if different
types of SCS categories were associated with different types of organizational
performance. The results indicated that different groups were not related to different
levels of firm, customer, market, and supply chain performance.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“The times, they are a-changin”
Bob Dylan
Problem Identification
On September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter), the security of the United States was
directly challenged when it suffered its worst terrorist attack in history. With this new
security threat, it became obvious that organizations in the U.S. and around the globe
would be forever altered as public and private entities began creating new requirements
for conducting business. Because supply chains are integrated and complex,
organizations around the globe have been incorporated into the war on terrorism, whether
they choose to be or not (Eggers 2004). For example, the newly formed Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) recently announced that securing the supply chain is part of
the overall strategy for national security (Wilson 2005), thus placing additional
expectations on organizations. These new requirements are likely due to terrorist cells
and rogue governments that are hostile toward the U.S. viewing supply chains as
significant targets (Quinn 2003). The obligations placed on organizations have become
known as supply chain security (SCS). However, the initiatives have proven difficult to
implement as nearly all supply chains have grown extremely complex and operate on a
global scale.
1

Prior to 9/11 and the increased interest in SCS, there was already considerable
attention dedicated to the importance of supply chain management (SCM) (Cooper,
Ellram, Gardner, and Hanks 1997). As interest has grown, SCM has experienced
boundary spanning, such that it is now common to find distribution, marketing, customer
relationship management, manufacturing, and transportation literature including
discussions of SCM or SCM-related topics (Ross 1998). This boundary spanning has
also confounded definitions of SCM. Although many definitions exist, a widely utilized
definition refers to SCM as
The integration of key business processes from end user through original
suppliers that provide products, services, and information that add value for
customers and other stakeholders (Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh 1998, p.1).
Multiple processes and touch points that take place from suppliers to end users is inherent
in this definition of SCM. This increases the problems for creating a secure supply chain.
While supply chains have become more complex, they have also become more
efficient. However, striving for efficiency creates new issues effecting security. For
example, many philosophies, such as lean manufacturing, focus on the creation of
efficiency throughout the entire supply chain (Cagliano, Caniato, Spina 2006), yet when
it comes to SCS these efficiencies may result in increased risk. An example of this
comes from Yossi Sheffi’s book on creating resilient enterprises (2005b). In striving for
efficiency, the electronics manufacturer Ericsson relied solely on Philips as a main
component supplier for its cell phone production. When Philips suffered a fire to its
production facility plant and could not produce this main component, Ericsson suffered
greatly and soon pulled out of the market (Sheffi 2005b). As a result, organizations are
now encouraged to build redundancies, such as using multiple suppliers, in the supply
2

chain to prepare for attacks (Burke 2005; Sheffi 2005b). This is just one example of
conflicting issues that securing the supply chain can present to organizations.
Another lesson taken from 9/11 was that an attack on any part of the supply chain
would have impact well beyond the location of the attack (Rice and Spayd 2005).
Specifically, the terrorist attacks in New York directly affected many industries and
organizations, such as the airline industry and the many firms located within the World
Trade Center. However, many other firms, who were not directly involved in the attack,
were indirectly affected and suffered large setbacks due to the attacks. For example,
many domestic auto manufacturers had plants with just-in-time operations in Windsor,
Canada, just across the U.S. border. After the terrorist attacks, the borders were quickly
sealed and the JIT operations were halted. This situation was a rude awakening for U.S.
based supply chains to the vulnerability that exists when working with other
organizations. The U.S. and Canadian border is still feeling the effect today, as the
estimated costs of border delays are well over $8 billion per year (Burke 2005). Prior to
9/11, SCS focused primarily on issues like smuggling, stowaways, and theft (Thibault,
Brooks, and Button 2006) as opposed to preventing terrorist contraband from entering the
supply chain. Due to integrated and complex supply chains, organizations around the
globe have been affected by the war on terrorism, whether they choose to be or not
(Eggers 2004). This has resulted in private organizations and public entities working
together to ensure the efficient flow of goods and the protection of citizens.
While efforts have been made to ensure that supply chains are more secure, there
are still many questions as to whether it has been enough. Recently, the results of both
private and public initiatives have come under scrutiny by Wilson (2005), who states that
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even with the multitude of SCS programs that have been instituted since 2001,
vulnerability has not been eliminated or even reduced. Also, when it comes to supply
chains in a global environment, Barry (2004) states:
The shock of 9/11 was to be a wake-up call to the uncertainty of a global
environment. It was instead a snooze button. The world is restored to comfort
and complacencies, at least in the short run, (p. 695).
Most of the money allocated by the U.S. government is dedicated solely to the airline
industry, where is it estimated that the Transportation Security administration (TSA) has
spent $11 billion. Meanwhile, the shipping and import sectors still struggle with
vulnerability and creating SCS. This vulnerability was illustrated when reporters with
ABC News shipped depleted uranium on multiple occasions from a high-risk port into
the United States after 9/11 (Staff 2003a). Tom Ridge, former secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security recently recognized that government inspection of all
incoming containers to the U.S. is a fallacy and as a result called on the business
community to initiate their own strategies for SCS (Witt 2006).
Increased Interest from Executives
The calls for SCS, as illustrated by DHS and Tom Ridge, have resulted in
acknowledgement from top management in the private sector. In a survey of global
shippers, it was found that security related issues are responsible for applying the most
pressure on global supply chains (Shawdon 2006). As a result, research suggests that
supply chain executives are worrying more about security than ever before (Spekman and
Davis 2004) and many are indicating that security is their most dire concern (Wilson
2005). This concern may be justified when considering that:
4

•

The estimated cost to a supply chain that allowed a weapon of mass destruction to
be shipped via container is $1 trillion (Eggers 2004).

•

30 percent of financial and risk managers indicated that their firms were not ready
for disruptions to their business (Bradford 2003).

•

40 percent of businesses that are affected by terrorism never re-open; of those that
do, 30 percent close within two years of re-opening (Hardy and Roberts 2003).

Anecdotal evidence would suggest that these figures are expected to grow rapidly, yet
many firms have insufficient SCS.
While top management at many organizations is concerned about SCS, they may
have difficulty dedicating resources to establish and bolster it. This may be a result of the
heavy cost involved with developing and enhancing security. For example, a survey
conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton found that 80 percent of CEOs indicate security is
more important now than before 9/11 (n=72; firm revenue greater than $1 billion). Yet,
only 33 percent indicate that they would increase spending on security (Fischer and
Green 2004). Similarly, research conducted by Deloitte found that 57 percent of
transportation executives (n=103) indicate that physical security is critical to reducing
security threats, yet only nine percent feel that the industry performance is excellent
(Steinman 2004). These two studies conducted by top consulting firms indicate that
while management is finding SCS to be critical, allocating resources dedicated to
becoming more secure is difficult.
While it is extremely difficult to determine the amount spent on SCS, the best
estimates are that it costs U.S. businesses over $150 billion a year. This includes $65
billion directly traced to logistics and supply chain cost increases (Bernasek 2002). Many
times these costs are difficult to justify as 1) there is often no indication that an
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organization will be a target, and 2) it is difficult to quantify the return on investment. If
SCS efforts are implemented, the failure to link them with performance may allow many
security programs to become stale (Quinn 2003) or abandoned. The potential
abandonment of SCS results in the increased need to examine the impact of SCS efforts
on organizational performance (Rice and Spayd 2005; Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept 2006).
However, to understand the relationship between SCS and organizational performance,
one must first understand what SCS activities are being implemented.
Supply chain management requires security because of the complexity,
dependence, and extensive trust and commitment between supply chain partners (Sarathy
2006); and although individual firms have created SCS measures within the firm, these
measures fail to address the rest of the supply chain (Sheffi 2005a). While SCS should
be initiated as an organizational strategy (Trunick 2005), there is little insight into the
types of strategies that firms use. Unfortunately, to date, logistics and SCM literature
provide ‘little help’ when it comes to understanding SCS and best practices (Closs and
McGarrell 2004; Hale and Moberg 2005). In summarizing the existing SCS literature,
Rice and Spayd (2005) suggest that three themes emerge: little empirical evidence, many
examples of reaction to past instances and events, and no investigations into current
corporate responses. Thus, there is a need to understand how organizations approach
SCS efforts individually and how they are approaching SCS with other firms.
The lack of understanding concerning SCS strategies from within the organization
and in coordination with other organizations provides the need for this dissertation
research. In particular, the focal point of this dissertation is to discover SCS categories,
why they are developed, and how various SCS categories influence organizational
6

performance differently. To further establish this, the next section of this chapter
presents a review of existing research to determine gaps that this research will address.
The brief review of existing literature is followed by the research objectives and the
presentation of the conceptual research model and hypothesis. Next, contributions and
limitations of the study are presented. Finally, this introductory chapter concludes with a
summary, which serves as a guide for the remainder of this dissertation.
Existing Literature
While the importance of security has been emphasized and various topics related
to SCS have been investigated, few formal definitions of security in SCM exist (e.g. Peck
2003; Closs and McGarrell 2004). This research uses the definition put forth by Closs
and McGarrell (2004). Formally, they suggest that supply chain security management is
The application of policies, procedures, and technology to protect supply chain
assets (product, facilities, equipment, information, and personnel) from theft,
damage, or terrorism and to prevent the introduction or unauthorized contraband,
people or weapons of mass destruction into the supply chain (p. 8).
This definition of SCS focuses on security issues involving man-made factors: theft,
damage, and terrorism and excludes natural disasters, as will this research. Following the
definition by Closs and McGarrell (2004), this research will focus on security efforts to
thwart a man-made disaster.
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services website (HHS
website 2008), man-made disasters include terrorism, bioterrorism, pandemics and
diseases, chemical agents, and radiation emergencies. These man-made disasters can
include a high level of fear associated with them. The high visibility and negative
publicity to society of these types of acts creates added pressure for organizations to
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avoid them. These types of disasters present a special scenario for organizations because
they can be distributed through supply chains, whereas other disasters, such as natural
disasters cannot. As a result, these types of disasters can have a special impact on
organizations as they try to develop activities to decrease the likelihood of their direct
involvement in them. As indicated by Barry (2004), among others, it was 9/11 that was
the catalyst for organizations developing programs around security efforts and risk
reduction. Thus, the threat of man-made disaster has caused firms to make special
preparations and strategies for their organizations relative to SCS. Furthermore, efforts to
prevent man-made disasters can involve initiatives that are unique from natural disasters
While SCS should be initiated as an organizational strategy (Trunick 2005), there
is little insight into the types of strategies that firms use. This may be the result of prior
research presenting normative suggestions to create security in supply chains, such as
treating it as total quality management procedures (Lee and Wolfe 2003) or presenting
SCS as an achievable mark and expectation among supply chain partners (e.g., Russell
and Saldahna 2003).
Since 9/11 and its aftermath, SCM researchers have placed a large amount of
focus on government intervention on SCS. In particular, research has focused
specifically on governmental involvement in anti-terrorism policies and its impact on
domestic and international trade (Christopher and Peck 2004). For instance, Thibault et
al. (2005) report that strengthened relationships between maritime organizations and the
government are the result of container security initiatives. Other research has also
evaluated how importing from Canada has changed due to updated security measures
imposed by the U.S. government (Prokop 2004).
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SCM researchers have also presented normative measures for handling SCS. For
example, Helferich and Cook (2002) suggest that organizations follow standards
presented by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Following this
typology, these researchers suggest that preparedness for disruptions is done in stages
through: planning, mitigation, detection, response, and recovery. Similarly, Sarathy
(2006) and Sheffi (2005b) support the layered approach, whereby as one layer of security
is breached, another layer of security exists to protect the chain. In this approach, after
security risks are identified and assessed, risk avoidance and risk mitigation follow.
Additional research in this area discusses how organizations should respond to security
breaches, focusing mainly on resiliency (e.g., Rice and Caniato 2003; Sheffi 2001; Sheffi
2005b). Resiliency is defined as the “ability to react to unexpected disruption and restore
normal supply network operations” (Rice and Caniato 2003, p.27).
Investments in security can be hard to justify by top management as security
efforts are expensive and when organizations get into difficult budget situations, security
is an easy way to cut expenditures (Quinn 2003). For example, 80 percent of
transportation executives indicated that homeland security measures would require
increased spending on security initiatives by their firms (Steinman 2004). However, if
those security dollars are illustrated as positively impacting performance, the likelihood
of maintaining and dedicating resources toward SCS increases greatly. As a result, the
research on SCS has also investigated whether the investments in security measures are
justified by various performance outcomes. Conceptual research suggests that supply
chain efforts toward security will lower total system cost, raise visibility, increase
shipment data and tracking, raise customer satisfaction, enhance profitability (Sarathy
9

2006), protect the brand, and preserve market share (Eggers 2004). Empirical research
has supported this notion. Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept (2006) find that efforts in SCS
result in improved internal operations, relationships with customers, and profitability.
Eggers (2004) reports that participating in SCS government initiatives resulted in a cost
savings of $378-$462 per container imported into the U.S. This was the result of reduced
transaction costs, increased labor productivity, reduced theft, lower inventory, and lower
overhead. Hasbro provides one of the few examples of a company’s SCS effort being
tied to performance. As a large importer, they implemented the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program shortly after the initiative launched.
They found initial expenses to be around $200,000 and the expected annual expenses to
be over $100,000. The benefit has been a drop in customs holds as containers enter the
U.S. Before C-TPAT, Hasbro had over seven percent of all incoming containers
inspected upon arrival to the U.S. Since C-TPAT was implemented, that has dropped to
less than 0.7 percent of all containers. This has resulted in estimated inspection cost
savings of almost $550,000 per year (Gonzalez 2004). Finally, investments in security
measures may give an advantage to a firm in terms of collateral benefits that exceed the
cost of investments such as greater employee organizational commitment from increased
personnel security (Rice and Spayd 2005).
While the research conducted on SCS has been broad, SCS is still in its infancy.
This dissertation will attempt to advance the SCS knowledge base for both academics and
practitioners. The specific objectives are discussed next.
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Research Objectives
The brief review of research on SCS presented above illustrates the need for
additional research on this issue. While the research conducted on SCS is broad and
ongoing, SCS is still in its infancy. Previous research conducted in the manufacturing
environment suggests that SCS innovators can realize positive impacts on performance
(Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept 2006). However, while seminal, many questions from this
research remain, including: what about firms who are not “innovators” in SCS? What
about firms in industries other than manufacturing? This, along with other strategic
issues surrounding SCS, is investigated as part of this research. Therefore, the focal point
of this dissertation is to discover categories within a SCS taxonomy, why they are
developed, and how various SCS categories influence organizational performance
differently. Specifically, the main questions to be addressed in this dissertation are:
1. Is there a SCS taxonomy?
2. What causes organizations to partake in specific SCS taxonomy categories?
3. Do different SCS categories result in different organizational performances?
To gain more insight into these research questions, 19 in-depth interviews with
senior level supply chain executives were conducted as part of this dissertation.
The first objective is to understand which specific SCS activities organizations
engage in to make their supply chain more secure. Qualitative research identified
numerous activities that organizations initiate to help secure the supply chains in which
they participate. A dichotomy of SCS activities emerged from the qualitative research
and is presented as intra- and interorganizational activities. First are intraorganizational
activities, which are any activities that the organization does on its own in creating SCS.
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This may include any internal decision making or activities the organization enacts to
create SCS (ex: using fences, modifying inventory levels, monitoring deliveries, etc).
Second are interorganizational activities, which are initiatives that the organization does
in conjunction with other members of the supply chain, specifically for SCS (ex:
partnering, communication, learning, etc). The qualitative research indicated that firms
may engage in only a few or many of the identified intra- and interorganizational
activities. These activities were tested empirically in an effort to better understand the
overall SCS activities that organizations deploy and to classify the various ‘mixes’ of
activities into taxonomy. In strategic management and organizational literature, it is not
atypical to find organizations being classified into taxonomies (Miller and Roth 1994) by
using variables and determining commonalities between groups (Miller and Friesen
1997). This taxonomy was developed by asking respondents to indicate the degree to
which each of the identified SCS activities are included in their overall SCS strategy.
The second objective is to understand why organizations engage in SCS
taxonomies. Several “drivers” of the SCS taxonomy were identified during the
qualitative research. Specifically, the emergent qualitative research that was conducted
as part of this research revealed Institutional Theory as a theoretical foundation as to why
organizations partake in security efforts. In its simple form, Institutional Theory suggests
that organizations are social systems (Scott 2001). Institutional Theory has long been
used as a theoretical framework to explain why organizations adopt practices, policies,
and procedures (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977), what they
should look like and how they should behave (e.g., Hatch 1997; Powell and DiMaggio
1991; Scott 1995), and their actions in response to environmental pressure (e.g., Grewal
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and Dharwadkar 2002; Hoffman 1997; Scott 2001). From a security perspective,
Institutional Theory should help to explain how different environmental pressures impact
firms to create SCS. For example, the qualitative research revealed that the government,
customers, competitors, and society were reasons for an organization to engage in SCS
strategy formulation. As a result, the second objective is to quantitatively analyze and
understand how the identified “drivers” impact the implementation of specific SCS
taxonomy categories.
The third and final objective is to gain an understanding of how various SCS
taxonomies impact organizational performances (such as firm performance, supply chain
performance, etc). This objective is also the result of a review of existing literature and
the qualitative research. With the exception of the research by Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and
Sept (2006), there is no empirical research to indicate SCS impacts organizational
performance (if at all). The qualitative research indicated a high variation of the impact
on selected performance measures. As a result, this research helps to understand how
different SCS categories affect organizational performances.
The review of existing literature and qualitative research results in a model and
hypotheses relating the SCS taxonomy and outcomes and is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Conceptual Model of the Dissertation Research
Hypotheses related to the model are:
Hypothesis 1a:

A multi-categorical supply chain security taxonomy exists.

Hypothesis 1b:

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’ supply chain security
activities are significantly different from one another.

Hypothesis 2:

Government pressures result in organizations engaging in a level
of SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 3:

Customer pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 4:

Competitive pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 5:

Societal pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.
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Hypothesis 6:

Firm performance varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 7:

Organizational market performance varies depending on the supply
chain security taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 8:

Organizational customer performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 9:

Organizational supply chain performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.
Contributions

This dissertation research has three main contributions for academic researchers
and practitioners alike. First, this research describes a SCS taxonomy with categories
that organizations can deploy to create security in the supply chain. The SCS categories
were determined by the degree to which respondents feel that the intra- and
interorganizational activities are part of their overall supply chain strategy. To date,
research on SCS has typically viewed security as normative. For example, a normative
suggestion is that firms need to approach security from a strategic perspective (Sarathy
2006; Shrader and McConnell 2002). However, research has failed to provide specific
categories for firms to secure the supply chain. This research contributes to the SCS
strategy knowledge base by identifying categories for firms to create SCS. In particular,
this research is the first to identify and describe detailed activities and overall firm
approaches to SCS. As a result, this research contributes to the call for research strategic
issues around SCS (Tang 2006).
Second, this research helps to understand why organizations partake in security
practices at all. Importantly, this contribution also answers the call for research into
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external persuasions on organizational adoption of SCS initiatives (Haughton 2007).
Specifically, the research used Institutional Theory as an explanatory theory of why
organizations adopt security practices. The qualitative interviews revealed that
organizations perceive pressure from sources such as governmental agencies, customers,
competitors, and society. It is hypothesized that these sources result in SCS activities
within categories being deployed. This presents a strong addition to the theoretical
knowledge of SCM and SCS. Pressures from external environments have been identified
as having an impact on organizations in a number of applicable areas. For example,
management literature has evaluated how institutional pressures have caused firms to
adopt environmentally friendly practices (i.e., Bansal and Clelland 2004). However, with
the exception of Zsidisin, Melnyk, Ragatz (2005), Institutional Theory has been
inexplicably missing as a theoretical foundation in supply chain research. This research
fills this void and answers the call for research into external considerations in SCS
endeavors.
Third, this research identifies organizational perceptions of SCS categories and
their impact on performance. Previous research has found that innovative companies
implement security initiatives and realize business value (Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept
2006). While their research is seminal, it does fail to identify different SCS categories
and only focuses on SCS innovators in one industry. Further, their limited sample size
and survey also present the opportunity for further research in the area of SCS and
organizational performance. By using the developed SCS categories in this research, a
more salient view of security and performance emerges. For example, it is hypothesized
here that a firm deploying one SCS category type will vary in its performance compared
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to a firm with another SCS category type. This finding will be a great contribution to
practitioners as they make decisions to expend resources on SCS. If different category
types result in different outcomes, organizations will have a better understanding of what
to expect from their investment. Previous research suggests that the role of management
is to develop strategies that lead to performance gains for the firm (Hunt and Morgan
1997). This research contributes to this notion by developing an understanding of how
different SCS categories influence organizational performance.
The contributions of this research are beneficial to theoretical and applied
knowledge on SCM. From a theoretical perspective, one way this research contributes is
through identifying and empirically testing Institutional Theory and the external
environment as a catalyst for SCS categories. From a practitioner perspective, this
research is crucial as firms are increasingly implementing activities for SCS. This
research helps to identify SCS categories and outcomes.
Limitations
Several limitations for this dissertation should be mentioned. First, due to scope,
this research is focused on the security of the physical flow of goods throughout a supply
chain. While it is recognized that other things, such as information and finances, flow
through the supply chain, this current study is limited to physical security practices. This
may be justified as practitioners have indicated that physical security is their top concern
(Staff 2004). Second, this research is designed to use key informants from an
organization to represent the entire organization. As such, executive level and mid-level
personnel are desired as they are likely to have the capability to answers questions about
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security activities and organizational performance. Third, this research evaluates
performance based on perceptual measures of the key informant. This will follow prior
research that captures organizational performance in a similar manner (e.g., Matsuno,
Mentzer, and Rentz 2000). While objective organizational performance measures are
preferred, that data is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, especially in the timeframe
and scope of this research project.
Summary and Dissertation Organization
This chapter has established the importance of studying the organizational
perspectives of SCS. As organizations continually feel pressure to embrace security
measures to create a secure supply chain, they will need to understand what SCS
categories exist and how those strategies translate to organizational performance. In
addition, this introductory chapter also presented a brief review of existing SCS literature.
The review of literature coupled with a qualitative study led to the research objectives
and conceptual model. Finally, the chapter is finished by presenting contributions and
limitations of the study.
This dissertation consists of five additional chapters. Chapter two presents a
thorough review of the existing literature that is relevant to this dissertation. This
includes an in-depth view of supply chain, SCM, SCS, Institutional Theory and firm
performance. Chapter three presents the qualitative research findings, testable model,
and hypotheses. Chapter four presents the research design and method. This discussion
includes research design, measurement development and purification, results of pretest,
results of the main data collection, and data analysis procedures. Chapter five presents
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details of the hypothesis tests. Chapter six concludes this dissertation with a discussion
of the results, limitations, and future research.

19

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Since the early 1990’s, interest in supply chains and supply chain management
(SCM) has grown immensely among academics and practicing managers (e.g., Cooper,
Lambert, and Pagh 1997; Tan et al. 1998; van Hoek 1998). However, even with this
increased interest, confusion still exists as researchers have taken different perspectives in
defining SCM (Mentzer et al. 2001). This is likely due to the supply chain discipline
being in the early stages of development. Therefore, this chapter reviews relevant
literature from the areas of supply chains, SCM, supply chain security (SCS),
organizational performance, and Institutional Theory. Though previously researched,
SCS is still in its infancy, which requires additional research to extend the academic and
practioner knowledge base. As a result, this chapter reviews and addresses all previous
relevant literature on SCS. Specifically, this chapter builds a theoretical foundation by
discussing the specific SCS security categories, the relationships between the external
drivers that cause firms to partake in SCS, and the relationships between SCS categories
and organizational performance.
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Supply Chains
In its simplest form, a supply chain is a process by which firms are aligned to
bring goods or services to the marketplace (Lambert 2004). Thus, a supply chain
encompasses all organizations involved in the flow of goods from raw material to end
user. More formally, a supply chain can be defined as “a set of three or more entities
directly involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances,
and/or information from a source to a customer (and includes the end consumer),”
(Mentzer et al. 2001, p.4). Similarly, Alber and Walker (1998) suggest that supply
chains are all parties involved from raw material to end consumer, through an engineered
flow of information, distribution, and finances. These definitions of supply chains are
derivatives of earlier definitions that had difficultly in delineating supply chains from
marketing channels and logistical activities. For example, Novak and Simco (1991)
suggest that a supply chain consists of those who are associated for the purpose of
facilitating transactions among channel members. Another conceptualization blends
supply chains with physical distribution and logistics management. For example,
Lamming (1996) states that traditional logistical issues, such as cross-docking and
information sharing of inventory levels, are strongly emphasized and combined with the
concept of supply chains.
While the definitions presented above have been used by researchers in recent
years, one can find general descriptions of supply chains in the early writings of Alderson
(1950). Although he does not specifically use the term “supply chain,” Alderson (1950)
does discuss the process and sequence of raw and unspecialized material that over time
ends up as a specialized article which consumers buy. His description provides details of
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a generic raw material going through the necessary conversion processes and becoming
more specialized to meet consumer needs. While it is general and at a high level of
abstraction, the flow which Alderson (1950) describes can easily be understood as the
description of the modern supply chain. Also of interest is Alderson’s description
concerning unspecialized and specialized processes. As organizations become more and
more specialized, they will have to rely more on other organizations to bring the final
good to the end consumer. In this process, it is inherently understood that organizations
need to work together to create the product for an end consumer to purchase. While these
earlier writings generalize a supply chain, Alderson rarely receives credit for the
indoctrination of the supply chain concept.
In addition to Alderson, researchers also often credit Oliver and Webber (1982)
with presenting and building the foundation for the modern day supply chain (e.g.,
Harland 1996; Svensson 2002; Svensson 2004). Their idea of a supply chain is based on
the intraorganizational integrative behaviors between functions such as purchasing,
marketing, and distribution (Harland 1996). The intraorganizational view is the internal
view; these are the activities that a particular firm conducts and controls within the
organization. This early approach to supply chain implies that all organizational
functions should be fully integrated to realize the efficient and effective flow of goods.
Shortly thereafter, Porter (1985) presented the concept of the value chain, which is
similar to the intraorganizational view of interconnected activity within the organization.
He describes this as “the physically and technologically distinct activities a firm
performs. These are the building blocks by which a firm creates a product valuable to its
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buyers,” (p.38). The direct activities of the value chain include inbound logistics,
conversion (production), outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service.
Over time, the concept of a supply chain transitioned from exclusive
intraorganizational coordination to coordination with other organizations involved in the
flow of product, information, and finances from raw material to end consumer. In other
words, this became known as the interorganizational view of a supply chain, which is the
external view. The interorganizational view is the process by which all other firms
involved in the supply chain work together to effectively deliver value to the end
customer. In particular, specific interest has been given to the purpose of
interorganizational supply chains and providing examples of effective supply chains. The
textile industry was a catalyst in bringing the interorganizational view to interest. In the
mid-1980’s it was discovered that the textile industry took 66 weeks for a raw material to
be processed into a final consumer product. Further, 40 of the 66 weeks were dedicated
to warehousing and transportation alone (Lummus, Krumwiede, and Vokurka 2001).
This resulted in suppliers and retailers working closer using quick response methodology
to simplify the flow of goods. This also illustrated that the intraorganizational approach
was not the only practice of a supply chain. In the textile industry example,
interorganizational efforts to work together in a cooperative manner resulted in the lead
times for processing raw material to end consumer product being cut substantially.
The interorganizational approach has grown in importance as globalization has
had a profound influence on the concept of supply chains (Mentzer et al. 2001). The
globalization of the supply chain has occurred in an effort to deliver more value to the
end customer. Thus, organizations have been forced into interorganizational approaches
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as the globalization of supply networks have caused organizations to focus on effective
inbound and outbound flow, closer relationships with suppliers, and an emphasis on time
and quality (Mentzer et al. 2001). In other words, because organizations are now
working with other organizations all over the world to create value for the end customers,
there is a need to work closely with one another, to achieve mutual benefits, while also
serving the end customer. The interorganizational efforts are dedicated to creating value
for the end user. Christopher (1992) suggests that value for the end customer is the goal
of a supply chain and it is accomplished through upstream (suppliers) and downstream
(customers) value creation. Langley and Holcomb (1992) also emphasize creating value
for the customer through synchronization of all channel activities to bring a product to
market. This is similar to the exertions by Bowersox, Closs, and Stank (1999) and
Antonette et al. (2002) that the overall mission of the supply chain is to maximize value
for the end consumer. This focus also directly relates to the work of Alderson (1950) in
that the efforts of multiple organizations are dedicated to adding value for the end
consumer. Each member of the supply chain has the ability to improve the
competitiveness of the supply chain, which results in benefit for all members (Bowersox
and Closs 1996; Cooper and Ellram 1993). This exertion draws analogies to the slogan
of “we are only as strong as our weakest link.”
There are many examples of effective supply chains. Lee (2000) provides
examples of P&G, HP, Dell, and Wal-Mart as having successful supply chains. Much of
their success can be attributed to their interorganizational integration of suppliers and
customers into focal business processes. These notable efficient supply chains have
resulted in organizations building partnerships and enduring a strategic competitive
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advantage. More specifically, highly efficient and integrated supply chains have been
shown to have a positive effect on response times, customer-service, profits, inventory,
return on assets, and shareholder value (Lee 2000).
In summarizing supply chains, the general definition used in this research is the
flow of goods, information, and finances from a raw material to an end consumer (Alber
and Walker 1998; Lambert 2004; Mentzer et al. 2001). In the past 25 years of supply
chain research, there has been a transition from the intraorganizational coordination to
also include an interorganizational focus on all members of the supply chain. As the
focus transitioned from the intra- to interorganizational view, research and practice have
made efforts to better understand these processes among supply chain members.
However, just as with any other process, a supply chain needs to be managed to be
effective. The following discussion will examine the literature related to SCM.
Supply Chain Management
Based on the discussion of a supply chain given above, it is clear that the
activities involved within a supply chain are the flows of material, information, or
finances between organizations. However, as there are exchanges between organizations,
there is a responsibility for the organizations involved to manage this process effectively
(Mentzer et al. 2001). The process of managing the supply chain and the related
activities is referred to as supply chain management. Supply chain management is an
emerging field and as such, many similar, but different definitions of SCM have been
presented. Examples of these definitions are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1
Various Definitions of Supply Chain Management
Author
Stevens

Year
1989

Cavinato

1992

Lee and
Billington

1992

Monczka, Trent,
and Handfield

1998

Handfield and
Nichols
Tracey and
Smith-Doerflein

1999

Svensson

2002

Bowersox,
Closs, and
Bixby
Council of
Supply Chain
Management
Professionals

2007

2001

2007

Definition
A system whose parts synchronize the requirements of
the customer with the flow of materials.
Adding value through the process of raw material to end
consumer is a main goal.
Networks of organizations that are focused on producing
raw materials, transforming them into components and
finished goods, and distributing them to final customers.
Emphasizes the total system approach across multiple
functions and multiple suppliers to integrate the sourcing
and control of materials.
All activities involved from raw material to end consumer
in order to achieve competitive advantage.
The integration of important processes from suppliers to
the ultimate end user that provides value added products,
services, and information.
A business philosophy to integrate the dependent
activities, actors, and resources in marketing channels
between the points of origin and consumption whereby
competitive advantage and profits are created.
The collaborative efforts taken by firms in order to
leverage strategic positions and increase operating
efficiency.
Supply Chain Management encompasses the planning
and management of all activities involved in sourcing and
procurement, conversion, and all logistics management
activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and
collaboration with channel partners, which can be
suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers,
and customers. In essence, supply chain management
integrates supply and demand management within and
across companies. Supply Chain Management is an
integrating function with primary responsibility for
linking major business functions and business processes
within and across companies into a cohesive and highperforming business model. It includes all of the logistics
management activities noted above, as well as
manufacturing operations, and it drives coordination of
processes and activities with and across marketing, sales,
product design, finance, and information technology.
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While many definitions exist, it is understood that SCM involves both intra- and
interorganizational approaches. In his HBR article, Forrester (1958) discusses the
increasing importance of both intraorganizational functions and interorganizational
relationships. Mentzer et al. (2001) credit this research with identifying the key issues
involved in SCM, in particular the role of relationships. Relationships are the critical
foundations for managing the entire supply chain from the interorganizational
perspective. More recently, Houlihan (1987) purports that managing the entire supply
chain entails all business activities, including procurement, production, logistics,
marketing, and distribution (intraorganizational). Monczka, Trent, and Handfield (1998)
suggest that SCM is the integration of internal functions as well as external suppliers.
Both of these reflect the intra- and interorganizational approach
Due to these various definitions of SCM and focus on intra- and
interorganizational activities, research has been conducted to develop a consensus
definition. Mentzer et al. (2001) state that definitions of SCM can be split into three
categories: a management philosophy, a set of management processes, and/or the
implementation of a management philosophy. Each of these views is evaluated below.
First, according to the management philosophy category, each member of the
chain impacts the performance of the other members. This view of SCM uses the system
approach where outcomes are maximized as a result of managing the entire network from
supplier to customer (Cooper, Ellram, Gardner, and Hanks 1997). Specifically, this
philosophy has three characteristics:
1) A systems approach with the ultimate customer included,
2) A strategic orientation toward cooperative efforts among all parties to create a
unified, cohesive unit and
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3) A customer focus that will lead to customer satisfaction.
The system approach stresses that each entity in the system has the ability to impact
another (cf. King 1967). This philosophy also includes the end customer and thus has a
customer orientation. The thrust of this management philosophy is that customer value is
the ultimate goal of all supply chain members (Mentzer et al. 2001). Ellram and Cooper
(1990) would fall under this classification as they define SCM as a philosophy to manage
flow from supplier to ultimate user.
The second category suggests that SCM is a set of management processes. In this
approach, all functions of SCM are key processes that are based on work actions within
time and space, with a beginning and end, defined inputs and outputs, and a structure for
action (e.g., Cooper, Ellram, and Hanks 1997; Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh 1997; Croxton
et al. 2001; Ellram and Cooper 1990). If an organization were to adopt this approach to
SCM, intra- and interorganizational silos must be alleviated (Lambert, Stock, and Ellram
1998). Croxton et al. (2001) provide eight core processes that are essential in managing
effective SCM:
1) Customer Relationship Management
2) Customer Service Management
3) Demand Management
4) Order Fulfillment
5) Manufacturing Flow Management
6) Supplier Relationship Management (which encapsulates purchasing)
7) Product Development and Commercialization
8) Returns Management
NOTE: Each of these processes is managed throughout the entire supply chain, from raw
material supplier to end customer.
The final category, and arguably most adopted by academic researchers, is
considered to be the implemented management philosophy. This is similar to a market
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orientation being the implementation of the marketing concept. It is the focus on the
various activities required for successful management of the supply chain. Mentzer et al.
(2001) describe the primary activities that are associated within this interorganizational
view, including activities like: developing partners to build and maintain long-term
relationships, mutually sharing information, and cooperation (e.g., relationship
marketing, buyer-seller relationships, etc). In addition, research on relationships in SCM
and logistics has indicated that relationships and partnerships are built on factors such as
trust, commitment, communication, and cooperation (e.g., Knemeyer et al. 2003; Maloni
and Benton 2000; Moore 1998; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Tan et al. 1998).
This third SCM perspective (implemented management philosophy) is adopted
for this research. It is important to acknowledge that SCM is an implemented activity,
which the third perspective does. This would also follow the work of Gibson, Mentzer,
and Cook (2005) who surveyed a large portion of supply chain practitioners and
academics and found that over 72 percent suggested that the primary role of SCM within
the organization is a combination of strategy and activity. This implies that the dominant
view of SCM is that of implemented philosophy. As such, this research focuses on many
of the activities that organizations focus on and implement to develop a highly
synchronized and effective supply chain.
In summary, supply chains are firms that are involved in the flow of goods from a
source to customer. SCM is the process by which the organizations involved in the flow
of goods integrate processes and coordinate activities for the purpose of creating value.
For the purpose of this research, SCM is viewed as an implemented management
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philosophy that focuses on interorganizational relationships, partnerships, and the factors
that help build them. Specifically, it is defined as:
the systematic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the
tactics across these business functions within a particular company and across
businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term
performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole,
(Mentzer et al. 2001, p.18).
This definition encapsulates many other definitions that have been presented by other
researchers. Keeping supply chains intact and safe has become an important issue, due to
a number of factors including: globalization, complexity of the supply chain, managing
activities among many supply chain partners, and terrorism. The result is that supply
chains are not only managed to be effective, they are now managed to be safe and secure.
This is known as supply chain security and the following reviews literature on this topic.
Supply Chain Security
While the modern view of SCS became of academic interest following the events
of 9/11, the notion of security existed before being applied to SCM or organizations for
that matter. The origins of security come from individual level theories in sociology and
psychology. Sociological literature defines security as a sense of insurance against
hazard (Fairchild 1944). Among other things, human security is concerned with
personal choice and efficacy, opportunity, and positive outlook on the future (Bajpai
2003). According to Fischer and Green (2004), security “implies a stable, relatively
predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without
disruption or harm and without fear of disturbance or inquiry” (p.21). Other common
themes from definitions of security include reduction of anxiety and fear, and increases in
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understanding. For example, Dunham (1947) posits that security is the protection against
activities that threaten happiness, economics, and life. Further, security is described as
the ability to understand and act in situations without fear due to uncertainty reduction
(Berne 1947; Mead 1937; Sullivan 1941). Security as a human psychology is of such
importance that Maslow (1943) included it as a basic human function in his Hierarchy of
Needs model. The average adult has a need for a safe, orderly, predictable, lawful,
organized world, which he can count on and in which unexpected, unmanageable,
chaotic, or other dangerous things do not happen, and there are protectors from harm
(Maslow 1970). Finally, security has not only been researched at the individual level.
The concept of security is also an integral part of governments or nations as evidenced by
political science literature. More recently, Newman and van Selm (2003) state that
human security from a governmental perspective is focused on protecting people from
life-threatening dangers, whether those dangers are from a natural source or made by
man.
While not formalized as it is today, there are also examples that security in
logistical and supply chain activities has existed for decades. Hess and Wrobleski (1996)
reference the need for security in the distribution of goods throughout history. One
notable example is the difficulty that many railroads faced during the expansion of the
U.S. in the 1800’s. The expansion saw the development of railroads connecting the east
and west coasts. The expansion allowed for much more efficient distribution of goods
and people throughout the country. However, the railroads also provided thieves with a
prime opportunity to stop the trains, robbing its goods and passengers. As a result, there
was a strong need for railroad security to protect goods and passengers. Due to the lack
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of governmental and law enforcement protection of the railroads, a privatized railroad
police force was established. This is one of the first examples of SCS.
However, the focus and activities associated with SCS changed as a result of 9/11.
With the nation suffering attacks, the government took actions such as prohibiting air
traffic and border crossing. Closing the borders of the United States prohibited truck
traffic to deliver parts needed to run JIT operations in automotive plants in Windsor,
Canada (Sheffi 2001). As this worst case scenario played out, two key issues emerged.
First, it became salient that while supply chains were extremely efficient, they were also
extremely susceptible to being directly or indirectly affected by terrorism. Secondly, and
probably most terrifying was that supply chains were determined to be ways to dispense
tools of terrorism.
The events of 9/11 brought to light many issues that exist for modern SCM.
Modern supply chains are at a greater risk than ever before (Christopher and Peck 2004).
The difficultly in protecting supply chains comes with the areas of vulnerabilities that
exist, including: goods, factories, supply chain providers and partners, supply chain
facilities, freight carriers, people and information (Sarathy 2006). Supply chain
executives worry more about terrorism than before and are concerned with how secure
their systems, their cargo, and their supply chains are (Spekman and Davis 2004). Efforts
in security are needed if organizations are interested in protecting customers, intellectual
property, infrastructure, brands, and employees (Eggers 2004). As a result, SCS is a
necessary component of corporate strategy, similar to marketing or financial strategies
(Sarathy 2006).

32

Firms are dedicating more time and resources to SCS activities to handle security
issues (Banomyong 2005). Given the role of these activities, there is a strong need to
have them monitored and vigorously maintained (Quinn 2003). If they are not, the
outcomes could be detrimental, such as lost brand equity for example (Closs, Speier,
Whipple, and Voss 2008). Adopted from Hess and Wrobleski (1996), Table 2 illustrates
some of the negative outcomes of not approaching security from a strategic position.
Table 2
Effects of not Incorporating Security from a Strategic Orientation
Increased costs of insurance and security protection.
Costs of internal audit activities to detect crime.
Costs of investigation and prosecution of suspects measured in terms of lost time
of security and management personnel.
Increased selling prices and weakened competitive standing.
Reduced profits.
Loss of productivity.
Loss of business reputation.
Deterioration in quality of service.
Threat to the survival of the business.
From Hess and Wrobleski (1996)
Here, it is important to discuss SCS in relation to risk as much SCS literature has
discussed risk (e.g., Jüttner 2005; Kahn and Burnes 2007; Peck 2006 ). Inherent in the
definition of SCS presented by Closs and McGarrell (2004), security efforts in the supply
chain are done to protect and prevent. In other words, SCS efforts help to reduce risk.
While SCS and supply chain risk are not mutually exclusive, they are
conceptually different. Risk can be defined as the “extent to which there is uncertainty
about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be

33

realized” (Sitkin and Pablo 1992, p. 9). Applied to SCM, risk is the “disruption of flows
between organizations,” (Jüttner 2005, p. 122). More formally, supply chain risk is the
likelihood, the value, and the variance in distribution of supply chain outcomes (Jüttner,
Peck, and Christopher 2003). This risk comes from 1) accidents (e.g., fire), 2) acts of
God (e.g., natural disasters), and 3) socio-political actions (e.g., terrorist attacks) (Jüttner
2005).
From the definitions of risk, SCS and supply chain risk are related. Creating and
maintaining SCS can result in lower risk. By focusing efforts on SCS, the likelihood of
socio-political actions (e.g., a terrorist attack) on a supply chain is lowered. So SCS is
most concerned with intentional acts to breach and disrupt a supply chain. Risk may still
exist for accidents and acts of God, but through SCS efforts the total risk is lowered.
Organizational Approaches to SCS
Even with security measures taken, attacks on supply chains will occur and
supply chains will suffer (Sheffi 2002). As a result, planning for disruptions to the
supply chain is a necessity (Hale and Moberg 2005). Firms should integrate preventative
security measures (Zsidisin, Ragatz, Melnyk 2005) and be ready to respond to the
disruption when it occurs (Sheffi 2002; Hale and Moberg 2005; Zsidisin, Ragatz, and
Melnyk 2005). Most important is that SCS efforts need to be incorporated as part of an
overall organizational strategy (Rittner, Barrett, and Wilson 2007).
In order to have a SCS strategy to prevent and recover from supply chain
breaches, organizations have four approaches to choose from. Similar to discussions
from supply chain and SCM literature, organizations can approach SCS from 1) an
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intraorganizational perspective, 2) an interorganizational perspective, 3) a combination of
both, or 4) some firms have chosen not to adopt security efforts as all. Each of these is
discussed below.

Intraorganizational SCS
Intraorganizational SCS actions are those activities that take place within the
organization in an effort to secure the supply chain. Closs and McGarrell (2004) refer to
this as the four-walls approach to SCS. Further, creating excellent SCS measures require
internal dedication throughout the organization (Rittner, Barrett, and Wilson 2007).
Intraorganizational activities are often presented as prevention and response measures.
Prevention measures suggest that steps can be taken to reduce the likelihood of
becoming a victim (Dugan and Apel 2005). For example, governments have increasingly
used prevention strategies if deterrence does not work or apply (Cha 2000). Prevention
measures avert security breaches by wearing down the perpetrator (Gopal and Sanders
1997). Anecdotes and the popular press would suggest that prevention measures are the
most popular way to secure a supply chain. For example, a SCS expert suggests that “it
makes far more sense in terms of time, money, resources, and aggravation to dedicate
your efforts to preventing problems from happening,” (Quinn 2003, p.41).
Closs and McGarrell (2004) provide examples of prevention activities by
organizations that have a high emphasis on SCS. These include using positive match
requirements for production and inventory receipt quantities, requiring satellite tracking
of trucks and containers, controlling access to employee parking, and performing
unannounced inspections on carriers. Prevention measures are also suggested by Hess
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and Wrobleski (1996) who state that protection for shippers and carriers come from
personnel security, accepted processes, and secure packaging. Finally, some additional
prevention measures discussed with SCS include locking all external doors, using
security gates and fences, employee badges, monitoring everyone who enters facilities,
hiring guards, better and emergency lighting of facilities, and prohibiting visitors and
passenger vehicles (Knight 2003; Rice and Spayd 2005).
A specific type of prevention activity is detection, whereby SCS personnel are
warned of an impending intrusion or breach so that proper actions can be taken to thwart
the breach. Specifically, detecting can be defined as the “process of distinguishing a true
problem from the sometimes considerable variations of normal day-to-day business,”
(Sheffi 2005, p.155). A detection related SCS activity is using closed circuit television
(Knight 2003). Detection is becoming more possible as firms have created security teams
(Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept 2006) which make comparisons between expectations and
behavior for detecting atypical activities (O’Leary 1992). Researchers in SCS discuss the
detection process as having two facets: training to understand detection actvities and the
detection process itself (Helferich and Cook 2002). Training helps members of the
supply chain understand what should be considered normal business operations. When
anything in the supply chain falls outside of what has been identified as normal
operations, members of the supply chain understand that something is wrong.
Another interorganizational approach is presented by Lee and Wolfe (2003) and
Lee and Whang (2005) that suggests organizations adopt concepts from philosophies
such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and Six Sigma to assist in SCS. For example,
in manufacturing processes, quality should be built into the product in an effort to reduce
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inspections. Similarly, these researchers suggest that organizations use preventative
measures before shipments leave the producer’s dock to prevent tampering and avoid
inspections from the government. The initial inspection process would then blend into
ongoing monitoring of the shipments. This would allow for detection, in the event that
something happened during the movement of goods (Lee and Whang 2005). For
example, organizations should define what is to be measured, track and monitor using a
measurement system, and analyze the out-of-control points. Also, RFID tags have been
identified as a security initiative for detection. The technique was originally adopted by
SCM to help track inventory to avoid stockouts. However, increased security has also
been an outcome of the technology. For example, consumers in Japan can gather
information about a cow before purchasing beef products in the retail outlet (Eggers
2004). The process allows the consumer to feel secure and buy with confidence as a
mysterious stop along the supply chain would send up red flags prompting an
investigation into the supply. The adoption of such practices should have other benefits,
such as greater organizational efficiencies (Lee and Wolfe 2003).
A portion of SCS prevention literature has specifically focused on inventory
levels as an area of interest. This is likely due to inventory serving as a potential target
and also serving as a critical component to remediate a breach. Normative suggestions
include segmentation tactics for inventory, including groups for international, domestic,
dangerous, and high-value (Knight 2003). Further, Martha and Subbakrishna (2002)
suggest that just-in-time operations are dangerous because they rely on organizations to
run very lean. In the event of SCS disruptions, the inability to serve customers can cause
customer defection. However, as additional levels of inventory oppose supply chain
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efficiency, research has suggested the use of alternative ways to address the issue of
inventory. Martha and Subbakrishna (2002) suggest alternative supply arrangements,
having alternative transportation available to distribute the inventory, and managing the
right levels of inventory (which will be different for every organization). Sheffi (2002)
supports using a dual inventory system where a certain amount of inventory is designated
as strategic emergency stock, where stock is held and only used in extreme situations.
Also, decision models can help logistics managers determine the equipment and supplies
needed during critical times. Traditionally, location science has been used by logistics
managers to develop an optimized site for holding inventory. In the interest of supply
chain recovery, Hale and Moberg (2005) suggest using the technology to determine
optimized locations and levels of critical emergency supplies.
Even with all the prevention measures in place, SCS breaches are likely to occur.
As a result, additional intraorganizational SCS activities include the ability to respond.
Research has suggested that firms should have a detailed understanding of their own
processes and security threats, and how these two factors interact (e.g., Rittner et al.
2007). This view of security includes intraorganizational understanding of transportation
security, shipping and storage, facility security, personnel security, and information
security. In addition to understanding current processes, organizations may need to make
additional efforts to create new emergency processes that dictate how to continue
operations in the event of a SCS breach (Sheffi 2001). This may include activities such
as documentation, process flow, hierarchy, checklists, maps, and agreements for critical
supplies, materials, and backup communication (Helferich and Cook 2002).
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Additionally, there is a strong emphasis placed on internal standardization in response as
it allows for quick recovery after a SCS situation (Sheffi 2002).
Arguably, the most important part of intraorganizational security efforts is
organizational culture. Rice and Spayd (2005) refer to this as the process of “socializing
security” (p.43). This is the process of creating and enhancing a sense of SCS among
employees. The main factors involved with the socialization of security throughout the
organizational culture are the structure of the firm, leadership, skill sets of the employees,
employee education of security issues, and training. However, Rice and Spayd (2005)
posit that potential harm from security efforts can come from building a false sense of
security. As a result, if SCS efforts are implemented, the failure to link them with
organizational performance can allow for many security programs to become stale
(Quinn 2003) or abandoned.

Interorganizational SCS
It is not surprising that the foundation of interorganizational approaches is also
prevalent in SCS literature. It has been suggested that the only way to succeed is
collaborating SCS with others (Knight, 2003), particularly with upstream and
downstream supply chain partners (Sheffi 2005b) and the government (Closs and
McGarrell 2004). Further, it has been suggested that the improved relationships between
public and private entities will be the future of SCS (Sheffi 2001). In their research, Rice
and Spayd (2005) had one organization suggest that its entire security plan was to
become Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) certified, which is a
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primary U.S. Government public-private security initiative. This is just one example of
an organization partnering with entities external to the organization to create SCS.
The SCS interorganizational approach is focused on organizational relationships
with 1) other supply chain members, 2) public entities (governments and non-government
agencies such as Red Cross), and even 3) competitors. Each is discussed below.
SCS Relationships with Other Supply Chain Members
SCS may be the result of efforts being co-created between organizations and the
upstream and downstream members (Rice and Spayd 2005). Further, it requires
organizations to develop deep relationships with suppliers and customers (Rice and
Caniato 2003). This requires more collaboration with suppliers and customers to create a
secure supply chain that is able to bounce back quickly when a breach does happen. In
fact, collaboration between supply chain members has been presented as critical to SCS
(Sheffi 2005b). However, this may be easier said than done, as many are unaware of
what their suppliers are doing in terms of security and continuity (Rittner, Barrett, and
Wilson 2007).
Security can be implemented as part of supply chain strategy once an organization
understands its relationships with suppliers (Rinehart, Myers, and Eckert 2004). As a
result, the first step to creating a secure supply chain is to understand the varying types of
relationships with suppliers. Rinehart, Myers, and Eckert (2004) present seven types of
supplier relationships, which are founded on trust, interaction frequency, and
commitment. Once a firm identifies which type of relationship it has with each supplier,
it can then begin to focus on security with that supplier. This suggests that not all
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relationships are equal, thus not all security efforts should be equal. The security
segmentation philosophy is similar to Giunipero and Eltantawy (2004) who suggest that
suppliers whose products need higher levels of security require more dedication and
attention. As a result, different SCS activities may be required with different supply
chain partners.
SCS Relationships with Public Entities
Another key theme in SCS literature is the interaction between private and public
agencies. Normative research suggests that organizations should be creating
relationships with government agencies to become more secure (Rice and Caniato 2003).
For example, research has evaluated how importing from Canada has changed due to
updated security measures imposed by the U.S. government (Prokop 2004). As such,
governmental partnerships and working with customs and trade agencies are stressed as
critical components of SCS. In this instance, relationships with government agencies
may be as important as relationships with other supply chain members. Since 9/11, there
have been multiple government initiatives designed to specifically address SCS. The
most popular and advertised programs are described below.
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) – The primary goal of
the Customs and Border Protection group is to prevent terrorists and their
weapons from entering the United States. As a result, the government is
partnering with private firms to ensure security. It is a voluntary program
whereby organizations work with the Department of Homeland security to verify
that their supply chains are secure. In addition, the program requires that firms
show that they have a security plan that is broad and covers the entire supply
chain (Eggers 2004).
Fast and Secure Trade (FAST) – The program, designed under the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), was created to expedited shipments for partners
working in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The program is designed to allow low41

risk security threats expedited crossing of the North American borders (Customs
and Border Patrol website 2007).
Container Security Initiative (CSI) – The initiative is a four phase process by the
U.S. Customs Service. First, develop criteria to identify high-risk containers.
Second, pre-screen containers before they arrive at U.S. ports. Third, use
advances in technology to screen containers that have been tagged as high risk.
Fourth, assist in the adoption of smart containers (Eggers 2004).
Safe and Secure Tradelanes (SST) – The program allows shipping containers to
be monitored from its point of origin to the point of destination (Eggers 2004). It
was started by the largest ports in the world. This initiative uses technology
developed by the Department of Defense to track military shipments all over the
globe (Gonzalez 2004).
Advanced Manifest Rule (AMR) – The goal of AMR is to provide accurate
manifest information. For example, transportation providers using ships that
originate in foreign ports bound for the U.S. must report a detailed manifest to the
U.S. Government 24 hours in advance of any cargo being loaded on the ship
(Eggers 2004). Other modes of transportation also have designated time frames
to provide a manifest in advance.
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) - The law was
created in order to help local communities from chemical hazards. Each state is
required to divide into districts and name a emergency planning committee for
each. The collective committee includes public, private, media, and emergency
managers (Environmental Protections Agency Website 2007).
ISO/PAS 28000:2005 – The International Standardization Organization (ISO)
designation is specifically designed to create standards in supply chain security.
Those participating in this program have indicated that they are making efforts to
secure their operations. The functions that are included in this designation are
finance, manufacturing, information management, and physical facilities used to
pack, store, or transfer goods (International Standardization Organization website
2007).
Academic research has investigated the relationships between some government
programs and private security efforts. For example, Sheu, Lee, and Niehoff (2006)
conducted a case study to determine the impact of C-TPAT certification on international
supply chain collaboration. Their findings suggested that most (4 out of 5 cases in their
research) organizations found benefit in C-TPAT certification through border inspections,
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cost reduction, and increased customer satisfaction. All case subjects reported improved
relationships with supply partners and increased security among international partners.
An inference from this research suggests that working together in a cooperative manner
has benefit for the public and private sector. This notion is supported by Thibault,
Brooks, and Button (2006). In their quantitative research, they interviewed 24 top
management personnel from shipping importers and port authorities. Their findings
indicated the biggest benefit to security initiatives have been the increased cooperative
nature between the government and industry. Future collaboration between these two
sectors is likely.
SCS Relationships with Competitors
Recent research suggests that alliances with competitors can have positive
organizational performance, if managed correctly (Luo, Rindfleisch, and Tse 2007). SCS
presents similar situations, whereby competitors sometimes serve as collaborators. In
some instances, it has been suggested that firms that are competing in the same market
place have collaborated for the sake of security. An illustration of this comes from India.
There is a cooperative group of manufacturers who compete with one another, but who
have also worked together in an effort to ensure SCS while at the same time, ensuring
continued operations of their own. The organizations investigated imported goods to
India, where government security efforts prohibited the supply to be released for to a
month or longer. As a result, competing firms work together and create coping
mechanisms that are utilized to handle the customs clearance importation process. The
coping mechanism involves sharing inventories with one another. In other words, they
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pool their risk and as a whole, lowered uncertainty, while at the same time working with
the government to create and allow for secure supply chains (Sawhney and Sumukadas
2005). The coordinated efforts of sharing knowledge and creating best practices among
competitors can also be referred to as horizontal integration (Sheffi 2002) and is
supported by SCS researchers (Sheffi 2005b).

Combination of Intra and Inter Approaches to SCS
While intra- and interorganizational activities have been presented above as
separate philosophies, at times combinations of both activities are needed to create SCS.
For example, Sheffi (2001) states that SCS can be created from not sharing too much
proprietary information with other organizations (intraorganizational), reducing the
supplier base (intraorganizational), managing inventory in a central location
(intraorganizational), and cooperating with the government and competitors
(interorganizational).
In order to address the possibility of becoming a medium for administering
terrorism, Russell and Saldanha (2003) suggest five tenets of SCS:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

partner with government organizations
create stronger relationships with suppliers and customers
create contingency plans and mode-shifting capabilities
create communication channels to manage crisis situations
adopt a military philosophy of agility, reservists, and pre-positioning

In these five tenets, one is able to identify the intra- and interorganizational dichotomy.
The first two tenets suggest organizations need to work with external organizations
(interorganizational) to create SCS, while the last three promote the use of internal
activities for SCS (intraorganizational). While there is a dichotomy, Russell and
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Saldanha (2003) present these activities as an entire SCS strategy, again suggesting that
SCS is the result of a combination of intra- and interorganizational activities. Other SCS
philosophies that focus on a combination of intra- and interorganizational activities are
SCS orientation and total security management. These are discussed below.
Research indicates that firms have varying levels of SCS awareness (Autry and
Bobbitt forthcoming). This variation in security mindedness is called Supply Chain
Security Orientation (SCSO), which is defined as
A firm’s organization wide propensity to partner, plan, adapt, collaborate, and
communicate, both internally and with external trading partners and governmental
entities, toward the dual goals of strategically preventing and responding to
potential security breaches and the minimization of risk that threaten the
performance and/or continuity of supply chain operations, (Autry and Bobbitt
forthcoming).
Thus, a SCSO can be viewed as an organization’s propensity or intensity to expend
resources to ensure safe supply chain operations. Further, in the decision to expend
resources to create SCS, organizations should assess internal and external activities. The
internal/external dichotomy of SCCO mirrors the intraorganizational/interorganizational
dichotomy.
Similar to SCSO, Rittner, Barrett, and Wilson (2007) suggest adopting the total
security management (TSM) approach to SCS. The authors define this approach as
the business practice of developing and implementing comprehensive risk
management and security best practices for a firm’s entire value chain. This
includes an evaluation of suppliers, distribution channels, and internal policies
and procedures in terms of preparedness for disruptive events such as terrorism,
political upheaval, natural disasters, and significant accidents (p. 17).
In the TSM approach, firms are encouraged to take an approach that includes
internal and external activities. For example, TSM implies using a continuous
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improvement philosophy for SCS. TSM is founded on the notion of continuous
improvement, total quality management, and six sigma philosophies. To adopt and
utilize these philosophies as SCS actions, internal efforts are required to implement these
activities. Second, Rittner et al. (2007) suggest that to achieve total security, involvement
from everyone throughout the value chain is critical. This would include upstream
suppliers, downstream customers, logistical providers, and the governmental agencies
which are responsible for overseeing the process. This assertion is focused on the
external efforts of the organization.

Ignore
Some firms have shown reluctance to adopt any security initiatives (Eggers 2004).
For example, many ports based in the U.S. have taken a limited approach to security and
implemented no security initiatives (Thibault, Brooks, and Button 2006). The reluctance
to implement security efforts is likely due to two primary reasons: cost and level of risk.
Organizations expend large amounts of resources trying to secure their supply chains.
The best estimates for costs of security in SCM is approximately $65 billion (Bernasek
2002). There are likely an excessive amount of indirect costs are not included in that
estimate. As a result, some firms do not or can not justify the costs that security efforts
take. Rather, they choose to gamble that their supply chain will not be breached.
Some industries may be more prone to ignore SCS. Leading global shipper and
carrier firms have also indicated that little to no security efforts have been taken within
their organizations (Rice and Spayd 2005). The reason behind this view is that firms
assume an attack to the supply chain will affect all firms equally. This view suggests that
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breaches to supply chains are going to happen and everyone will be impacted. Thus,
security efforts are ineffective.
SCS has proved to be an area of interest to academic researchers, especially after
9/11. In particular, normative literature suggests that SCS is the result of
intraorganizational, interorganizational activities, or a combination of both. However,
because of its complexity and scope, SCS literature has yet to develop SCS best practices
and strategies (Closs and McGarrell 2004; Hale and Moberg 2005). As a result, the next
section will evaluate organizational strategy and organizational performance and linkages
with SCS.
SCM, Organizational Strategy, and Links to Performance
Strategy, from an organizational perspective, refers to plans or decisions that
integrate the goals, policies, and actions of an organization (Mintzberg and Quinn 1991).
Porter (1980) defines strategy as a formula that depicts how a business is going to
compete, what the goals should be, and what policies are needed to carry out the goals.
That is similar to Steiner and Miner (1977) who purport that strategy is the focus on the
creation of organizational mission and objectives, the policies to achieve them, and the
activities to implement the goals. Finally, there has also been focus on management to
enact the strategic process. Hunt and Morgan (1997) suggest similar views of strategy,
that it is the role of management to enact the strategy process, which in turn should lead
to financial performance.
The core of strategic management is the determination as to why some firms
perform better than others (Barnett, Greve, and Park 1994). Performance, however it
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may be defined, has been suggested to be the goal of the organization. For example,
Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1994) suggest that the objective of the organization is
superior performance. Further, Moyer, Mcguigan, and Rao (2005), state that the primary
goal of the firm is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders. Firm performance also
allows for the firm to continue operations and continue to pursue its goals (Cleverly and
Cameron 2002). Most importantly, however, is that performance is critical to
organizations and strategy because if it cannot be measured, it cannot be managed (Das
1994).
While investigating performance has long been of interest of researchers, coming
to a consensus definition has been difficult (Cameron and Whetten 1981; Ford and
Schellenberg 1982). It has been defined as the process of evaluating progress in
comparison to a predetermined goal (Rose 1995). Nash (1983) points out that performing
is the process of carrying out responsibility, while performance is the outcome. It has
also been described as quantifying efficiency and effectiveness of actions (Neely,
Gregory, and Platts 1995). Performance is the measure of what degree the organization
has reached the market and financial goals they have set for themselves (Yamin et al.
1999). Finally, performance can be viewed as actions that organizations partake in and
finish to accomplish goals for the purpose of profit generation (Sink 1991).
Since debate exists as to what performance is, it is not surprising to find
discrepancies in how performance is assessed. Some suggest that to be meaningful,
performance needs to be expressed in a quantitative nature (Macleod et al. 1997). As a
result, performance of an organization is often viewed through the traditional financial
lens that focuses squarely on financial balance sheet items (Venkatraman and
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Ramanujam 1986). However, recent research on performance suggests that performance
is more than financial measures. Nicholas (1979) suggests that performance of the
organization is related to its external environment. Further, Venkatraman and
Ramanujam (1986) suggest that market share, new product introduction, product quality,
marketing effectiveness, and manufacturing value-add are also non-financial measures of
how well a firm is performing.
Often, researchers in strategic marketing and management have measured
performance using subjective measures (e.g., Dess and Robinson 1984; Robinson and
Pearce 1988; Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986). This is the result of actual financial
measures being difficult, and in some cases impossible, to obtain (cf. Matsuno, Mentzer,
and Ozsomer 2002). However, the subjective measures of financial performance have
been shown to be a good surrogate for objective financial measures (e.g., Dess and
Robinson 1984).
Through evidence of its existence and positive outcomes, SCM has been viewed
from a strategic vantage point. SCM is a key element in strategic corporate planning
(Tan, Lyman, and Wisner 2002). SCM is not only necessary for staying competitive, it
may be necessary for survival (Monczka, Trent, and Handfield 1998). As a result, SCM
needs to synchronize with the overall organization strategy (Spekman et al. 1998). The
overall goal of SCM is to improve effectiveness and efficiency to achieve
competitiveness that results in profitability (Min and Mentzer 2004). With the linkage to
competition and profitability, SCM has been viewed as a strategic initiative for
organizations.
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Supply Chain Management and Organizational Performance
Supply chain strategies and their linkage to performance is an important area of
research (e.g., Lynch, Keller, Ozment 2000; Morash 2006). Mentzer et al. (2001)
propose that the successful implementation of SCM improves performance for each
individual party and for the entire supply chain. Empirical testing has found support for
this linkage (Min and Mentzer 2004). As such, SCM has evolved to include
intraorganizational (among departments) and interorganizational (with suppliers and
customers) cooperation and partnerships with the goal of cost savings and customer
service (Min and Mentzer 2004). With this arrangement, it would not be uncommon to
find manufacturers working with suppliers to help them become more efficient or the
sharing of what was once very proprietary information.
When the concept of SCM was first presented to organizations, it was often
adopted for its impact on quality, delivery, or ability to eliminate waste (Tan, Lyman, and
Wisner 2002). However, the link between SCM and performance has been well
researched and supported. Successful SCM has been shown to be positively correlated
with organizational performance (e.g., D’Avanzo, von Lewinski, and Van Wassenhove
2003; Slater and Narver 2000; Tracey 1998), which is often viewed as return on
investment, profits as a percentage of sales, market share, and net income (Anderson and
Katz 1998; Carr and Pearson 2002; Tan, Kannan, and Handfield 1998). Thus, it is
suggested that firms searching for competitive advantages and financial performance
should take a proactive approach to SCM (Gunasekaran et al. 2004). This requires
organizations at all positions in the supply chain (i.e., suppliers, manufacturers, and
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customers) to be aligned (Tan et al. 1999). Integration of a supply chain can result in
productivity, customer responsiveness, process improvements, enhanced responsiveness,
and cost reductions (Narasimhan and Jayaram 1998; Narasimhan and Kim 2001). In
addition, organizations need to align their capabilities with the adopted overall
organizational strategy to achieve superior performance (Lynch, Keller, and Ozment
2000). As a result, successful management of the supply chain results in long-term
success (Tan et al. 1999).
Another indication that SCM activities have an impact on the performance of an
organization comes from researching what happens when the supply chain does not
perform adequately. Research indicates that announcements of glitches or disruptions of
a supply chain have been shown to decrease shareholder value. In their research,
Hendricks and Singhal (2003) use event analysis to find that the announcements of
supply chain disruptions resulted in decreased shareholder value of nearly 11 percent.
Also, supply chain disruptions can have negative impacts on operating performance
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005a). Further research in this area suggests that the decrease is
the result of the actual and anticipated drop in profitability, not the reaction to bad news
or publicity (Hendricks and Singhal 2005b).
SCM is not limited to having positive impacts on financial measures. Research
suggests that supply chains, if managed effectively, should lead to customer value and
satisfaction, in addition to profitability (Mentzer et al. 2001). Customer service is the
outcome of the supply chain system. Integration activities leads to positive firm
performance, but is mediated through customer service (Vickery, Jayram, Droge, and
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Calantone 2003). This suggests that successful SCM impacts traditional financial
measures and non-financial measures, such as customer satisfaction.
While much interest has been dedicated to how SCM impacts the performance of
the organization, there is also interest in the impact of SCS on firm performance.
Supply Chain Security and Organizational Performance
Given the amount of resources and efforts dedicated to securing supply chains,
research has investigated the impacts, if any, on organizational performance. The
consulting firm BearingPoint found a relationship between security initiatives and
financial benefits. They studied the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, where
implemented RFID technology and electronic seals were used to track containers from
Thailand to distribution centers in Seattle, WA. The findings revealed that financial
benefits were obtained from the security efforts, including improvements in visibility,
avoiding cost on imports, reductions in safety stock, improved customer service,
increased profit, and reductions in theft. Assigning a dollar figure, BearingPoint (2003)
estimated savings at $150-$2000 per container. This analysis is important as it reveals
three important cost-benefit tradeoffs: 1) the cost to the service provider to establish the
program versus the increased revenue, 2) the costs that a shipper is willing to pay for the
increased service versus the increased security and efficiency received, and 3) the
increased security and lower probability of a terror attack the public will receive. These
are often the core to decision-making in security efforts. This illustrates the need to
quantify the potential positive benefits that can come from security efforts in the supply
chain, especially give the costs of implementing such a program.
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In their comprehensive study, Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept (2006) conducted
research on how innovative manufacturing companies approach security efforts on the
premise that most companies view SCS from a negative perspective. That is, most
companies view security as an expense without benefit, which causes reluctance to invest
in SCS efforts. As a result, their research focused on illustrating the point that SCS
measures can lead to collateral benefits for organizations if security is approached in a
positive way. The researchers compiled five areas that could be potentially impacted by
security efforts:
•
•
•
•
•

Inventory management and customer service
Visibility
Efficiency
Resilience
Customer relationships

A survey was then created which included a list of potential benefits that could be
impacted from each of the five categories. For example, efficiency included questions
about reductions in shipping delays, inspection delays, and lead-time variance. In all,
there were 56 specific items asked of each respondent. Each respondent was asked if
security initiatives contributed to a listed benefit. The respondent could respond as
“Yes”, “No”, or “Don’t Know.” If “Yes” was selected, the respondent was given space
to write in a percentage by which the security initiative had positively impacted the
potential outcome. For example, a respondent was asked if he had received a reduction
in inaccurate shipping information as a result of security initiatives, he could indicate yes,
no, or don’t know. Also, he could write in an estimated percentage as to how much he
felt he had a reduction in inaccurate shipping information. The researchers then
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contacted firms which they felt were “innovators” in SCS. This led to a survey of eleven
manufacturing firms and three ocean carriers/logistics providers. After completing and
returning the questionnaire, a phone interview was conducted with the respondents.
The researchers concluded that the innovative firms surveyed had positive
benefits from their security efforts. The firms found that their security efforts led to
improvements in profitability, relationships, and internal operations. Specific findings
for manufacturers are listed in Table 3.
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Table 3
Significant Benefits from Security Efforts for Manufacturers
IMPROVEMENT
AREA
Improved Product
Safety
Improved Inventory
Management
Improved Supply
Chain Visibility
Improved Product
Handling
Process Improvements
More Efficient
Customs Clearance
Process
Speed Improvements

SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS
38% reduction in theft
14% reduction in excess
inventory
50% increase in access to supply
chain data
43% increase in automated
handling of goods
30% reduction in process
deviations
49% reduction in cargo delays
29% reduction in transit time

Resilience

Close to 30% reduction in
problem identification time

Higher Customer
Satisfaction

26% reduction in customer
attrition rate

From Peleg-Gillai et al. 2006
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37% reduction in
tampering
12% increase in ontime delivery
30% increase in
timeliness of shipping
data

48% reduction in
cargo inspections
28% reduction in
delivery time
Close to 30%
reduction in response
time and problem
resolution time
20% increase in the
number of new
customers

While security efforts may have positive benefit for the firm, Rice and Spayd
(2005) investigated how efforts to increase security may lead to collateral benefits for the
firm. This research, which involves semi-structured interviews with senior supply chain
executives and security leaders from global shippers and carriers, is part of an ongoing
project at MIT called “Supply Chain Response to Terrorism.” The findings indicate that
security collateral benefits make a firm less prone to disruption and improve the
capability of bouncing back. In other words, resources dedicated to securing the supply
chain have a more global positive impact other than creating security. Further, these
collateral benefits may create competitive advantages. The researchers found eleven
security initiatives which organizations could participate in to realize collateral benefits.
A summary of investments and benefits are illustrated in Table 4.
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Table 4
Supply Chain Security Investment Options and Collateral Benefits
Supply Chain Security Investment
Option
Asset Visibility and Tracking

Collateral Benefit
Reduce Theft
Reduce delays in shipping
Protection of brand name
Higher employee commitment
Increased sales, customer loyalty, and
market share
Reduced equipment damage
Fewer safety incidents
Customer loyalty
Improved efficiency
Reduce non-security losses
Overall higher performance
Lower inspection costs
Faster throughput
Improved relationships and
collaboration
Reduce crime and vandalism
Reduced transportation cycle time
Fewer supply chain disruptions
Increased problem prevention
Increased early intervention
Improved ability to respond
Platform for broader alignment
Creation of secure supply chain network
Improved communication
Ability to customize application
Increase process efficiency
Provide real-time awareness
Reduction in safety stock
Higher levels of performance
Greater visibility to discern bottlenecks
Faster border throughput times
Develop mandatory standards
Higher levels of process performance

Personnel Security
Physical Security
Standards Development
Supplier Selection and Investment

Transportation and Conveyance
Security
Org Infrastructure Awareness and
Capabilities
Collaboration Among Supply Chain
Parties
Proactive Technology Investments
TQM Investments
Voluntary Security Compliance
From Rice and Spayd (2005)
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The SCS paradigm has a broad background. In general, SCS can be viewed as a
holistic approach. However, as there are various views about security, there are
discrepancies in how firms view and approach security. Many researchers have
suggested that SCS is a process and thus firms should adopt the layered approach.
Finally, there are preliminary findings that indicate that the creation of SCS can lead to
positive organizational performance.
The above literature review has presented discussions of supply chains, SCM, and
SCS. As this dissertation research is focused on SCS, it was necessary to build a solid
foundation of these literatures. However, it is also necessary to present the theoretical
underpinning of why security efforts are taken by organizations. This theoretical
grounding will assist in model development and establishing a priori expectations (model
development). Institutional Theory provides such a foundation. The following section
presents this theory.
Institutional Theory
Organizations are not only production systems; they are also social and cultural
systems (Scott 2001). Due to their social and cultural characteristics, firms are
susceptible to external pressures. These external environmental pressures create
expectations for organizations to adopt and adhere to. According to Greening and Gray
(1994), Institutional Theory explains managerial action generated by external force. The
external environmental demands can induce organizations to adopt roles in society and
create appearances (Hatch 1997), which may not be of the original intention of the
organization. As a result, organizational choices and actions are constrained and
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influenced by norms, habits, and customs of the environment (Oliver 1997a). This is
known as Institutional Theory and has been a catalyst to researchers understanding how
environmental pressures impact and shape individual organization structures and actions
(Goodstein 1994).
The main thrust of Institutional Theory is that organizations operate in a social
network (Oliver 1997a), whereby organizational practices are caused by and influenced
through social rules and rules of thumb (Ingram and Simons 1995). Selznick (1957), a
pioneering developer of Institutional Theory, suggests in his seminal work that
organizations are influenced by social behaviors, norms and values in their external
environment. Furthermore, Institutional Theory suggests that a social reality is created
and defined by the environment in which an organization operates. This reality is created
by the values and norms accepted in a particular environment (Scott 1987). As a result,
the social reality becomes the guideline for social behavior (Scott 2005). In other words,
Institutional Theory explains corporate behavior and suggests how organizations are
influenced and molded by other organizations and environmental factors though
conforming to standards set by the environment (e.g., Hoffman 1997; Scott 2001) to
survive and excel. The following will present a review of Institutional Theory and its
related concepts.
Organizational Fields
An organizational field is defined as “organizations that constitute a recognized
area of institutional life, such as: key suppliers, resource and product consumers,
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar devices or products,”
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 148). Organizations are members of fields that contain
similar organizations who compete against one another, but who also all share suppliers
and customers. In addition, the organizational field also contains governmental agencies,
professional and trade organizations, and the general public (Marshall, Cordano, and
Silverman 2005).
The members of the organizational field have the capability to assert influence
(including coercive, normative, and cognitive) on one another (Scott 1991). Hoffman
(1999) points out that the organizational field is formed around issues that bring together
various organizations/actors with unrelated purposes. As a result, while members of an
organizational field can exert influence on each other and others, it is also occupied by
organizations with many different beliefs and attitudes (Hoffman 1999). Organizational
field and external environment is used synonymously throughout the rest of this
discussion.
The organizational field has the ability to create norms and influence what others
within or who want to join the field should be doing. Over time, these norms, values, and
activities can become standards. In this regard, the standards that the organizational field
has adopted will become known as institutionalized.
Institutionalization
Selznick (1957) suggests that the process of something becoming institutionalized
is the process by which a structure or organizational form becomes instilled with value.
Specifically, an institution has been defined as “rules, norms, and beliefs that describe
reality for the organization, explaining what is and what is not, what can be acted upon
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and what cannot,” (Hoffman 1999, p. 351). Thus, something that is institutionalized is
widely and unconditionally accepted by the external environment. Further, the external
environment will create pressure for other organizations to accept the institutionalized
norms, values, and practices. Something becomes institutionalized when it is well
approved and commonly accepted by other organizations in the environment without
question (Selznick 1957, Tolbert and Zucker 1996, Zucker 1977).
Institutionalization creates processes and structures that are appropriate and
necessary (Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Institutionalized rules in the modern society are
responsible for the elaborate formal organizations that exist today (Meyer and Rowan
1977). For example, Kirby and Kirby (1996) find evidence for institutionalization of
social values among individual nations as the result of global pressures. However,
organizations can also fail to adopt institutionalized activities. If this is the case,
organizations are vulnerable to scrutiny of being negligent, irrational, or unnecessary
(Maier 2005). For example, many environment watchdog groups watch pollution
activities of manufacturers. If any manufacturer does not abide by governmental laws,
legal sanctions can be garnered. If any manufacturer does not abide by another social
norm, the watchdog group can provide negative publicity and unwanted scrutiny.
The institutionalized norms, values, and behaviors will need to be adopted in
order for an organization to be recognized as part of the organizational field. The
adoption of these activities is also known as the search for legitimacy.
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Legitimacy
The heart of Institutional Theory is that organizations have the desire and need to
adopt rules and practices as created by the external environment (DiMaggio and Powell
1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977), that are beyond the control of the firm (Hoffman 1997).
This desire is bred by a social construction as it joins legitimized behaviors and share
beliefs of a group (Suchman 1995). In other words, organizations have the desire or need
to feel as though they belong with others in their environment. Firms adopt
institutionalized behaviors to become legitimate in their environment (Zucker 1987). For
example, empirical evidence indicates that companies proactively adopt environmental
strategies to achieve greater legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland 2004; Darnell 2006).
Legitimacy is defined as “a perception that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper,
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). This indicates that legitimacy is the belief that
certain behaviors or practices are something that everyone in the environment should do.
In fact, firms can gain legitimacy by blending in with other firms (Peteraf and Shanley
1997). The process of becoming legitimate is the result of an organization conforming to
the external environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). However, this conforming to the
environment can have both positive and negative effects.
Legitimacy is important for organizations as it creates the perception of
credibility, persistence, and meaningfulness within the environment (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Seeking and creating legitimacy has additional
benefits, such as increased resources and survival capabilities. Thus, when an
organization pursues legitimacy, it is actually seeking support and survival within its
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environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, this legitimacy may not always be
beneficial. It is suggested that striving for external legitimacy can sometimes lead to
inefficient internal operations (Meyer and Rowan 1977). As such, organizations may
seek social legitimacy over efficiency and profits (Suchman 1995). While other theories,
such as comparative advantage theory of competition (Hunt and Morgan 1995), suggest
profit maximization, Institutional Theory suggests that social legitimacy, which can
conflict with profit maximization, is a key piece of organizational behaviors (Suchman
1995). The desire or need to be legitimate in an environment may cause the adoption of
values or practices that take away from efficient and effective operations currently held
by an organization. Therefore, Institutional Theory is a way to answer questions
concerning the role of institutional influence on social choices (Powell and DiMaggio
1991). Institutional pressure is discussed in more detail next.
Institutional Pressure and Isomorphism
As stated above, organizations feel the necessity to adopt the policies, procedures,
practices, and actions of other organizations operating in an institutional environment to
achieve legitimacy. Those who adopt will not only increase their legitimacy but may also
increase their possibility of survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The process by which
organizations begin to adopt similarities and create a homogenous set of organizations is
known as isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Isomorphic actions are developed
from the set of environmental standards which force organizations to mirror one another
(Fennell and Alexander 1987) and these actions lead organizations to become legitimized
and accepted by society (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Scott (1998) suggests that “by
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incorporating institutional rules within their own structure, organizations become more
homogenous, more similar in structure over time,” (p. 213). Therefore, when
organizations adopt the legitimized elements from the external environment,
isomorphism is achieved and the likelihood of survival is often increased (Zucker 1987).
As a result, all firms operating in an environment, who are deemed as legitimate, abide by
similar norms, values, and rules. However, as described with legitimacy, as firms
become more homogenous, they risk efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
As organizational fields develop and formalize, they begin to apply pressure to
one another and on others. Isomorphic responses are the actions that an organization
takes in response to pressure from the environment. The actions are consistent with
others in the environment. Organizations conform to pressures presented by the
environment because they are rewarded for doing so (Scott 1987). These continued
actions will help to institutionalize organizational structures, practices, and norms
(George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, and Barden 2006). As an example of Institutional
Theory, Greening and Gray (1994) used institutional source variables such as public
interest and group pressure, media exposure, and crises to predict issue management
structural development. The researchers hypothesized that the greater the institutional
variables, the more a firm will exhibit an issues management structure, for which their
empirical analysis found little support. Further, pressure is greater than economic
justifications; it includes social justifications and social obligations (Zukin and DiMaggio
1990). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), isomorphism is the result of three
types of external pressure: coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures.
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Coercive pressure
Coercive pressures result from force, persuasions, and invitations to participate
with other external environment members. Coercive institutional pressures often take the
form of governmental regulations or laws. For example, Oliver (1997b) provides an
example of coercive pressure as organizational compliance to government policies on
equal employment opportunities. Jennings and Zanderbergen (1995) cite the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) as sources of governmental legislation that has impacted organizational action.
Hoffman (1997) illustrates coercive pressure by illustrating that environmental strategies
are primarily adopted through fear of legal sanction. Others have suggested that adopting
voluntary environmental strategies, such an ISO 14001 certification, makes working with
governments and others much easier, and can lead to higher levels of trust (Darnell
2006). For example, in the chemical industry, it is informally assumed that these
organizations are stewards and they take measures to ensure they are not polluting the
environment. Also, there are formal governmental regulations which chemical
companies must abide by and voluntary ‘watch-dog’ groups that monitor these
organizations. Therefore, chemical companies not only adhere to informal social
responsibility pressures (normative pressures), they also adhere to formal forces of
regulation by the government and civic organizations (coercive pressures).
However, other sources of pressure in an environment exist. Other sources of
coercive pressure can be applied by others on which an organization is dependent, like a
customer organization. For example, in adopting environmentally friendly practices and
strategies, consumers can play a very important role in terms of what is expected of an
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organization (Darnell 2006). As a result, customers create policies and procedures that
they set forth and then apply pressure for exchange organizations to adopt these activities.
Often, coercive pressure is handed down by laws and regulations. As a result,
some firms are coerced into adopting these as they develop a fear of and try to avoid
sanctions (Scott 1995) and punishment (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).
In summary, coercive pressure comes from others who have the ability to apply
formal and informal pressure (Slack and Hinings 1994). Coercive pressure has been
linked to governments, customers (Khalifa and Davidson 2006; Teo et al. 2003), and
suppliers (Teo et al. 2003). Other researchers have referred to these pressures as market
forces (e.g., Darnall 2006).

Normative Pressure
The second source of institutional pressure is normative isomorphism which
comes from cultural expectations. With normative pressures, organizational choices are
influenced by values and norms. Values are conceptions of the preferred and desirable
blended together with the construction of standards, whereby existing behavior can be
compared. Norms specify how things should be done; they define the legitimate means
to pursue the valued end (Scott 1995, p. 37). Organizations conform because of moral
and ethical obligation and it is what is expected of them (Scott 1995). However, similar
to coercive pressures, the pressure may also come in the form of avoidance. For
example, by adopting and adhering to normative pressures, firms may reduce inspections
from other constituents (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These pressures usually result in rules
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of thumb, education curriculum, standard operating procedures, and occupational
standards (Hoffman 1999).
Normative pressures can come from a variety of sources. Normative institutions
include trade associations, professional associations, accrediting agencies, and
professions. These groups can create pressure for organizations to embrace accepted
norms and behaviors (Selznick 1984). However, society can also create normative
pressure for organizations. Firms interacting with society can result in institutional
behaviors that dictate corporate activities and strategies (Falkner 2003).
The primary cultural expectation from normative pressure arises from
professionalization, which is the “struggle of members of an occupation to define the
conditions and methods of their work to control the production of the producers and to
establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy,” (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983, p. 152). Professionalization, through empirical investigation, has been
shown to impact socially acceptable behaviors (March and March 1977). Similarities
result from common university educations and from the increased use of professional
organizations, trade associations, and networks. Education at universities assists in the
creation of a common body of knowledge for professionals. This common body of
knowledge can then be assessed and thus creates legitimacy for those who are able to
meet assessment requirements. Professional organizations then enhance and add to the
common knowledge of professionals by diffusing information of best practices in the
field. For example, professional associations exist for certified public accountants,
university professors, lawyers, doctors, etc. These associations not only set forth
standards for suitable behavior for professionals, but they also have the networking
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capability to legitimize those who adhere to the standards by being a resource for future
employment opportunities. In other words, the professionals that adhere to common
standards will have a better chance in the job market because their legitimacy as a
professional will be enhanced.
Summarizing normative pressures, they are cultural pressures in which norms and
standards in the operating environment are formed and which in turn guide decisionmaking (Khalifa and Davidson 2006). This pressure results from educational
organizations, trade associations, industry groups, interest groups, and public opinion
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1991).

Mimetic Pressure
The final type of pressure is mimetic institutional pressures which come from the
desire to look like other organizations by mimicking other organizations’ structures,
practices, or outputs. In other words, mimetic pressure comes from organizational
modeling of others within the organizational field (Oliver 1997b)
Mimetic pressures are often the result of environmental uncertainty, ambiguity in
the achievement of organizational goals, technological complexity, etc. When new or
problematic situations arise in the environment, organizations model themselves after
other organizations that they believe are adequately managing their business to survive
environmental conditions. Also, adopting practices that are deemed acceptable by the
organizational field may insulate the organization from criticism from competitors (King
and Lennox 2001).
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The organizations that serve as models do not intentionally serve as models,
rather they are viewed by other organizations as a “convenient source” (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, p.151) of information to reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, organizations
that are viewed as ‘innovators’ are often mimicked as other organizations seek to become
legitimized. A prime example of this action comes from a common marketing practice.
Often times, firms will use comparative advertising techniques whereby they compare
themselves or their products to the industry leader and explain why their products or
services are comparable or better than the leader. These actions result from organizations
modeling themselves after organizations in their field that they see to be similar but also
legitimate and successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For example, Khalifa and
Davison (2006) empirically assess mimetic pressures on the adoption of electronic
trading systems. Often, a mimetic force is measured by the perception of activities and
perceived success of the competition (Teo et al. 2003).
Environmentally friendly, green products and environmental marketing programs
are all excellent examples of mimetic pressures. Many of these programs have been
implemented without studying impact, but rather are the result of competitive pressure
(Jennings and Zanderbergen 1995). As organizations within an organizational field copy
the practices of one another, homogeneity of practices will result. Over a longer period
of time, this results in isomorphism whereby firms within the field look very similar as
the result of mimicking actions.
The members of an organizational field apply pressure to its members through
mimetic forces. Other pressure arises from normative and coercive power. However, as
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this pressure is applied, organizations have response options. There has been a stream of
literature to review strategic responses and that is presented next.
Strategic Responses to Environmental Pressure
Since its conceptualization, Institutional Theory has been heavily researched in
numerous areas (Oliver 1991). A recent trend is to gain an understanding of what
responses result from environmental pressure. In the traditional sense, organizations
within the same organizational field will gain similarities over time as they conform to
many common influences (i.e., DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977,
Scott 1987). For example, management literature has evaluated the role of Institutional
Theory on environmental issues. In research on the U.S. chemical industry, Hoffman
(1999) suggests that when external pressures are applied to organizations, the strategic
options to address the pressures are predetermined by the organizational field.
However, there are increases in strategic response actions, which is the result of
the evolution of the organizational field. Hoffman uses the recent developments in
environmentalism to discuss this. As the organizational field and strategic responses
have both evolved, this has resulted in a win-win situation. The win-win scenario comes
from through advances in environmental tactics and while at the same time realizing
economic gain for organizations. Other research has investigated how environmental
pressure has resulted in the adoption of information technology for conducting business.
Khalifa and Davison (2006) find that small and medium sized brokerage firms are
increasingly adopting electronic trading systems (ETS), which help to facilitate
transactions between buyers and sellers of securities, futures, and insurance options, as a
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result of institutional pressures. Through empirical analysis, they found that pressure
from customers, competitors, and employees (i.e., institutional pressures) cause firms to
utilize ETS. Finally, In SCM literature, Zsidisin, Melnyk, and Ragatz (2005) use
Institutional Theory as an explanation to why firms initiate business continuity planning.
Using a case study methodology, they suggest that organizations feel pressure from the
government, key customers, insurance companies, and corporate directives to create
business continuity plans. Their research illustrates that these sources create institutional
pressures, including coercive, mimetic, and normative. As a result of these pressures,
organizations are using business continuity plans to manage their risk levels. However,
the idea that all environmental pressures result in similar strategic responses has been
questioned. In particular, recent research asserts that firms adopt heterogeneous
responses to pressure from the environmental (e.g., Delmas and Toffel 2004, Oliver
1991).
Oliver (1991) was the first to evaluate the strategic response, or organizational
reaction, to the institutional pressures. She presents five generic strategies, each with
three tactics, which suggest firms react to institutional pressures in different ways. The
five strategies are acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation.
The acquiesce strategy suggests that firms will comply with the institutional
pressures. The three approaches associated with the acquiesce strategy are habit, imitate,
and comply. Habit is when organizations adopt actions unconditionally. The
environment has many norms and taken-for-granted rules, which end up being repeated
by others over time. An imitation approach is similar to mimetic pressure, whereby
organizations look to other successful organizations in the environment for guidance and
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modeling. Compliance is the process by which organizations obey and adopt institutional
norms.
The second strategy proposed by Oliver (1991) is a compromise strategy. The
environment may present expectations that are incompatible with internal operations and
goals. Three approaches of this strategy are balance, pacify, and bargain. Balance is the
process of accommodating internal interests and multiple stakeholders. Pacifying may
result in slight resistance to institutional pressures, while partially conforming.
Bargaining is an active form of compromising whereby organizations attempt to
negotiate terms with the environmental pressure.
The third strategy from Oliver’s (1991) typology is avoidance. The strategy of
avoidance is when organizations attempt to avoid compliance with environmental
pressure. The tactics involved with this are concealment, buffering, and escape.
Concealment is when organizations attempt to hide their nonconformance. Buffering is
the attempt by organizations to limit the external evaluation. Escape is the process of
eliminating the domain where the pressure is being applied. An example of this would be
when a firm stops producing a product that has been identified as environmentally
harmful and starts producing another product.
Fourth, the defiance strategy is the process whereby institutional pressures are
rejected. The three approaches for this strategy are dismissing, challenge, and attack.
Dismissing is the process of ignoring the environmental pressures all together. A
challenging approach is attempts to fight pressures, norms and regulations. Attacking is
process by which organizations discredit environmental pressures and the sources they
come from.
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The final organizational strategy to respond to institutional pressures is
manipulation. This strategy is the overt attempt to influence and control institutional
pressure. The three approaches are co-opt, influence, and control. Co-opting is trying to
co-produce the institutional pressure with another. Influence is the attempt to change the
perceptions of the institutional pressures. An example may be a lobbying organization
trying to change the public perception of a particular industry. Finally, a control
approach is a process by which organizations attempts to gain control over those who are
exerting pressure on them. The work presented by Oliver (1991) is important in that it
establishes a framework for strategic responses to institutional pressure.
The seminal framework by Oliver (1991) has seen mixed results through
empirical testing. Goodstein (1994) was one of the first to test Oliver’s (1991)
framework for responses to institutionalized pressure. His work evaluated
institutionalized pressure and strategic responses to work-family issues. This research
highlighted the role of dependency on influential environmental members in determining
responses and conformity to institutional pressures. Acquiescence strategies were
adopted when institutional pressures were strong and there was an internal perception that
benefit would come from adopting work-family initiatives, as long as they were not too
costly. Avoidance and defiance strategies were taken when institutional pressures were
seen as conflicts to internal goals. Importantly, Goodstein (1994) extended the work of
Oliver (1991) and emphasizes that institutional pressures are likely to result in the pursuit
of multiple organizational strategies.
Like Goodstein (1994), Ingram and Simons (1995) used Institutional Theory and
Oliver’s (1991) framework to evaluate organizational response to work-family issues.
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Their findings support Oliver’s predictors of how organizations will respond to
institutional pressure. They also suggest that, like Goodstein (1994), understanding
exactly how firms are going to respond to institutional pressure is difficult. This
replication was important as it suggests that salient views of strategic responses to
environmental pressure are not always predictable.
In another empirical evaluation of Oliver (1991), Clemens and Douglas (2005)
also assess the strategic framework of strategic response to environmental pressure, using
a single industry for analysis. Their findings indicate that firms that cooperated and
worked with other firms in the same industry were less likely to pursue response
strategies such as avoidance and defiance, where active opposition is prominent.
Alternatively, it was also suggested that organizations that are not inclined to work with
others are more likely to disobey regulatory interventions altogether. These findings are
important as they suggest the cooperation with other firms leads to adherence to
environmental pressures. However, if firms are not apt to cooperate with others, they are
likely to defy environment pressures using strategies that may isolate them from others.
In addition, this strategy has the potential to lead to new environmental pressures.
Finally, this research found that the strategic responses of compromise, acquiescence, and
manipulation to be extremely similar. This is contrary to the work of Oliver (1991), who
suggested that each of the three strategies as unique responses to environmental pressure.
This is an important finding as the strategic responses purported by Oliver (1991) have
shown to have differing results when tested empirically.
While not specifically testing Oliver’s (1991) framework, Delmas and Toffel
(2004) suggest that institutional pressures arise from community and environmental
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interest groups, governments, regulators, customers, competitors, and industry groups.
These stakeholders impose coercive and normative pressures on firms to adopt
environmental management practices. However, they also suggest that how these
pressures are interpreted and acted on by managers in manufacturing plants depends on
various factors, such as historical environmental performance, the parent company, and
the organizational structure of the plant. As a result, they suggest that multiple
organizations may have the same institutional pressures on them, but they may interpret
these pressures differently. The variance in interpreting the results creates variance in
strategic response.
The research and literature from management has viewed Institutional Theory
from the perspective of why firms choose to do something (i.e., Hoffman 1999) or how
they choose to react to institutionalized pressures (i.e., Oliver 1991). However, recent
uses of Institutional Theory have seen a wide range of applications. The work on
strategic response to Institutional Theory is important in developing an understanding of
how firms handle institutional pressure. A final step in institutional research is to
understand how the strategic responses to institutional pressure impact organizational
survival and performance. As suggested earlier, the role of management is to enact
strategies which should lead to performance (Hunt and Morgan 1997).
Survival and Performance
In general, firms enact strategic responses to institutional pressure as an act of
survival. These organizational strategic responses to the environment will influence
organizational performance (Oliver 1991). Several studies have evaluated the impact of
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strategic response to institutional pressure and organizational performance. Oliver
(1997b) conducted empirical analysis of the Canadian construction industry and found
support for the relationships between the institutional environment and organizational
performance. As a result, it is suggested that adoption of institutionalized actions result
in positive performance through simplified gathering of financial and human capital and
an increased demand for product and services.
Second, organizations that are perceived as legitimate among other firms can
receive three primary benefits from being seen legitimate in the eyes of others
(McNamara, Deephouse, and Luce 2003). First, exchange partners are more likely to be
willing to interact with other firms who have compatible strategies. Second,
organizations may provide extra benefits or incentives to firms they perceive as
legitimate. Third, organizations may not require risk premiums as legitimized
organizations are less likely to fail. These benefits of legitimacy clearly have positive
impact on the survival and performance of the firm.
Finally, firms who are perceived as environmentally legitimate through the eyes
of their stakeholders have less unsystematic risk (Bansal and Clelland 2004).
Unsystematic risk is the variability of the firm’s stock price that is reflected in events that
only affect that firm. An example of unsystematic risk would be the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. Generalizations from this research suggest that creating the perception of
environmental legitimacy may insulate a firm from perishing in the event of catastrophe
in which the firm is involved.
In summary, according to Institutional Theory, organizations are continuously
perceiving and interpreting external pressures being applied from the environment in
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which they operate. These external pressures are often adopted as firms seek to be
viewed as legitimate by their environment. This seeking of legitimacy can sometimes
lead to detrimental practices (i.e., adopting legitimacy over efficiency). However, as
presented in this section, it has also been suggested that strategic response to
environmental pressure can lead to survival and positive firm performance (i.e., Oliver
1997b). As a result, some environmental pressure can lead to reactions by organizations
that provide both financial and economic benefit.
Summary
This chapter reviewed relevant literature from the main areas that this research
will address, including a review and delineation between supply chains and SCM.
Additionally, a detailed description of SCS, was provided that highlighted research on
security in the supply chain to date, including approaches, government initiatives, and
organizational performance. Also, relevant literature on organizational strategy and
performance reveals that the premise of most organizational strategy research is strategic
action and its impact on a variety of performance measures. Finally, the theoretical
foundation for this dissertation Institutional Theory, (a sociological theory that is often
applied to organizational management) was discussed. This theory helps provide an
explanation as to why firms behave and respond so that they are viewed as socially
legitimate or part of the organizational field. In the next chapter, each of these areas will
be used to build a model and hypotheses to be used for empirical investigation.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
This chapter has multiple objectives. First, it describes the procedures and sample
used in the qualitative research. Next, the qualitative findings are presented, wherein the
hypotheses are developed. The chapter closes by presenting the testable model and
conclusions.
To date, research has yet to provide theoretical justifications as to why or how
SCS strategies emerge. In the work of Oliver (1991), a framework is presented that
describes how firms are likely to respond to environmental pressure. While the
framework is seminal, it is not without limitations. First, the framework is presented
from the strategic and operational levels in a ‘top-down’ manner. As a result, there are
potentially different strategies that exist when viewed from a tactical manner. Second,
empirical analysis has found varying support for this framework, suggesting that these
strategies are not all distinct (i.e., Clemens and Douglas 2005). Due to interpretation, the
same institutional pressures may result in organizations having very different responses
(Delmas and Toffel 2004). While this is also suggested in Oliver’s (1991) work, Delmas
and Toffel (2004) point out that the difference in perception may directly affect
differences in the tactical level response.
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Because of the limitations in Oliver’s (1991) proposed Institutional Theory based
strategy framework, qualitative research was conducted as a first step in this dissertation
to better understand what activities are used to create SCS strategies. Thus, while this
research emulates Oliver (1991) by describing responsive approaches to environmental
pressure, it takes an alternative approach to determine those categories. Instead, this
research will develop a perspective on SCS categories from a tactical or ‘bottom-up’
approach, whereby the tactical activities will be used to describe the overall SCS
response.
Building and Testing Theory
The driving force behind any research path is to advance knowledge (Spens and
Kovacs 2006). Within social science, there are considered to be two primary ways to
advance knowledge: induction and deduction. This process is illustrated in Figure 2 and
each is discussed below.

79

Laws and Theories
Induction:
Case Studies
Ethnography
Critical Ethnography
Interviews

Deduction:
Surveys
Statistical Analysis
Simulation
Experiments

Facts from
observation

Prediction and
Explanation

Adapted from Chalmers (1985)
Figure 2
Inductive versus Deductive Approaches

Induction
Induction is the process of building a theory (Chalmers 1985; Danermark 2001;
Johnson 1996). The inductive process begins with observations and tries to create
generalizations about the phenomena (Spens and Kovacs 2006). In other words, an
inductive process involves observing events, which when put together develop
generalizations and theories (Clark 1987). The generalizations and theories will then be
tested over time through deduction.
Induction is most often associated with qualitative research methods, including
interviews, observations, and case studies (Mentzer and Flint 1997). As such, theory
building through induction can be a subjective and creative process (Clark 1987). These
techniques lead to a “rich, context-dependent truth,” (Matthyssens 2007, p. 219).
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Deduction
From generalizations, or theories, specific claims (hypotheses) can be tested to
see if the predicted relationships act as suggested under various circumstances (Clark
1987; Mentzer and Flint 1997). In other words, the process of deduction involves taking
laws and theories and through testing, logically deriving predictions and explanations for
a specific situation (Chalmers 1985; Hyde 2000). This type of research is most often
associated with quantitative research methods, including surveys, experiments, and
simulations (Mentzer and Flint 1997).
Following the suggestion of Dunn, Seaker, and Waller (1994), who suggest using
qualitative and quantitative approaches to logistics research, this research uses multiple
methods to build and test theory. First, an inductive approach is undertaken to better
understand the phenomenon of SCS. Second, a deductive approach is used to empirically
test hypothesis of SCS.
Qualitative Research on SCS
Qualitative Research Method
In order to develop an understanding of this phenomenon about which little is
known, qualitative research was used (Strauss 1990). Qualitative research has many
benefits, including high face validity, richness, realism, and it can more accurately assess
causality (Miles 1979). Interviewing, one type of qualitative research, is specifically
known for its richness and depth (Bailey 1994). This particular methodology is useful
when the goal is to gain insight on abstract perceptions or attach meaning to experiences
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(Berg 1995). Given the nature of this topic and the need for grounding theory, semistructured interviews were conducted to gather primary data and gain a deeper knowledge
of SCS activities. Triangulation of the interviews was achieved through reviewing
internal company documentation and relevant literature. This interview process was
emergent and follows the foundation put forth by Glaser and Strauss (1967), where
theory is inductively developed.
With semi-structured interviews, the interviewer retains control of the discussion,
while the interviewee is given leeway in describing situations with which the interviewer
may not be familiar (Seidman 1991). Each respondent is asked a series of predetermined
questions; however the interviewer has the ability to adjust the interview as it takes place.
The interviewer has the ability to probe and ask follow-up questions if the respondent
does not provide enough detail.
Prior to data collection, relevant literature was reviewed to gain background on
the SCS phenomenon and to assist in creating an interview guide. The relevant literature
was also used for consultation purposes after the data were collected. Potential
respondents were identified from personal contacts and using a snowball technique.
Personal contacts of the researcher were contacted and asked if they knew of anyone
working in mid-to-high level management positions in the area of SCM. The research
project was explained to the personal contacts and they were prompted to respond to the
primary interviewer if they had any contacts that fit the desired respondent description.
Potential respondents were identified as working in any realm of SCM, primarily based in
the United States, and required to have “manager,” “vice president,” “executive” or
something similar in their title. This was intentional, as individuals in such positions
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would typically have a greater understanding of the SCS operations and also the
performance measures of the firm, which is key to this research. In all, 78 people were
contacted which resulted in nineteen interviews. Many of those contacted had left the
supply chain industry or felt they had no experience or insight in to the investigated topic.
Letters were sent to those individuals thanking them for their response, but no interview
was scheduled.
Of the nineteen respondents, seventeen of the interviews were conducted by
phone, while the other two respondents asked to respond to questions in a written format.
For the interviews conducted via phone, a semi-structured interview protocol was created
to facilitate data collection. This protocol was reviewed by colleagues who are
considered to be knowledgeable on the topic of SCS. Interviews lasted between 30 to 75
minutes. A complete interview protocol is shown in Appendix A. For the two
respondents who requested to provide written answers, an open-ended questionnaire was
created, based on the questions that would have been asked orally, and sent to these
respondents. They completed the questionnaire and sent it back to the primary researcher
via email. The interviews conducted by telephone were recorded upon permission of the
interviewee.
While this research is emergent, the structure and procedures of each interview
was repeated each time. Interviews began with introductions, backgrounds, description
of the research, and confidentiality agreements. This was done as the interviewer
attempted to build rapport with the respondent (e.g., Strauss and Corbin 1998). The
confidentiality agreement was read to each respondent and guaranteed that their personal
name and organization name would never be revealed. Instead, only their job title and
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industry would be used to describe them when the qualitative research was presented.
Audio taping the interview allowed the discussion to be transcribed, which assisted in
finding emerging themes. After each interview, the recorded interview was transcribed
and reviewed. This was done to inform and guide future interviews. The emergent
design of this research allowed for adaptation and additional questions to be asked of
future respondents. After all interviews were complete, themes that emerged across
interviews were analyzed, categorized, and compared to relevant literature.
Redundancy, which is more important than the number of interviews conducted
(McCracken 1988), was reached after thirteen interviews. However, six additional
interviews were conducted to ensure saturation had been reached. As a result, nineteen
interviews with respondents from different organizations were conducted (the total
number includes the two interviews that were conducted with an open ended survey).
This number of interviews would be consistent with researchers who suggest that at least
eight informants be interviewed, or until saturation is reached (McCracken 1988; Strauss
and Corbin 1998).
The sample was diverse across several variables, including supply chain function,
industry, position within the organization, and job tenure. This was intentional as the
purpose of the qualitative research was to gain a broad perspective of SCS. More
information on the sample is presented in Table 5.
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Table 5
Description of Semi-Structured Interview Respondents
Respondent
Industry

Number of
Respondents

Component
Manufacturing

3

High Tech

3

Medical Devices

1

Transportation/
Logistics Services

6

Building and
Construction

1

Consumer Food
Products

3

Consulting (Supply
Chain Security)

2

Respondent Job Title (s)
Materials Manager
Production Control Manager
Senior Buyer
Senior Sourcing Manager
Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
Program Manager, Supply Chain
Operations
Vice President of New Product
Development
Vice President of Security
CEO, Logistics Information Firm
Director of Account Management
Manager of Supply Chain Business
Development
CEO, 3PL
Senior Project Manager
Logistics Manager
Outbound Transportation Manager
Senior Transportation Manager
CEO, Consulting Firm
Senior Manager

The interviews were conducted over a two month period in early 2007. The
findings from the qualitative interviews are summarized below.
Qualitative Findings and Hypothesis Development
This section is organized as follows. First, the qualitative findings on the
importance of SCS and SCS activities are presented. At the conclusion of this
presentation, hypotheses relevant to SCS are developed. Next, qualitative findings on the
drivers of why organizations develop SCS categories are presented. In this discussion,
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hypotheses describing the relationship between SCS drivers and SCS categories are
presented. Finally, qualitative findings concerning SCS and organizational performance
are presented along with hypotheses describing the relationships between SCS categories
and various organizational performance measures.
The Importance of Security in SCM
After initial introductions and discussion, the first question asked of each
respondent was how important they felt SCS was at their respective organization. Only
three respondents did not feel that security was critical to his or her operations as they felt
little risk in terms of being a target of a breach. The rest indicated that creating a secure
supply chain was “extremely” to “very” important to their organizations. Some
respondents indicated how important SCS was through phrases like “paramount,” “vital
to compete,” and “extremely important,” to describe how they felt about SCS. These
firms also suggested that security had to be a part of every decision made in managing the
supply chain. As a Procurement and Supply Chain Manager from a High Tech Company
indicated:
[Referring to security] “It is important and needs to be included in everyone’s
supply chain strategy. However, it does need to have a voice. Even though it is
planned on being a part of the supply chain strategy, it can easily be lost or
redirected if it doesn’t have a strong voice.”
A Senior Sourcing Manager stated:
“Because we are growing internationally, our security efforts have become more
important.”
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Based on existing academic research and the quotes above, it becomes salient that
security in the supply chain is an important issue that organizations are facing. Others
suggested that SCS has become a fundamental part of conducting business:
“Prior to security becoming so important, there was a three-legged stool in terms
of supplier/vendor management: The right product, at the right price, delivered
at the right time. Customs has said that our world has changed. Now, it is a
four-legged stool, security has become the fourth leg.” CEO, Consulting Firm
While security issues have gained importance, there are still advancements to be
made in securing the supply chain. Wilson (2005) suggests that while efforts in SCS
have been taken, there are still vast improvements to be made to create secure supply
chains. The following statement from a Third Party Logistics Provider (3PL) reinforces
this notion and provides more rationale on the importance of SCS:
“There are huge holes in supply chain management yet. Security has a long way
to go. Security can be breached at so many points of the supply chain.
Companies are talking about it and know what it is, but very few companies have
a good handle on their SCS.” CEO, 3PL
Respondents also mentioned that if security issues did arise, supply chain partners
would typically be involved in dealing with the issue. This collaborative approach to
security may come from the feeling that ‘everyone is a part of’security. However, it is
interesting to note that most of the respondents who felt that security efforts were vital to
their operations would primarily mention their own security efforts before discussing the
efforts of supply chain partners.
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SCS Activities
The main thrust of the qualitative research was to have respondents discuss in
detail their SCS activities. As a discussion point, a high level question about security
strategy was asked of the respondent, which was followed by several probing questions.
In all cases, respondents had difficulty in explaining their SCS overall strategy. This is
likely the result of few firms having clearly defined SCS strategies. While respondents
were not able to articulate their SCS strategies, they were able to clearly discuss
individual activities that they had implemented to create SCS. This was also a key
determination in deciding to approach SCS categorization from the ‘bottom-up’.
After conducting the interviews, it became salient that the three integral
components to SCS categories were intraorganizational (SCS activities done on their
own), interorganizational (SCS activities done in conjunction with others), and a
combination of both. This is consistent with the literature on supply chains, SCM, and
SCS.
Based on the depth interviews and the literature on supply chain, SCM, and SCS,
this research uses the dichotomy of the intraorganizational and interorganizational
external security categories. For the purpose of this research, internal security activities
are referred to as intraorganizational approaches. These intraorganizational activities are
the efforts that are internal to the organization. In other words, intraorganizational
activities are activities within the control of the organization that they can implement on
their own in an effort to create SCS. Early conceptualizations of supply chains viewed
them as based on intraorganizational coordination. Thus, efforts were taken within the
organization to coordinate the effective and efficient flow of goods. In similar fashion,
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intraorganizational activities emerged from the qualitative research. These were focused
on the activities organizations endure as part of their own effort to make their supply
chains more secure. Alternatively, external activities for SCS also emerged from the
qualitative research. For the purpose of this research these are referred to as
interorganizational activities. The interorganizational activities are the efforts taken in
conjunction with other firms and government agencies in an effort to create SCS. These
approaches are similar to much of the literature on modern SCM activities as they focus
on interorganizational activities. In other words, these are the security activities that are
enacted with other parties involved in the flow of goods to make this flow more secure.
The following will present specific activities identified by respondents for each SCS
approach.

Intraorganizational Activities
Research on SCS has suggested that firms often take a “four walls” approach
toward SCS in that organizations approach security efforts internally, through their own
efforts (Closs and McGarrell 2004). The qualitative interviews reveal the same. Firms
feel that they are in control of and responsible for creating a secure supply chain.
Following the approaches put forth by previous SCM researchers, in this research, these
activities are called intraorganizational. Intraorganizational SCS activities are viewed as
the efforts that firms initiate within the firm to create a secure supply chain. The
respondents identified using a wide variety of intraorganizational activities, more
specifically, these are defined as the efforts taken internally and solely by the
organization in an effort to create SCS. Many respondents feel that security is their
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obligation and that they can not depend on others to create security. The following quote
illustrates this:
“Because we are the manufacturer, we are in charge of supply chain security.
We are the ones who dictate what happens in terms of security. It is our brand
that must be protected – it’s not some commodity based supplier who’s going to
suffer – they don’t have a brand.” Logistics Manager
Other rationale for the intraorganizational level activity comes from the
competitive nature of all markets. In many situations, a supplier may also be a
competitor, and as a result, organizations may be reluctant to work with and share
information. As a CEO of a SCS consulting firm notes:
“Organizations are approaching security individually. Security efforts are
individualistic. They are not willing to share efforts or information with suppliers
because suppliers can and often are competitors or work with competitors.
Organizations are not willing to share information because it can be a source of
competitive advantage.”
The intraorganizational activities are ones that organizations feel they have control over.
In other words, these are the actions one organization can take to make its entire supply
chain more secure. Respondents indicated numerous specific intraorganizational
activities during the interviews. The following section describes each major
intraorganizational activity that emerged from the qualitative interviews. Each
description also provides examples of the nature of that particular security effort.
SCS Culture
Respondents indicated that internal personnel are a critical component of SCS.
For example:
“We worry more about disgruntled employees and internal security than we do
about external security breaches. It is all about paying attention to the details
and paying attention to the people. If you have the right people on the team and
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you pay attention to them and they know that, they will by default operate in a
safe and secure manner. They will also be more conscious about securing your
operations. In general, this leads to better employee relations.” CEO, 3PL
“We have had some inside jobs. We have had incidents where people on the
inside, as part of our security providers, were cooperating with people on the
outside to plan a breach on us.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“We feel that our greatest threat is internal. As a result, a lot of our efforts are
guided toward hiring, training, and preparation.” VP of Security
From these statements, it is clear that organizations are concerned about their own
employees initiating a security breach, which is consistent with previous research (Sheffi
2002). The internal threat is encompassed in a larger security effort engrained in
organizational culture. Organizational culture has long been of interest to many
organizational researchers and is defined as “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that
help individuals understand organizational functioning and that provide norms for
behavior in the organization” (Deshpande and Webster 1989, p. 4). Through
organizational culture, employees collectively learn what is expected of them (McAfee,
Glassman, and Honeycutt 2001).
Previous research has indicated the need for creating a SCS culture (Sheffi 2002;
Sheffi 2005). There were many respondents who explicitly and implicitly mentioned that
the culture of the organization aided their security efforts. Many respondents referred to
the people they hire, training, vigilance, and executive support as factors related to a
culture that focuses on security. For example:
“However, all efforts toward security are developed internally. A focus on
security needs to come from the top down.” VP of New Product Development
“We have started to look at C-TPAT; we may pursue this a little more, but right
now we are just conducting a self assessment. However, this program looks to be
difficult and costly. This will also require a lot of culture changes. That is one of
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the problems; getting our culture to change and adopt these rules is going to be
very difficult. I think that some of our executives may like the idea of this, but
when the see the cost and change required, I don’t think it will be prioritized. In
all, I’d say we have about a twenty percent chance of actually doing this.”
Production Control Manager
“One of our core competencies is our ability to keep things when under these
circumstances; we have very talented people with some good contacts who are
ready to react at any time, 24/7.” Director of Account Management
“We approach security from a common sense standpoint. We require our
employees to be very aware of their surroundings. We feel that our greatest
threat is internal. As a result, a lot of our efforts are guided toward hiring,
training, and preparation. My belief is that we rely mostly on our human capital
for security. The relationship with our employees and making sure they do not
become complacent is absolutely critical to our organization. It is a culture and a
process that needs continuous involvement.” VP of Security
Implicitly and explicitly related to culture were discussions of the process by
which organizations let potential workers become a part of their internal operations, such
as hiring procedures. Firms are taking a close look at how they limit threats to their
supply chain by controlling who they let have access to their own supply chains. This
effort is in place to control and limit who has the chance to learn the organizational
culture and ultimately who has the opportunity to ensure or limit SCS. To protect who
becomes part of the organization, firms are dedicating resources to their hiring practices.
For example:
“Our background checks and hiring are extremely stringent,” Senior
Transportation Manager
For the purpose of this research, SCS culture is defined as the overall organizational
philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through
embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant
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with security efforts. This can be accomplished through hiring the right people, top
management support, training, and vigilance.
Avoidance
The concept of avoidance has been used in other disciplines. For example, in
criminal justice, constrained behaviors are presented as an activity for individuals to
reduce the opportunity to becoming a victim of a crime. As such, individuals may choose
to constrain their behaviors and avoid geographic areas they deem unsafe (Rader 2004).
Examples may include not going to areas that are perceived to have high crime rates or
areas with poor lighting, graffiti, and vandalism. Another area of research on avoidance
originates with negotiation and bargaining and suggests that avoidance is the sidestepping
of certain issues (Kozan, Wasti, and Kuman. 2006).
Similar to other research, an activity of avoidance emerged from the qualitative
research findings. The activity of avoidance was not specifically asked about with the
first few respondents; however, many of the first respondents alluded to variations of this
activity. The emergent design of this research enabled avoidance to become a probe
question in later interviews. Instead of an individual level, where someone may avoid a
dark alley, respondents indicated that at the organizational level, firms avoid suppliers,
customers, and geographic locations.
Avoiding suppliers was the first avoidance activity that was mentioned. As
suggested by an Outbound Logistics Manager, certain suppliers may a may lessen the
sense of security:
“We have really stayed away from certain suppliers. There are some that just
don’t get our philosophy and the effort to get them there just isn’t worth it to us.”
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In a similar example, Nike recently dropped a soccer ball supplier in the Middle East.
The supplier allowed employees to take materials home and stitch the soccer balls
together away from the plant (Kang 2006). As this presented security and quality issues,
Nike dropped the supplier. In both situations, suppliers can present organizations with
risk, uncertainty, and problematic supply chain situations. As a result, organizations
choose to avoid the suppliers who present such issues.
Surprisingly discussions of avoidance also brought about the practice of avoiding
customers. With modern SCM, firms are leery of selling product and service to
customers they do not know. The following two quotes illustrate that point:
“We have had to sidestep some customers. The nature of our product doesn’t
allow us to ship to everyone.” Senior Transportation Manager.
“We avoid certain customers who are high risk, or have too high of risk goods to
move. We push back hard on our customers to make sure that they understand we
will not accept unreasonable risk. Sometimes this means avoiding customers.”
CEO, 3PL
In order to be confident about conducting business with certain customers, thorough
investigations would first be conducted. As a result, some organizations now have to
avoid selling product and services to customers on spot buys. Prior to these new security
efforts, firms seemed to be much more lenient with customers. Now, customers often
have to meet certain criteria before being sold goods or services.
A final portion of avoidance involved just avoiding certain parts of the world all
together. This risk avoidance has often been a consideration for organizations in deciding
where to trade and set up operations (Eggers 2004). For example:
“We had identified India as a strong opportunity in the early [19]90’s. There
was just no way we were going in there at that time. It just was not a good
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business decision in terms of security,” Procurement and Supply Chain Manager,
High Tech Firm.
Other respondents referred to certain parts of the world as being too tumultuous to enter
into for any reason. As a result, organizations are willing to dedicate their resources and
efforts to other locations if for nothing else than piece of mind. Specifically, location
avoidance seemed to be the result of two main concerns: from higher levels of risk and
importation issues.
“Sometimes the risk is too great, so some of our clients are forced to source from
another area [of the world] where the costs are higher, but the overall
environment is much more stable,” Director of Account Management.
“A disruption to your supply chain is very detrimental. CBP [which is Customs
and Border Protection] has taken every country in the world and assigned a risk
level to it. For example, Pakistan is considered to be a high risk country. As a
result, products being imported from those countries are high risk and there is a
much higher likelihood that those products will be delayed. From an
organizational perspective, price can become secondary (within reason) to the
origin source just because of the reduced delays in import. Sourcing is moving
away from high risk sources (high risk countries).” CEO, Consulting Firm
In summary, avoidance is defined as the security activity of actively staying away from
suppliers, customers, or geographic locations, which pose a potential threat to supply
chain security.
Operation Modification
In an interview with a procurement and supply chain manager, it was mentioned
that “we have changed our operations to become more secure.” This intraorganizational
level activity was reaffirmed by multiple respondents. Firms have a wide range of
activities that constitute operation modification. Some firms have made small changes,
such as modifying the amount of inventory that is held in one location. As a consultant
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suggested, some firms are increasing inventory levels as a safety precaution and others
are keeping more stock of “critical supplies.” Other examples suggest that major changes
to the entire supply chain business model have been made for security. Specifically, the
operation modifications can be categorized as: 1) operational changes to a business
model, 2) inventory changes made to how an organization handles its amount of
inventory for security efforts, and 3) transportation changes to the transportation type or
how the transportation system handles goods for security. Examples of each are
presented below.
Operational modification:
“Part of our security effort is embedded within our other efforts – this means
reducing opportunity. We are currently moving to a more JIT model. This will
mean that we have less inventory sitting around and thus, less opportunity for
anything to happen. Scheduling is a key part of our security strategy.” Project
Manager, Home Building Company
“Reverse logistics is another security strategy which we have been working more
diligently on. When “it” does happen, whatever that may be, we’re able to
handle it quickly before it gets too big.” Logistics Manager
“Some facilities used to only be open for 18 or 19 hours; now they are open 24
hours a day to extend our security. We now have security personnel there 24
hours a day. This keeps up the visibility at a minimal cost.” Manager, Supply
Chain Business Development
“We became inflexible with our manufacturing as well. Our labor costs went up,
because we increased the requirements on our third parties on background
checks. If we needed 14 day workers, we would have to call 100 to find those 14
because so many people would have background issues.” Procurement and
Supply Chain Manager
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Inventory modification:
“We avoid having all of our eggs in one basket. We used to be so centralized.
We had everything in one warehouse minutes away from the airport. Well, that is
an advantage when everything is working seamlessly. But, as soon as anything is
disrupted, we were in for a rude awakening. Our challenge was that a lot of
customers are not close by. So, we cannot serve those customers next day by
truck, if we go down – which we learned with 9/11. As a result, we have
implemented regional inventory centers that can respond to crisis situations.
Now, we can serve any of our major customers within six hours. ” Vice
President, New Product Development.
Transportation modification:
“A lot of product is moved as air-freight. This is a time-value of money issue and
a security issue. The time saved from ocean freight was that much greater that we
were willing to spend the extra money to get the product here. What really sold
us on the idea, though, was the fact that air freight was so much more secure than
ocean liners. Think about how long your product is sitting out on a ship. Every
minute it is out there, your entire supply chain is at risk. Speed is security.”
Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“We also have had situations in which we caravan our trucks together to make a
delivery instead of sending them out one at a time.” Procurement and Supply
Chain Manager
“We ship many more truckloads than what we used to. This cuts down on
security issues because there are less touch points.” Manager, Supply Chain
Business Development
Overall, the intraorganizational level activity of operation modification is defined
as organizational changes to core supply chain activities, including operational
procedures, inventory levels, and transportation in an effort to create supply chain
security.
Quality
Lee and Wolfe (2003) and Lee and Whang (2005) suggest that security should be
treated as an organizational function. This philosophy mirrors the efforts implemented
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by organizations in total quality management. Similarly, many respondents discussed
quality as being part of their security activity. The term “best in class” was used several
times by respondents describing raw materials, monitoring systems, reactionary systems,
technology and communication. In other words, these organizations had developed a
sense of security from utilizing the best possible technology, systems, and organizational
processes available. One respondent referenced a conference recently attended where a
global chemical company presented planned initiatives of its updated security plan.
Included in this plan was the purchasing of all new rail cars in its fleet in an effect to have
the newest, best, and safest cars available on the market. Another comment made by an
Outbound Logistics Manager stated that they ensure quality in their “materials,
packaging, and material handling” which also creates the sense of security. Yet another
example of how using state of the art technology assists in creating a secure supply chain
is:
“[in discussing their world class technology] Our technology is our security.
Because we have such high standard requirements for technology, a certain level
of security comes from that. We are only using cutting edge stuff. For example, if
we know that a delivery is supposed to be made Monday at 5pm, and we don’t get
a notification of delivery at 5pm on Monday, that immediately triggers an event
for us to investigate.” Materials Manager
The intraorganizational activity of quality can be defined as the use and
deployment of the best available resources, technology, and processes to enhance security
efforts.
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Facilities Hardening
From the criminal justice literature, much research is dedicated to describing how
people develop a sense of internal security. In this search for internal security, many
people take great lengths to make themselves less vulnerable. These are prevention
measures and are developed to stop potential perpetrators before they partake in the
crime. In this literature, this action is referred to as target hardening and they include
creating physical barriers (bars on windows), buying a gun, or learning self defense (e.g.,
Krahn and Kennedy 1985). While organizations do not typically buy guns or learn self
defense, they do initiate many internal measures to prevent themselves from becoming a
victim of a security breach. For example, Walt Disney World has implemented
antiterrorist barricades that are designed to stop a 20,000 pound truck bomb traveling at
70 mph (Mussenden 2004). For the purpose of this research, these organizational
activities are referred to as facilities hardening. These initiatives are evident from the
following quotes:
“So, we have focused on the physical layout of the receiving area. Different sites
of manufacturing, depending on their location, we now have barbed wire fences,
gates, lock boxes etc – this is like a tiny warehouse on site of manufacture. This
makes it much simpler to track inventory and become much more secure,” Project
Manager
“We have overhead doors are run by remote and we have to had to make sure
that those remotes are secure on the hi-lo’s. We also have security seals on all the
trucks and video cameras in all facilities,” Production Control Manager
“All of our facilities have fences and gates and armed guards. We also have
cameras. We have on-site guards. We also have alarm systems that would fire if
there were someone unauthorized in our facility at an unauthorized time,”
Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
“We do overtly communicate that our supply is invincible. However, if you go to
any of our facilities, I think the initial reaction is “whoa, [company name] really
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takes security seriously.” This is very evident from looking at the facility and
quickly realizing it is going to be nearly impossible to break-in,” Logistics
Manager
Through the use of facility hardening activities, organizations develop a sense of
security. From the responses above, it is clear that many firms are taking facility
hardening and prevention measures seriously. The majority of respondents indicated that
prevention measures include things such as security seals, locks, gates, fences, and armed
guards as measures taken to secure the supply chain. These efforts are consistent with
previous research that suggests advanced levels of facility security include fences, locks,
alarms, id tags, and CCTV (Closs and McGarrell 2004). Facility hardening is defined as
efforts taken within the organization to physically secure and prevent SCS breaches from
occurring.
Access Restriction
Many respondents referenced their tight and restricted control to their facilities as
a SCS activity. This is in congruence with other research that mention tactics like control
access points, verification, visitor procedures, gate passes, and limiting access for both
internal and external personnel. This activity can be described as knowing who has
access to what at all times, thus resulting in increased security. Respondents indicated
that restricting access is necessary as it provides a better understanding of who is entering
their facilities, what they are bringing in with them, and also, better control of what
information is getting out. Respondents spoke specifically of vendors, truck drivers, and
their own employees having restricted access to facilities.
[Referring to how access restriction by his customers has affected his
productivity] “My ability to work with the client has been inhibited because of
100

time. In the past, I would be able to walk into a client and go about their facility
as needed to meet with whom I needed, when I needed. Now, you cannot go
anywhere without an escort. The security part of it won’t allow me to roam
around the facility anymore. This has had a negative effect on my productivity,”
Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
“We have taken efforts to make sure that people cannot walk in and out of our
doors. We used to allow suppliers to wander around our facilities, but not
anymore. There is much access to the manufacturing floor. Now we have them
sit in a conference room and we go get whoever it is that they need to talk to. We
now have secure doors, access doors, visuals identification cards, and card
readers at our facilities now.” Production Control Manager
“We do not allow drivers on our docks. A lot of people will allow drivers to enter
and account for freight. That is prohibited throughout our organization.
Suppliers making deliveries to our facilities are segregated from our product
when they are at any our facilities. This rule also holds true for visitors. We make
sure that it is either us or our third parties who are in control of the product the
entire time, which greatly reduces the chance of any kind of contraband getting
in.” Logistics Manager
As the above quotations indicate, access restriction is the security activity of only
allowing those who should have access to facilities have access, to only the appropriate
area, while limiting and monitoring the access of those who are not part of the
organization. By allowing unknown people only in known areas, firms are reducing the
possibility of any unauthorized personnel introducing contraband into the supply chain.
Therefore, assess restriction provides a sense of security to organizations by creating
knowledge of who and what infiltrates their physical locations.
Combating Complacency
As suggested above with SCS culture, many firms are attempting to secure supply
chains through the creation of a culture that is focused on security. However, while many
organizations are trying to implement security as part of the culture, others worry about
keeping it. Organizations are no longer afforded the luxury of being complacent with
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SCS (Eggers 2004). Several respondents directly discussed complacency as being a key
component of culture.
[Referring to their approach to supply chain security] “…we always avoid
assuming threats are defeated! It’s a chronic problem across the industry in
general which is driving industry thinking, strategies, technologies and standards
to combat a $6B/year problem in [this issue] alone.” Program Manager, Supply
Chain Operations
“You have to very careful not to let your people become complacent. People can
become lazy when they walk in the door, as they have a zillion other things on
their minds.” CEO, 3PL
“We make sure our employees never become complacent. Our workers are very
patriotic and take pride in security. They want to participate in the national
efforts. But we never give them the chance to let their guard down” VP of
Security
Organizations are not only concerned about creating a security culture, but they
are also concerned about keeping it that way, which is to combat complacency.
Organizations are concerned about their employees becoming lackadaisical when it
comes to security. As a result, complacency is being combated through organizational
culture. Complacency is the feeling of contentment with efforts and results, coupled
with a lack of motivation. When complacency is fostered, future efforts are often
thwarted. Interestingly, if future endeavors are attempted, the attempts may be
inadequate (Kawall 2006). This results in a definition of human complacency as an
“overestimate of one’s efforts and achievements, and a resultant excessive selfsatisfaction that produces a lack of desire to improve or maintain one’s efforts with
respect to a project” (Kawall 2006, p. 353).
Many respondents feel that complacency is a crucial part of SCS and they are
dedicating internal efforts to combat it. Unfortunately, security has the ability to easily
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create complacency. In some cases, security efforts can create the false sense of security
and confidence (Rice and Caniato 2003). This is a serious issue as SCS is an ongoing
endeavor for organizations. For example, Sheffi (2001) notes that recent attacks on the
supply chain do not suggest a war upon us, but rather it presents an era of continuous
danger. Other academic researchers highlight the need to continuously review security
measures and look for improvements (Hess and Wrobleski 1996; Quinn 2003).
Therefore, continuous security efforts are needed to prevent degradation over time
(Sarathy 2006).
This makes the potential for organizational complacency hazardous and illustrates
the need to investigate this phenomenon. In fact, some actions of SCS may have the
opposite effect of what they are intended to do. As suggested above, the feelings of
security can lead to complacency by allowing individuals to think things like “we have
done enough.” This can be detrimental to the organization. For the purpose of this
research, combating complacency are the activities taken to prevent the overindulged
sense of accomplishment and satisfaction that promotes the reluctance for more proactive
engagement in security activities.
Security Services
Another theme from the interviews was the use of security services. Many firms
utilize outsourced security services for special situations (escorting high-value shipments)
or for full-time facility or transportation guarding. Half of the 103 senior executives at
transportation companies responded that they would hire companies that specialize in
physical security services (Steinman 2004). Examples from the qualitative interviews
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indicated that armed secure transport, deploying off-duty police and ex-military
personnel, and procuring services from security firms were all part of security services.
For example, one respondent mentioned having helicopter escorts of truck deliveries.
“Our freight escorting and guarding services that deal with our supply chain and
our freight are in the international arena. We don’t really have a problem in the
U.S. because a lot of security is already embedded in the carriers here. They take
responsibility for delivery. Most of our concerns are in international settings.
We don’t have a big problem in the U.S. with holding up delivery trucks and
people going into factories stealing stuff. While theft is a big concern, we are
always evaluating the fact that what if people get into our facilities not to steal,
but to introduce some sort of disruptive device. There are a lot of people losing
sleep trying to understand and stop this from happening. And, as a result, we
work with some of the biggest private security firms in the world.” Senior
Sourcing Manager
“We also have contracts with major security vendors across the U.S. That way,
we try to have one common theme across the U.S. This is important in security.”
Logistics Manager
From the comments of the respondents, it becomes salient that firms make the
decision to outsource security instead of internally tackling the daunting task. Much like
outsourcing distribution initiatives with third party logistics providers, firms are
outsourcing their security efforts. These outsourcing security initiatives are a key way
that firms are creating SCS. Security firms have the expertise in the area of security,
whereas most organizations do not. Partnering with these firms assists in the creation of
a secure supply chain. Security services are defined as the outsourcing of security
initiatives to external organizations or persons specializing in providing security to
supply chain management activities.
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Monitoring
Having the ability to understand what is going on in the supply chain was
mentioned as a security activity. More specifically, the process of monitoring was
described as knowing when an activity has fallen outside of a known process or
procedure. According to the respondents, the process of monitoring involved tracking
devices inside the moving products, evaluating customer orders to identify irregular
activity, tracking the movements of truck drivers, and using cameras to attend virtual site
visits. There was, however, variation in how monitoring was conducted. Several
respondents mentioned technology as a method of monitoring, while others have relied
on the human element for monitoring purposes.
“We have tracking devices on the trucks and also embedded within the cargo.
This allows us to know when a breach has happened.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“Our Qualcomm technology also works as a security measure. Now we know
where everything is at all times. This is a detection device that also works as a
security device.” Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
“We have on-board computers in every truck, so we monitor unassigned stops.
Anytime truck stops in an area they should not be, our managers are notified so
that we can investigate why it is there. This happens immediately.” VP of
Security
“We tracked the customer orders too; we would monitor everything our
customers were ordering. When we saw any movement that was suspicious, we
would investigate.” Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“We have done a much better job of doing dock checks, trailer checks, and the
like; we know where all of our equipment is at all times. We know have it in our
requirements where if trailers are not on the road, someone is checking them
pretty much everyday as they sit in the yard. This is done through a visual check
with the terminal manager. This is also a brand issue; even though the trailer is
sitting empty, if someone took that trailer and used it for something devious, that
brand name might as well be put away.” Manager, Supply Chain Business
Development
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“We also keep and make our third-parties keep detailed records of who makes the
rounds and checks the facilities on a daily basis. Then, all of our upper mgt.
signs off on these every week. All facilities also have camera systems that are
monitored from HQ centrally. Anyone with the right access can log on at any
time and look through any camera at any location.” Logistics Manager
From these responses, it becomes clear that firms feel that an activity to create
security comes from the ability to monitor goods, services, or situations where security
breaches may take place. A monitoring security activity is defined as the process through
which firms continually evaluate their environments to determine if current processes and
activities are within the predetermined process limits.
Inspection
Similar to monitoring, respondents also referred to inspection processes as part of
their security efforts. The process of inspection can be viewed as a prevention activity as
respondents were concerned with inspecting products and services to ensure everything
was in the proper order and working condition. Inspection can be contrasted with
monitoring. Monitoring is the process whereby organizations watch and track to
determine when something out of the ordinary has happened. In this sense, it is used to
initiate a response. Inspection on the other hand is the process by which firms are
diligently preventing anything from becoming out of the ordinary. For example:
“We have an outgoing audit and inspection process, so it happened, we would
likely catch it there before it got out.” Production Control Manager
“We have many security measures to keep threats low too. We have metal
detectors and such to detect tampering.” Senior Transportation Manager
“We diligently inspect our trucks on the outbound side of things before they leave
too.” Materials Manager
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“All our facilities are all audited on a minimum of a bi-annual basis.” Logistics
Manager
Inspection as part of SCS efforts is defined as the process of checking products and
processes to stop security breaches from occurring.
Security Departments
As organizations become more apt to dedicate internal resources to security
efforts, they have also dedicated internal personnel to manage these efforts. Respondents
discussed using dedicated departments for security of the supply chain and other internal
security provisions. In addition, some companies have dedicated executive positions to
oversee the security of the supply chain, or security for the entire organization and other
operations. According to Sarathy (2006), a Chief Security Officer (CSO) provides
benefit through creating security awareness. Over half of companies with more than $1
billion in sales have a CSO (Eggers 2004). The respondents also indicated the use of
executive level positions for security, for example:
“Security at [our company] is managed through our security group which
contains several hundred people. They have a corporate security director, who is
a VP level person.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“We have a special situations taskforce. There are six individuals within the
organization. If an event happens that is deemed a ‘special situation’, these six
people are sequestered and put into a control room. They are ones who make all
decisions, who control information – including what information is released to the
public. This is a cross-functional team. If this team comes together – that is a
worst case scenario.” Logistics Manager
“We have teams focused on fighting large security holes throughout each
channel. These efforts are lead by the Supply Chain Security personnel…”
Program Manager, Supply Chain Operations
“Our firm takes security so important that we have two people dedicated to it: a
VP of Security and a VP of Safety.” VP of Security
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Formally, a security departmental activity is defined as an organizational change
process by which executive management roles and specific departments have specific
roles within the organization.
Security Sourcing and Audits
Research in the area of supply chain and purchasing security has evaluated what
organizations should do to make their supply chain more secure. For example, Sheffi
(2005b) purports that resilient supply chains have multiple sources of supply to make
sure that the entire supply chain does not shut down as a result of a security breach or
disruption. This process was reiterated in the qualitative research:
“Dual sourcing is another strategy that many of our clients take.” CEO,
Consulting Firm.
However, another theme that emerged was that some organizations had to slim their
supplier base for security efforts. For example:
“Security has also made us rationalize our supplier base. As a result, we have
fewer suppliers, fewer carriers, fewer warehouses. This has resulted in a
simplified model – we streamlined because not everyone could meet our
standards for security, and we became more secure.” Logistics Manager
This indicates that both the addition and reduction of supply chain partners has been an
activity that firms have taken in steps for security. This dichotomy is also recognized by
Rice and Spayd (2005) in their research on SCS resiliency.
Related to sourcing efforts are the processes by which organizations enact to bring
on a supplier of any kind. The supplier audit process can be similar and more rigorous
than employee background checks that organizations conduct to hire internal employees.
Supplier audits include assessing the potential supplier’s capabilities, in terms of
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delivering product and also keeping the supply chain secure. Retailer JC Penney
evaluates each supplier’s security based on a 22-item checklist. If the supplier fails the
audit, they have 90 days to fix the problem or they are suspended (Eggers 2004). The
following quotes express these efforts:
“We screen our suppliers very, very rigorously on the front end before bringing
them on.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“The companies we hire for outbound delivery go through a stringent process of
investigation by us before being brought on. We do the homework on the front
end so there are not issues on the back end. Our carriers know what they are
getting into when they are working with us.” Outbound Logistics Manager
In addition to the quotes listed above, a completed supplier audit document was
obtained from one respondent. The scrutiny of the supplier selection process was
apparent. The ten page report included pictures of the potential supplier facility and
major issues that the potential customer represented. In a similar document obtained
from another company, a file was created in which point allocations were made to assess
the potential supplier on various security measures. Finally, another respondent verbally
listed the following “key issues” his organization would go through when selecting a
transportation provider:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Licensed and bonded
Import and export authorization
Provide point-to-point service needed international
Level of technology and other security measures
Interaction with law enforcement
Communication capabilities
Understanding of routes taken (identifying all stops and parking)
Drivers have the necessary licenses and security clearance (including driver hiring
processes and background checks).
Vehicle are insured, maintenance is up to date, and safety is up to date
Contingency plans.
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The sourcing and audit intraorganizational activity is defined as organizational
efforts to develop a supply base through supplier audit practices that make certain the
number, quality, and type of suppliers ensure and fit the overall security activity.
All of the above sourcing efforts are examples of how firms ensure the security
and integrity of the supply chain by regulating how other organizations can participate in
it. Firms are taking many intraorganizational efforts to make sure that those who are part
of the external chain create a secure supply network.

Summary of Intraorganizational Activities
Organizations have taken many internal efforts toward making sure their supply
chains are secure. This is the result of activities that firms feel they have sole control
over when it comes to creating a secure supply chain. These efforts are labeled
intraorganizational activities and are presented in detail above and summarized in Table
6.
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Table 6
Summary of Intraorganizational Activities
Intraorganizational
Activity

SCS Culture

Avoidance

Operation
Modification

Quality

Facilities Hardening

Access Restriction

Combating
Complacency

Definition
The overall organizational philosophy
that creates supply chain security as a
priority among its employees through
embracing and projecting norms and
values of vigilance to support secure
activities.
The security activity of actively
staying away from suppliers,
customers, or geographic locations,
which pose a potential threat to supply
chain security.
Organizational change to core supply
chain activities, including operational
procedures, inventory levels, and
transportation in an effort to create
supply chain security.
The use and deployment of the best
available resources, technology, and
processes to enhance security efforts.
Any effort taken within the
organization to physically secure and
prevent supply chain security breaches
from occurring.
The process of allowing those who
should have access to facilities have
access, only in appropriate areas, while
also limiting and monitoring the access
of individuals who are not part of the
organization.
The activities taken to prevent the
overindulged sense of accomplishment
and satisfaction that promotes the
reluctance for more proactive
engagement in security activities.
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Example Activity
Developing a
monthly internal
security report for
all employees.
Not serving a
customer due to
lack of security
preparation.
Keeping large
quantities of
inventories on
hand in case of
breach.
Purchasing the
best available
security seals.
Building secure
fences around a
facility.

Adding gated
parking lots.
Providing
continuing
education on SCS.

Table 6 continued

Security Services

Monitoring

Inspection

Security
Department
Sourcing and
Audits

The outsourcing of security initiatives
to external organizations or persons
specializing in providing security to
supply chain management activities.
The process through which firms
continually evaluate their environments
to determine if current processes and
activities are within the predetermined
process limits.
The process of checking products and
processes to stop security breaches
from occurring in a secure network.
Organizational change process by
which executive management roles and
specific departments are specific roles
within the organization.
Organizational efforts to ensure the
number, quality, and type of suppliers
fit with the overall security approach.

Adding security
guards from a
third party firm.
Watching
customer
purchasing habits
looking for out of
range activity.
Checking the
contents of
packages before
putting them onto
a truck.
The addition of a
Chief Security
Officer.
Creating a detailed
checklist for
supply chain
partners.

However, given that supply chains have grown very complex in recent times, a
secure supply chain is not likely to only come from an organization’s own efforts.
Security is likely to be the result of another organization’s efforts too. Therefore, firms
are working with their supply chain partners to help assist in security efforts. This
interorganizational view suggests that all members of the supply chain have a role to play
when it comes to SCS. For the current research, these emergent collective efforts are
called interorganizational activities.
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Interorganizational Activities
Interorganizational activities are those in which many members of the supply
chain work with one another to create a secure supply chain and reduce vulnerability.
This is similar to the interorganizational view that dominates current SCM thought. From
a SCS perspective, it is a collectivist activity founded on the communal efforts of the
supply chain members. When discussing SCS activities from a collectivist standpoint,
respondents identified members of the supply chain and government agencies as having
an impact on security. The following quotes exemplify the importance of
interorganizational activities in securing the supply chain:
“To be efficient, supply chains need to be very tightly woven supply chain. I think
a firm is living in utopia if they think they can tackle supply chain security by
themselves. Everyone is realizing the importance of supply chain security and
they should be taking efforts together.” CEO, Logistics Information Firm
“Governments play a role too. They have all of their standards now and we have
to watch, adopt, learn, and obey those standards. They are definitely part of
supply chain security.” Senior Buyer
“If we worked more closely with our suppliers, we would be much more secure.
And the sad part is, it really wouldn’t take a lot in our industry,” Production
Control Manager.
“Security is driven by our customers because we are not asset based. Security is
driven by what our clients want, so sometimes we have to invest more resources
for a particular client.” Director of Account Management
The quotes above help identify that many firms take the collect approach to security in
the supply chain. These interorganizational activities share similarities to the SCM
activities presented by Mentzer et al. (2001). Core SCM activities such as partnering,
learning, collaboration, and communication were identified as critical to effective SCM.
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These were also identified as key activities to creating SCS. Each specific activity that
emerged from the qualitative research is discussed below.
Partnering
Much supply chain literature is focused on the partnerships developed between
organizations involved (e.g., Lambert, Emmelhainz, and Gardner 1996). Partnerships
emphasize mutuality, which means a long-term focus on mutual planning and problem
solving (Gunasekaran, Patel, and Tirtiroglu 2001). SCS literature follows this assertion
and suggested that SCS is the result of developing stronger partnerships with members of
the supply chain (e.g., Sheffi 2001). This means deeply engaging with direct and indirect
members of the supply chain, as well as any government initiatives that also interact with
the flow of goods. The respondents reiterated this notion. As SCS was discussed,
forming partnerships with other organizations in the supply chain was deemed a critical
activity:
“We partner with other companies who are secure; for example, our
transportation providers are a big part of our security strategy.” Senior Sourcing
Manager
“We are involved with C-TPAT and the FAST program (for crossing the
Canadian border). Another way we work with the government is that we will fax
all the paperwork over to the immigration/border folks an hour or so before our
trucks get there, so when they do arrive, the there isn’t the hassle to get through
there.” Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
“However, on our transportation side of the business, we are non-asset based. As
a result, we farm-out the security issues to the transportation providers. In other
words, it is their responsibility that we are safe.” CEO, 3PL
“One of our clients has a war room with scripting dedicated to how they would
react in this situation. This depicted who would be engaged, who would be
contacted, what the process was for allocation, how they would communicate,
they had a contingency list of who they could contact, and this plan updated on a
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quarterly basis. It was interesting that we were involved in that as a service
provider.” Director of Account Management
“We actually partner with a 3PL to hold these inventories for us. We wouldn’t
just partner with anyone on this.” VP of New Product Development
Thus, it is apparent that organizations find working with other firms to be a vital
component of SCS. The SCS activity of partnering can be defined as a tailored, deep
relationship built on security, where supply chain partners dedicate their own assets and
share security responsibilities.
Learning
Another theme that emerged from respondents was that SCS was the result of
learning the approaches of all supply chain parties. Previous research on learning would
suggest that learning is the process by which partnering firms reduce or eliminate
redundant costs, improve quality, and increase speed (Selnes and Sallis 2003). This is the
result of organizations gaining knowledge of one another. This research also found
aspects of learning, but it was specifically addressed through security efforts. Often
times, this involves members of the supply chain understanding the specific security
requirements that other members require. For example:
“Any time there is an incident, we do a full blown investigation with all involved
parties to determine what went wrong. We then make sure we take measures to
stop this from happening again. If something happens, we communicate a breach
very quickly to our other locations to make sure that they are not also at risk.”
Senior Sourcing Manager
“We worked across our vendor base – from suppliers, to carriers, to 3PL’s, they
all were included in our security efforts. However, we did have to do a lot of
education and push with them.” Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“We have had a carrier who on multiple occasions broke the seal before getting
to the customer location and the customer refused shipment. As a result, we had
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to the drop the carrier because they were having a detrimental effect on the
customer.” Senior Transportation Manager
“There is now a burden on every aspect of the business on security. On the
supply side, the impact has been minimal. There has been a big impact on the
customer side. They have now had to make drastic changes to there procedures
to handle our product. This has also changed the way we work with customers.
The results have been positive, but it was challenging at first because of the work
load. These have been both government initiatives and our own.” VP of New
Product Development
From the responses above, learning is defined as the security process by which
supply chain members gain knowledge and understanding of supply chain security efforts
of other supply chain members (including government agencies) which results in
modified behaviors and ultimately in security for the entire supply chain.
Adopting
Once security practices among partners are understood (learned), they need to be
put into practice. This is the process of adoption, which was another theme that emerged
from the qualitative interviews. This activity is the integration of new security practices
and measures with existing practices as suggested by other supply chain members or
government agencies. The adoption process can be formal or informal. For example,
formal adoption is illustrated by:
“We really had to work closely with the airlines to make sure that they were
securing our cargo as needed.” Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“We have worked very closely with our transportation providers to have them
adopt our security measures. A lot of our providers had a lot of measures in
place, but we also have our own, so our suppliers have adopted these standards to
remain one of our core carriers.” Senior Transportation Manager
“We got in with C-TPAT early on and it is a big part of everything that we do
now. We saw the writing on the wall with this one, so we though it was better to
get in early.” Manager of Supply Chain Business Development
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Informal adoption can be illustrated through:
“The other thing is that have come from this that our partners in the supply chain
– our carriers and our third parties warehousers have become much more
diligent and observant. From our standpoint, we are extremely happy with that”
Logistics Manager
“We are very proud of our security efforts. A good example of why is shown by a
number of our suppliers who have adopted many of our policies and procedures
as their own standard operating procedures.” CEO, Logistics Information Firm
The quotes from the respondents listed above illustrate the process by which firms
bring in new security efforts and blend those with their existing measures. Integrating
new security measures into existing measures as the result of working with other
organizations in the supply chain or government agencies is known as adoption.
Adopting is defined as the integration of new security practices and measures with
existing practices as suggested by other supply chain members or government agencies.
Collaboration
According to many of the respondents in the qualitative research, securing the
supply chain is the responsibility of all members. This is not a far deviation from much
of the research on SCM, in which collaboration is part of the overall relational effort and
is required for planning and discussions (Ellinger, Daugherty, and Keller 2000).
Organizations wishing to work with others collaboratively need to create a sense of unity
and synergy (Stank, Keller, and Daugherty 2001). Further, SCS collaboration is
supported by many SCS researchers as a normative measure (e.g., Sarathy 2006; Sheffi
2005b) to secure supply chain activities.
While one firm may be the initiator of security efforts, it is still the responsibility
of all firms within the chain to come together and work in a secure manner. In other
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words, collaborative security efforts are those where multiple firms have mutually
understood, shared security processes to achieve everyone’s security goals. As a result,
all firms working in the supply chain will need to work closely to create a sense of
security. For example,
“Securing the supply chain is a collaborative effort, period.” CEO, Logistics
Information Company
“Supply chain security is based on increased collaboration.” Consultant
“From a collaborative effort, that is the biggest thing is” knowing” who is
shipping what in the chain. Our carriers want to make sure that we are a known
shipper – that means that they need to know us really well. And, not only do they
know us very well, but we also make decisions with them.” Production Control
Manager
Formally, a collaborative supply chain security activity can be defined as supply chain
partners (including government agencies) working together jointly on security behaviors,
attitudes, efforts and decisions in the supply chain.
Compromising
The notion of compromising has been presented in research streams such as
negotiations. In particular, bargaining literature suggests that compromising is the action
by which parties each give something up to reach a middle ground (Froman and Cohen
1970, Kozan et al. 2006). The compromise is based on equal or reciprocal concessions
from both parties (Ganesan 1993). Compromising was also identified as an
interorganizational security activity taken by firms operating in a supply chain.
Not all respondents expressed excitement for the activities they were doing to
secure the supply chain. Compromises were often made to adhere to guidelines set forth
by other supply chain members or in some cases, government agencies. The compromise
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results in an organization altering practices or procedures in an effort to continue supply
chain operations and also create a sense of security.
“We raised the bar with the supply base that we worked with. Our suppliers
weren’t used to the security efforts that we were requiring. Take video
surveillance for example. We required cameras on their floor. They saw this as
big brother looking over their shoulder and as a result modified their operations.
This issue strained and modified a lot of relationships. There was supply base
reduction and push back because of this issue alone.” Procurement and Supply
Chain Manager
“We used to have trailers all over the city trying to totally tailor our operations to
each customer. Now, we don’t do that – the customers have to be willing to play
by our rules much more from a security standpoint. They don’t like it, but, that’s
the way it has to be now.” Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
Accordingly, compromising is defined as the process by which organizations
participate in security activities or initiatives in which they normally would not or do not
want to as a result of the desire to secure the supply chain.
Communicating
Another emergent theme from the interviews was the importance of open lines of
communication with all supply chain partners. Organizations identified the need for
access to other firms, at any time of day. They also stressed the sharing of critical
information that may prevent or minimize a supply chain breach. Organizations
participating in supply chains often have communication and information expectations
they have to meet.
“A big part of security is good communications with our suppliers and following
up with audits of their facilities.” Production Control Manager
“We require EDI capabilities from all our suppliers. We require GPS technology
from all of our carriers as well. In some our facilities, they are using GPS
technology in the trailer yard. It’s all about having and sharing that information”
Logistics Manager
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“We can’t anticipate everything, but I think we are as good as we can be. We
have effective lines of communication internally and externally and this includes
direct lines to the appropriate government agencies.” VP of Security
“To be considered a family carrier, we expect from EDI that we know that you
are here, you have been loaded, and you are ready to go and we’re leaving the
supplier. If they make it to any stop, we get a notification whenever they stop and
we know where they are at.” Materials Manager
As illustrated by the respondents, communication and information sharing is a critical
part of SCS. Organizations that are working together in the physical flow of goods rely
on one another for sharing and disseminating information. Communicating is defined as
the ability for all supply chain members to grant, share and transmit critical information
to one another to ensure security.
Camaraderie
An unanticipated theme that emerged from the qualitative research was how
unlikely security relationships developed. Respondents discussed SCS activities that
involved direct competitors. Several examples were offered whereby respondents shared
stories of alerting competitors to potential security breaches. For example:
“We get reports about any trailer or truck being stolen across the US – thus,
there is a lot more collaboration among all the manufacturers and suppliers. For
example, we have had product come up missing in the Southern California market
and it was determined that there a individual who was taking the product, who
said he was taking it to a local dump, but he was really taking our product and
selling it on the black market. When we raided his facility, we found that there
was a lot of other product from other manufacturers too. We contacted them and
worked together with them collaboratively breaking up these rings around the
country.” Logistics Manager
Other examples were offered whereby supplier firms took a mediator role to work with
competing firms to gain acceptance for security practices that work for everyone. In
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these instances, competing firms have accepted the fact they will have to work with the
supplier and competing firms to get products in a timely and secure manner. For
example:
“… if we are shipping a two stop, we’ll put together too food grade customers
who are likely competitors. When the first stop is made the seal is broken, the
driver and first customer verify the breaking and that nothing else happens.
Then, they go on to the next food grade customer who accepts the load as being
untampered with, even though the seal is broken. The customers are willing to
accept this solution for cost savings, but also so it doesn’t have to go LTL, where
their product may go through a lot of cross-docks and be exposed. As a result of
this, we may travel a little further to pick up shipments from several of our
facilities to get together on one outbound shipment. It has been kinda usual to see
competitors behave in this manner” Senior Transportation Manager
Camaraderie can be defined as process by which competing firms share information or
work together on security issues to ensure the overall supply chain is safe.

Summary of Interorganizational Activities
The descriptions from the qualitative interviews above illustrate tactical level
activities that organizations are conducting in conjunction with supply chain exchange
partners and government agencies. These activities, labeled interorganizational activities,
are the activities in which organizations partake with other organizations and the
government to ensure the secure flow of goods throughout the supply chain. In contrast
to intraorganizational activities, interorganizational activities are focused on the how
supply chain members can work as a collective whole to adopt activities for security.
These supply chain activities are primarily extensions of core SCM activities. These
efforts are presented in detail above and summarized in Table 7.
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Table 7
Summary of Interorganizational Activities
Interorganizational
Activity

Definition
A tailored, deep relationship built
on security where supply chain
partners (including government
agencies) dedicate their own
assets and share responsibilities.
The security process by which
supply chain members gain
knowledge and understanding of
supply chain security efforts of
other supply chain members
(including government agencies)
which results in modified
behaviors and ultimately in
security for the entire supply
chain.

Understanding why
customers return items
due to potential
security compromises.

Adopting

The integration of new security
practices and measures with
existing practices as suggested by
other supply chain members or
government agencies.

Making sure the
transportation provider
secures the cargo
properly.

Collaboration

Supply chain security activity in
which supply chain partners
(including government agencies)
work together jointly on security
behaviors, attitudes, efforts and
decisions in the supply chain.

Working with a
supplier base in order
to become C-TPAT
certified.

Partnering

Learning
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Example Activity
Two firms swap
employees to monitor
security process of each
other.

Table 7 continued

Compromising

The process by which
organizations participate in
security activities or initiatives in
which they normally would not or
do not want to as a result of the
desire to secure the supply chain.

Allowing customers to
put cameras in a
supplier facility.

Communicating

The ability for all supply chain
members (including government
agencies) to grant, share and
transmit critical information to
one another to ensure security.

Sharing proprietary
safety stock location
information.

Camaraderie

The process by which competing
firms share information or work
together on security issues to
ensure the overall supply chain is
safe.

Providing a competitor
with information
concerning a security
breach against them.

Summary of SCS Activities
The qualitative research suggests that organizations take a multitude of
approaches to secure the supply chains in which they participate. Respondents ranged
from adopting few to many of the intraorganizational and interorganizational activities
described here. For example:
“Companies are trying a myriad of many different things for security. They are
not relying on one strategy; they are working with many different things. For
example, isolationist and reactionary strategies taken exclusively will not work,
they need to work with others as well.” CEO, Consulting Firm
“We don’t have a specific strategy at our organization. It is a lot of little things
that we do that make us secure. For example, we are largely localized and
autonomous. We are a franchise model, so security can differ from all our
locations.” Senior Project Manager, Building and Construction
The quotes presented above lend legitimacy to the premise that organizations are using
multiple tactics as part of their informal security approach. This may not be uncommon:
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researchers have previously suggested that organizations may pursue multiple
organizational strategies when dealing with external pressure (e.g., Delmas and Toffel
2004, Goodstein 1994, Oliver 1991). The same sentiment is suggested here as a result of
the qualitative research. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H1a:

A multi-categorical supply chain security taxonomy exists.

H1b:

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’ supply chain security activities
are significantly different from one another.

Why Organizations Initiate Security: Institutional Theory and SCS
During the interviews, two themes emerged to describe why firms enact security
efforts in the first place. While never specifically asked about why they initiate SCS,
interviewees suggested that their organizations security efforts due to 1) pressures from
the environment in which they operate and 2) fear of the environment in which they
operate. As a result, an Institutional Theory perspective was adopted to build hypotheses
as to why organizations initiate SCS categories.
Institutional Theory posits four main points which are used to explain why and
how organizations approach supply security efforts. First, organizations are social
systems which continually change to fit their environment. Second, the environments in
which organizations operate create pressure to adopt norms, values, and practices. Third,
firms search for and adopt activities that make them seem legitimate. In other words,
there is a need to ‘fit in’ with other organizations in their environment and be seen as a
legitimate organization. Fourth, the search for legitimacy comes from adopting activities
that are institutionalized. Something has become institutionalized when it assists in
creating reality for an organization; including what can be done and what cannot
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(Hoffman 1999). Institutionalized activities are those that the environment has deemed
appropriate and creates pressure for other organizations to adopt. For example, Delmas
and Toffel (2004) suggest that institutional pressures arise from community and
environmental interest groups, governments, regulators, customers, competitors, industry
groups. These stakeholders impose coercive and normative pressures on firms to adopt
environmental management practices. Therefore, these institutionalized factors are
adopted by all organizations in the environment as the result of the pursuit of legitimacy.
In the qualitative research, respondents suggest that institutional pressures are
catalysts for enacting SCS categories. It is also interesting to note that Darnell (2006)
has specifically called for research on the impact of coercive pressures on the supply
chain. As a result, the following describes respondent’s perception of how the external
environment and Institutional Theory explain why organizations are creating SCS
categories
Through the qualitative interviews, respondents discussed SCS from a standpoint
of why and how it has impacted their organization. Respondents indicate that a variety
of environmental pressures caused firms to take action. For example, the following quote
indicates the power of security that can be brought about by environmental forces:
“After 9/11, security didn’t become cool, but it became okay to spend money on it.
Anytime we are having trouble pushing through a security initiative with a
supplier, all you really have to say is “this is the post 9/11 environment,” and you
don’t have to go any farther than that because whatever needs to get done gets
done.” Logistics Manager.
In this quote, it would suggest that SCS is itself becoming institutionalized. In other
words, SCS is something that is expected of members of a supply chain and if ignored or
not salient, the mere mention of it causes action.
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Firms specifically mentioned several sources that influence their SCS categories.
In particular, respondents mentioned the government, customers, competition, and
society as all playing a role in the formation of SCS categories. Along with each of those
external sources of is fear of the environmental pressures. For example, having
governmental sanctions imposed; failing customers; being seen as unsafe or causing harm
to the brand; and being responsible for harm to society were all fears that were
mentioned. Each of these external pressures is discussed in more detail below.

Government
“C-TPAT is the most voluntary, “non-voluntary” program in the history of the
U.S. government.” CEO, Consulting Firm
Since 9/11, the government has imposed many standards, policies, and procedures
for the flow of goods into, within, and out of the U.S. This was direct response to trying
to protect citizens from acts of terrorism and other potential threats. Prior to 9/11,
government initiatives for SCM were primarily focused on keeping the general public
from being exposed to potentially harmful contaminates. However, the role the
government plays in supply chains has changed. For example, as noted in a recent
Harvard Business Review article (referring to supply chains):
One area that’s quite different from what it was a few years ago is, of course,
security. The government has imposed, and is in the process of imposing, new
regulations and requirements, particularly on companies doing business overseas,
and a lot of them are not prepared for it, (Staff 2003b, p. 66).
The above quotes illustrate the impact that the government has had on
organizations due to security issues. The program listed in the quote, C-TPAT, is a
voluntary government program in which organizations have been encouraged to
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participate. However, with the pressure applied from governmental agencies, the choice
not to participate in this program may have serious detrimental effects for the firm.
These effects may include direct costs (e.g., longer lead times due to extra inspection in
ports of incoming goods) and indirect costs (e.g., losing potential customers as a result of
not being certified by government programs). Other research supports this notion of the
government creating pressure for organizations to adopt SCS. Eggers (2004) and Rice
and Spayd (2005) support the notion that compliance with government regulations or
voluntary programs are often the reason for investing in SCS. As a result, even the
voluntary programs create pressure for organizations to participate.
While most of the government initiatives are voluntary, some are mandatory. For
example, previous research suggests that fines of $25,000 per day can be imposed on
organizations by the Coast Guard as part of new DHS security requirements (Steinman
2004). The threat of sanctions often results in compliance. As a result, respondents
spoke of governmental security pressures as something they had to do, without any
choice. From this view, the government imposes security activities that an organization
has to participate in, with very little input on the initiative. This has altered the way firms
make decisions and may result in negative effects for some firms. For example:
“We abide by all bioterrorism laws and use those laws when making
organizational decisions.” Logistics Manager
“For medium to large companies, the two biggest components of supply chain
security are C-TPAT and export compliance. Most companies are dealing with
supply chain security from a regulatory/compliance standpoint only. Companies
are struggling to do other things: please customers, produce the products,
marketing and sales. Companies are viewing this as a necessary evil. This will
be their view until “it” happens to them. Most are trying to understand what the
minimal is to get by.” CEO, Consulting Firm
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Other respondents indicated that they were working with the government to adopt
and abide by the regulations being imposed. While the same pressure was applied from
the government, these respondents seemed to view the pressure as an opportunity to work
closely with the government. For example:
“We worked closely with the government on the NAFTA initiative.” Procurement
and Supply Chain Manager
“We were one of the first companies to train all of our employees in the Highway
Watch Program.” VP of Security
“We are involved with C-TPAT and the FAST (for crossing the Canadian border)
programs. Another way we work with the government is that we will fax all the
paperwork over to the immigration/border folks an hour or so before our trucks
get there, so when they do arrive, the there isn’t the hassle to get through there.”
CEO, Third Party Logistics Provider
“We follow the FEMA process for disaster management as part of our security
plan.” Production Control Manager
“We felt that it was critical to partner with the government.” Manager, Supply
Chain Business Development
“When it comes to security, I think that people are more diligent. The bioterrorism act and C-TPAT have helped to raise awareness.” Logistics Manager
“We educate and work with regulatory agencies about our industry.” [Referring
to partnering with the government on a TSA on a pilot program] VP of Security
Finally, respondents also discussed the impact that the governmental pressures
had on their customers. The respondents indicated that the government policies created
difficult situations for the exchange partners, but, often positive effects did emerge. This
may be the result of exchange partners working more closely and collaboratively to abide
by the governmental policies. For example:
“The nature of our product doesn’t allow us to ship to everyone. The government
watches that too. Senior Transportation Manager
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“Security is really important to us because we are under strict government
restrictions. We fear becoming notified that we are violating government laws.”
VP New Product Development
The qualitative research suggests that government pressure has caused firms to
engage in security initiatives. For this research, government pressure is a force,
persuasion, or invitation that is applied both implicitly and explicitly by governmental
agencies, which is adopted to comply or avoid sanctioning. This is not the first research
to indicate that the government is a form of environmental pressure that results in
response. Regulatory pressures, such as those imposed through the government, were
found to be a key initiator of ISO 14001 certification (Darnell 2006). When it comes to
SCS, laws and regulations have left many organizations with no choice but to dedicate
resources to security activities. Voluntary government programs, such as C-TPAT, are
becoming standards, such that organizations have to comply to stay competitive. Since
the government has taken such a large role in security, organizations are left with few
choices when it comes to their own security efforts. Government entities have created
security expectations which create pressure for compliance. Therefore,
H2:

Government pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Customers
“We do our security efforts for our customers first.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“For the most part, firms are implementing security efforts for commercial
considerations, such as customers demanding it.” CEO, Consulting Firm
“Security is driven by what our clients want, so sometimes we have to invest more
resources for a particular client.” Director of Account Management

129

The comments from respondents listed here suggest that environmental pressure
for SCS is being applied by customers. Customers create security expectations by which
suppliers (both material and service providers) must comply to retain business and remain
competitive. For example, the following comment illustrates that meeting customer
demands may be necessary to continue to grow:
“When a customer is looking for a supplier, the more secure you are, the more
likely you are to pass their first audit, and eventually win the business.”
Production Control Manager
In many instances, customers demand security efforts that are greater than the
measures that the government is imposing. Examples of this include 24 hour
accessibility to tracking information and to supplier personnel, special requirements in
the handling of goods, and documented emergency planning and response plans. The
following illustrate more demands that customers have imposed on suppliers to enhance
security:
“Even though we are in control, there is a communal effort to this too. We create
our standard operating procedure and distribute that to our suppliers. Everyone
who has anything to do with our product must adhere to these strict guidelines –
and there are no second chances, so they must learn quick.” Logistics Manager
“About a year ago we had a situation where we had some truckloads refused at
some of our largest customers. We had several trucks refused from a large fast
food chain not because our seals were broken, but rather because our seals were
not of a specific kind that they required. Customers have imposed those
standards on us that we use their specific seals. That was something we had to
get used to.” Logistics Manager
“We had to increase the size of our package for security efforts. We did a lot of
package redesign and every time, security was incorporated. Our customers
wanted bigger boxes. This had a detrimental impact on the supply chain. We had
to buy more corrugate, the boxes were bigger, so they weighed more, and we
couldn’t get as many on a pallet.” Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
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These quotes illustrate the pressure that customers have exerted on suppliers.
This pressure required respondents to make significant changes to meet customer
demands. There were even mentions of how customers required changes that were
detrimental to the supplier. In general, these respondents suggest that they fear failing
customers. Failing any customer because of a security issue would be extremely
devastating to an organization.
How customers are demanding security efforts from their suppliers was also
evident from respondent discussions. Many respondents spoke from their own customer
perspective. From this view, respondents discussed the expectations they created for
their suppliers. For example, the following quotes illustrate some of the demands that the
respondents, as customers, are bestowing on suppliers:
“We raised the bar with the supply base that we worked with. Our suppliers
weren’t used to the security efforts that we were requiring.” Procurement and
Supply Chain Manager
”We have had a carrier who on multiple occasions broke the seal before getting
to the customer location and the customer refused shipment. As a result, we had
to the drop the carrier because they were having a detrimental effect on the
customer.” Senior Transportation Manager
“We get surprised at how loose and lax our suppliers were with security,
specifically in terms of tracing and trace-ability of product. We have very good
records of products that have come into our control However, many suppliers
did not have the same capabilities. This is what has caused the interest in the
supplier certification program…We require EDI capabilities from all our
suppliers. We require GPS technology from all of our carriers as well.” Logistics
Manager
A prime example of the SCS customer pressures is illustrated by the demands
being imposed on the trucking industry. Many firms discussed the process of hiring
carriers who are seen as secure by providing evidence of safety, preparedness, and
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vigilance. Some firms referred to developing lists to accomplish this as their “family
carriers.” In order to become a “family carrier,” a provider would have to meet a
standardized set of guidelines, which were heavily laden with security requirements. For
example:
“We only hire carriers that are internally certified. This will help to make sure
that all goes as smoothly as possible.” Director of Account Management
“We partner this other companies who are secure, our transportation providers,
as part of our security strategy. We screen our suppliers very, very rigorously on
the front end before bringing them on.” Senior Sourcing Manager
“Especially with transportation/logistics providers, customers are dictating what
they need to do in terms of security efforts.” CEO, Consulting firm
While the trucking industry is used as an example, customer requirements and
creating approved supplier lists is practiced by all types of suppliers. This is likely to
continue as security expectations from customers are likely to continue to grow. As the
qualitative research supports, customers are increasingly making stringent demands of
their suppliers for security efforts. Customer pressure is defined as a force, persuasion, or
invitation that is applied both implicitly and explicitly by customers. This pressure has
been previously indicated as a pressure in which firms enacted a response. Market
pressures, such as those imposed by customers, were key initiators of achieving ISO
14001 certifications (Darnell 2006). Suppliers of all kinds are answering the call for
security through the development of programs, changes to operations, and as an
illustration to customers that their practices are secure. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
customers are a driving force behind SCS categories:
H3:

Customer pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy category.
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Competition
Competitive forces were another theme that emerged from the qualitative
research. The competitive environment creates pressure for firms to adopt a particular
SCS category. In many cases, security practices are mimicked among competing firms.
As a result, firms can often be similar when it comes to security efforts. For example:
“We don’t use security as a marketing tool enough. I think we have the tools and
skills; we just do not use it as a differentiator yet. In the future we are going to
have to though, because others around us [competitors] will be. The sad part is,
we’ll be looking at them [competitors] to figure what we should be doing.”
Director of Account Management.
Organizations partake in security efforts as the result of how others see them.
Creating the perception of security helps assist in creating legitimacy among peers.
Further, the perception of security suggests that the organization is legitimate and this
element may also have deterrent effects on potential security breaches. For example,
“Our flatbed division bought out some smaller companies. They still spend a lot
of money updating equipment to meet or exceed standards, and this also impacts
security. Part of security is perception. We don’t want our trucks going up and
down the road looking like junk. Not only would our customer and competitors
have a field day with that, I think it would just invite more people to try and attack
us.” Manager, Supply Chain Business Development.
The quote from this manager explains how the environment forces have caused
them to implement strategic initiatives for security efforts. Coupled with the other
discussions with respondents, the competitive marketplaces in which organizations
operate cause them to take security efforts seriously. In taking security seriously, firms
incorporate security efforts as an overall strategy. There may also be the feeling of
necessity in the competitive marketplace. The following response indicates that
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organizational brands are competitive advantages and firms fear any damage to them as it
could hurt their competitive position:
“Our biggest fear is that something contaminates; Our biggest fear is ending up
on the news – for whatever reason. We try to protect our brand because we’re a
brand driven organization. Specifically, if an bio-hazardous agent gets delivered
through us, well, there wouldn’t be anyway quicker to the news and a shutdown of
our organization.” Outbound Logistics Manager
Based on the qualitative research presented on competitors, it becomes salient that
the competitive marketplace is causing organizations to become more security minded.
Competitor pressure is defined as the pressure applied by the competitive marketplace
creating the desire to appear similar to others by mimicking structures, practices, or
outputs. This is similar to the mimetic force from Institutional Theory. This force is
used to explain why organizations in an environment end up looking similar to one
another. Mimetic force happens when institutions mimic one another’s structures,
practices, etc. More specifically, the competitive environments in which firms operate
create practices and actions that everyone in the environment adopts in an effort to
remain competitive. Also, adopting the actions of the competition can protect an
organization from the criticisms of competition (e.g., King and Lennox 2001). Finally,
this pressure has helped to explain why management practices are adopted when no
empirical evidence exists to indicate performance benefits (Abrahamson 1996). By
respondents discussing this, it appears that security efforts are also being put into place
by the competition in a mimicking fashion. As a result, is it hypothesized that:
H4:

Competitive pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy category.
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Society
The final pressures discussed as part of Institutional Theory are normative
pressures. Normative pressures are those that come from rules of thumb or just the sense
that this is something they should be doing. For example, Sheffi (2005b) notes that
organizations now have a higher responsibility to society for their assets and operations,
which ties directly to SCS. Sources of this pressure can come from formal education,
trade associations, professional groups, and even societal norms. This type of pressure
was evidenced from the qualitative research. Respondents often referred to activities that
benefited society and also to their fears of harming anyone. Two respondents from the
food industry clearly mentioned fear as a driving force of their security measures. Their
fear was based on the impact that they could have on society, if a security breach
happened at their organization.
“Contamination and bio-terrorism is what our top concern is. We are fully aware
that if something goes down in our supply chain, there are a lot of people that
could be negatively impacted.” Logistics Manager
“Compared to other products, ours are relatively inexpensive; however, if think
about the effect that our products could have if we were targeted, it is scary to
think about.” Outbound Logistics Manager
The two quotes above illustrate the fact that organizations fear the impact that
they might have on society. This fear can likely be attributed to the retributions that were
felt by many after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In that instance, societal pressures resulted in
many security activities being adopted. Other respondents referred to ‘what if’ scenarios
that caused fear. These scenarios were not the result of their direct impact on society, but
rather, were the result of if they were involved in a security breach of some kind. For
example:
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“We are concerned with manipulating our shipments; what if someone got a
malicious object within one or our shipments? That would be a big security issue.
We unfortunately do a lot of air freight both domestically and internationally. If a
terrorist got a bomb within one of our shipments, we would be in a very tough
situation as an organization…that situation might have dire impacts on innocent
people.” Production Control Manager
“My old company came at security much differently (rail company). If they had a
security breach, they would not only shut down the railroads, but the country
would shut down.” CEO, Third Party Logistics Provider
“We aren’t shipping certain products to certain customers in certain parts of the
world. While there may be gains for us in terms of sales, the overall benefit is
ensuring everyone’s well being.” Senior Transportation Manager
The respondents indicated that causing harm to society was a fear. It is
interesting to note that respondents mentioned the media and professional conferences as
sources of gathering information about security and society. One respondent mentioned
attending a conference session on pandemic flu. This session caused fear as he realized
that this organization would not only suffer from something like bird flu, but they might
also be inadvertently assisting in its distribution. Based on the comments by
respondents, societal pressures are defined as cultural values and norms in which
organizations attempt to benefit society through organizational behavior. Societal
pressures include “doing the right thing” attitudes and are causing organizations to take
on security efforts. As a result,
H5:

Societal pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

In conclusion, the environmental pressures that firms face can be very strong. As
evidenced in previous discussions, environments are continually setting expectations for
other firms when it comes to SCS. Institutional Theory helps to explain why firms are
divulging resources toward security efforts. This has helped to explain the ‘why.’ The
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next section will discuss what the outcomes of SCS categories are. In other words,
organizations are expending a lot of resources on SCS, but what are they getting for it?
SCS and Performance
The qualitative interviews were finalized with a discussion on SCS efforts and
firm performance. Respondents were asked about the effects that their specific SCS
approaches had on the performance of the organization. In order to gain a clear picture of
the performance of the firm, organizational performance was broken into four segments:
firm performance, market performance, customer performance, and supply chain
performance. In addition, these performance measures were chosen following the
suggestion of Autry and Bobbitt (forthcoming).
Firm performance was described to the respondents as the hard accounting and
financial measures of the firm, which are found on the balance sheet or annual report.
This is based on similar definitions by other researchers (i.e., Matsuno, Mentzer, and
Özsomer 2002). Firm performance is financial performance of an organization, as in
comparison to its main competitors. Indicators of firm performance included profit
margins, return on investment, and sales growth.
Venktraman and Ramanujam (1986) suggest that financial measures are not the
only measure of how firm is performing. They suggested that measures of how the firm
is performing in the marketplace should also be considered in assessing performance.
That philosophy was also adopted for this research. Market performance is the nonfinancial performance of an organization, as in comparison to its main competitors. The
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indicators for this during the qualitative interviews were market share, product quality,
product development, and relationships with suppliers.
The third performance measure is customer performance. Customer performance
is the organizational performance of satisfying customers and retaining customers
(including customer loyalty, satisfaction, and commitment), as in comparison to its main
competitors. The probes for this during the qualitative interviews were customer
retention, customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty.
Performance of the supply chain has also long been of interest to academic
researchers (e.g., Tan et al. 1998). Yet, to date, there is no consensus way to measure the
overall performance of a supply chain. For this research, supply chain performance is the
performance of an organization from the flow of goods from raw material to end user, as
in comparison to its main competitors. Probes in the qualitative research included
responsiveness, product availability, optimized inventory, and overall efficiency in the
flow of goods.

Firm Performance
Respondents were asked about how their SCS approaches impacted the financial
measures of the firm. A few respondents struggled with this question by trying to relate
the two variables. From this, it became clear that some firms did not the have ability to
know if their SCS approaches impacted financial measures. No clear consensus
developed among the respondents who were able to answer this question. The following
quotes illustrate positive, neutral, and negative impacts of SCS on firm financials (note
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that all of the following are responses to being asked about the impact that their SCS had
on firm performance):
Positive:
“Absolutely the firm performance is affected by security. We had a shooting at a
facility in the past couple of years and Wall Street hammered us for it. The same
thing will happen if we have a serious security breach in the supply chain and it
hits the newswire.” Logistics Manager
Neutral:
“We would have to have a huge loss or breach to have any impact on our firm
performance. Our freight breaches are not going to have an impact on financial
performance, but it will have a huge impact on our customers. If we have a
breach, we may be able to go out and find the material, which will recoup the
financial loss. However, you cannot make up lost time with your customers, even
if the material is found – that damage has already been done…if that happens
often, which it better not, financial suffering will eventually catch you.” Senior
Sourcing Manager
[Referring to firm performance] “Very little impact from supply chain security;
this is going to be difficult to get quantified.” CEO, Consulting Firm
Negative:
“This can be a regulation nightmare; anytime anyone wants to do anything, it is
virtually impossible. This is detrimental and we suffer all the way around from
it.” Production Control Manager
From these quotes and the rest of the interviews, is it clear that great variance
exists when it comes to understanding the relationship between SCS and firm
performance. In other words, the respondents indicated that as different SCS approaches
were deployed, different financial performance was achieved. Therefore:
H6:

Firm performance varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.
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Market Performance
Market performance showed extreme variance from the respondents much like
financial and supply chain performance. For example (note that all of the following are
responses to being asked about the impact that SCS had on market performance):
Positive:
“The security efforts that we did internally allowed us to be in some markets and
distribution channels that our competitors were not. Were able to grow across
and take share. As a result, we had a positive response on our market share.”
Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
Neutral:
“Market share is hard to determine whether or not security directly impacts it.”
CEO
“We have had an impact on our suppliers. I hesitate to say whether it is has been
positive our negative. We have raised the requirements for suppliers. It has been
positive for us, but I don’t know if it is has been positive for our suppliers or not.”
Materials Manager
Negative:
“Negative. Everybody tries to develop a good relationship with a supplier, but
our security efforts really inhibit that. I don’t have any direct evidence of this, but,
in my opinion, new product development has been hurt too. Everything has to
evolve around security, which just adds time and cost” Production Control
Manager
The variation in the relationship between SCS and market performance further
indicates a discrepancy between security categories and performance. Being consistent
with other performance measures, the relationship between SCS and market performance
was illustrated with much variation from the respondents. Security efforts taken by some
have allowed them to expand their market reach, having a direct positive impact on the
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market performance. Others suggest that the additional effort of security adds negative
attributes to all processes and products they do. As a result:
H7:

Organizational market performance varies depending on the supply chain
security taxonomy category.

Customer Performance
While customer performance was similar to the other performance measures in
that variation existed in respondents perceptions, there was not as much disparity. With
the exception of two respondents, there was generally a perceived positive relationship
between SCS activities and customer performance. For example (note that all of the
following are responses to being asked about the impact that their SCS had on customer
performance):
Positive:
“When a customer is looking for a supplier, the more secure you are, the more
likely you are to pass the first audit.” Production Control Manager
“Our customers liked the fact that we modified our packaging. They called for
changes and we made them, which our customers loved. These changes to the
packages also allowed the customers to handle their inventory much better.”
Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“Referring to the efforts that have been taken throughout the supply chain, I think
that our customers really realize that and feel comfortable buying our products.”
Outbound Transportation Manager
“Our national customers are much less likely to change now as a result of
security efforts. Some efforts are so stringent that a customer cannot afford to get
away from a customer.” Manager, Supply Chain Business Development
Negative:
“Customer Performance – our customers don’t care. They don’t care about our
supply chain security. They don’t want to know about it, they don’t want to pay
for it.” Material Manager
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“I feel that customers expect it, but don’t give us anything back for delivery on
security. Even though they have been a big cause of our security effects, they
really could not care less. They expect it, but we don’t get anything in return.”
Senior Buyer
The variation in responses may come from the position in the supply chain that
the firm resides. For example, a retail outlet will work with end consumers, while a raw
material supplier is likely to work with a manufacturer. These customers are inherently
different and security may have different levels of importance between them. Another
factor that may describe the variation is the product or service rendered. For example, a
transportation provider is likely to have high security expectations set forth by all
customers, while a small engine manufacturer may have little to no security expectations
set by their customers. It is likely however, that security efforts that are visible to the
customer that do not require extra resources or effort by them will likely be rewarded
positively. Therefore:
H8:

Organizational customer performance varies depending on the supply
chain security taxonomy category.

Supply Chain Performance
Similar to firm performance, respondents varied on their responses to the impact
that SCS measures had on the performance of the supply chain. The following quotes
help illustrate that point (note that all of the following are responses to being asked about
the impact that their SCS had on supply chain performance):
Positive:
“Absolutely; security and supply chain performance work hand in hand.”
Consultant
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“We have been able to increase our inventory turns as a result of our
partnerships. Reduced shrinkage, obsolesce, etc. from our partnerships.” Project
Manager
“It has had a positive impact on our supply chain performance. We now pass
more information back and forth with our suppliers, which will allow us to react
better and faster.” Materials Manager
Negative:
“It inhibits; it’s harder to do a same day shipment now. I have run into a few
times where containers have been held up trying to get through customs.
International shipping is worse; I have learned a lot that I never thought I would
about security trying to get things shipped internationally. It is a real
nightmare.” Production Control Manager
“This may have been negative because there were things that slowed us down.”
Procurement and Supply Chain Manager
“Security hinders performance [of the supply chain] because there are that many
more policies and procedures.” CEO, 3PL
“To a certain extent, our supply chain is slowed down as a result of supply chain
security. The policies and procedures are a hindrance. Additional steps and
procedures can slow everything down. And all these things have to be put in
place.” CEO, Logistics Information Firm
The respondents who suggested that security has had a positive impact on their
supply chain performance viewed security efforts as a blessing. The security initiatives
have helped with relationships upstream and downstream, which has made the flow of
product much easier. There was also mention of better inventory levels, which is
probably the result of better tracking and monitoring of inventory among supply chain
members. It is likely that these firms have fully embraced security efforts and used them
as an advantage in their operations.
There were also respondents who suggested that their supply chains suffered from
security efforts. These respondents often viewed security as a hindrance. The security
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procedures were prohibiting them from operating in an efficient manner. It is likely that
these firms are battling security initiatives and instead of proactively embracing security,
they are reactively doing what has to be done.
H9:

Organizational supply chain performance varies depending on the supply
chain security taxonomy category.
Conclusion and Model

To date, little empirical research has been conducted on the area of SCS. As a
result, this research is designed to shed light on what causes firms to deploy SCS
activities, what those categories are, and importantly, how those categories impact
organizational performance metrics. The qualitative research conducted and presented in
this chapter presents new findings on these issues. Thus, this qualitative research has
helped to gain understanding of each of these key areas of investigation. As a result, the
model (shown in Figure 3) and hypotheses (shown below) were developed. This allows
for empirical investigation into this phenomenon.
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Figure 3
Supply Chain Security Empirical Model
Hypothesis 1a:

A multi-categorical supply chain security taxonomy exists.

Hypothesis 1b:

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’ supply chain security
activities are significantly different from one another.

Hypothesis 2:

Government pressures result in organizations engaging in a level
of SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 3:

Customer pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 4:

Competitive pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.
Societal pressures result in organizations engaging in a level of
SCS activity congruent with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 6:

Firm performance varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 7:

Organizational market performance varies depending on the supply
chain security taxonomy category.
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Hypothesis 8:

Organizational customer performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 9:

Organizational supply chain performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

This research has three primary objectives. First, this research attempts to
identify how organizations are responding to external environmental pressures. Research
has yet to explain how organizations are responding to these environmental pressures
with SCS activities, which can be categorized. The qualitative research was conducted in
such a manner that SCS tactical activities, including intraorganizational and
interorganizational, were discussed. This allows a quantitative view of SCS categories
from a ‘bottom-up’ approach, whereby the tactical activities are used to describe the
overall SCS response. Further, through the qualitative research, respondents suggested
that a variety of approaches to tactical activities were taken to secure the supply chain.
As a result, it is hypothesized that many different responses exist for SCS (H1a and H1b).
The second objective of this research is dedicated to understanding what causes
firms to develop and embrace SCS categories. Several drivers of SCS categories were
identified during the qualitative research. Specifically, competitors, customers, society
and government programs were each identified as reasons for an organization to engage
in SCS formulation. These drivers are described by using Institutional Theory. This
theory has previously been used to describe how pressures from the external environment
cause firms to react and conform. It hypothesized that this theory will also explain why
firms partake in SCS categories (H2, H3, H4, H5).
The final objective of this research is to understand how the various SCS
categories impact organizational performance. Security efforts can cost firms large
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amounts of resources to secure the supply chain. Therefore, this objective is specifically
designed to understand how these expenditures are benefiting or hindering organizations.
From the qualitative research, it is clear that organizations, each taking different
approaches to SCS, gave very different perceptions of how their organizations performed.
As a result, it is hypothesized that different SCS categories will lead to different
organizational outcomes (H6, H7, H8, H9).
This research, with its three stated objectives, has the potential to fill important
gaps in academic literature as well as be very beneficial to practioners. The quantitative
assessment and existing literature provide the foundation for a model and hypotheses that
can be empirically assessed. Detailed descriptions of this empirical design and analysis
are provided in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY METHOD AND MEASUREMENT
Introduction
In this chapter, the study design for testing the theoretical model is detailed.
Specifically, this chapter discusses the survey development, construct measurement and
refinement, the pretest and results, main data collection, and data analysis procedures.
The intent of the research design is to reach a sufficient, targeted sample of executive
personnel from various industries working in SCM or related positions. Measurement
and analyses are consistent with prior literature.
In general, the objectives of the study are to understand what SCS categories
exist, what causes them, and how performance varies among different SCS categories.
Therefore, consideration has to be given in the study design to accomplish these goals
with one assessment of the same group. More details of the method are discussed in the
next sections.
Survey Development
Before any data collection can take place, a survey instrument to collect these data
must be created. The survey instrument includes measures designed to capture the
constructs of interest. These items include newly created measures and modified existing
measures. For example, new scales are developed for SCS activities. However, in
148

assessing organizational performance, modified scales are used (e,g., Matsuno, Mentzer,
and Ozsomer 2002). One of the primary goals of the survey is to create an efficient, easy
to understand and use survey. The specifics of how the constructs were measured are
described below.
Construct Definitions and Measurement
Item Generation
Following Churchill’s (1979) paradigm, an initial pool of items for measurement
was developed. Items were generated using literature reviews and qualitative research.
Item generation was done in a manner to capture all dimensions of the construct.
Engelland, Alford, & Taylor (2001) set forth guidelines for using borrowed scales, which
are focused around revalidation of the scales. These recommendations are used here.
Another consideration during item generation was to use multiple similarly worded items
to assess which wording may work best (e.g., Churchill 1979). In particular, several
steps were taken as part of this process:
Step 1: Evaluate each construct definition used in this research.
Step 2: Examine previous research for items that could be adopted or modified
for this research.
Step 3: Create additional items where previous measures did not exist in
accordance with the construct definition.
The following sections present more details on measuring drivers of SCS, SCS activities,
and organizational performance.
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Drivers of SCS Categories
The qualitative research and Institutional Theory suggest that organizations adopt
responses as the result of external environment pressure. Specifically, those pressures
come from four sources: the government, customers, competitors, and society. Each of
these sources was assessed to determine their impact on SCS category type.
According to Institutional Theory literature, coercive, mimetic, and normative
pressures result in institutionalized actions and behaviors. It is noted and adopted here
that previous research has empirically tested the source of the pressure as an alternative to
the pressure itself. This is likely due to the difficulty in empirically distinguishing
between the three sources of pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Following previous
research and the qualitative research, the empirical analysis assessed the sources of
pressure.
This is not the first research to assess institutional drivers as they impact
organizational action. As a result, previous research was used for adopting/modifying
items, in addition to creating new measurement items. Table 8 presents the initial
measures created to measure the four drivers of SCS security.
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Table 8
Scale Items Measuring Drivers of SCS
Government Pressures are forces, persuasions, or invitations that are applied both
implicitly and explicitly by governmental agencies, which are done to comply or
avoid sanctioning.
The U.S. Government…
1 Requires us to adopt security activities.
2 Pressures us into adopting their supply chain security practices.
3 Is likely to deploy sanctions if we do not develop a supply chain security
strategy.
4 Is critical in putting supply chain security as top of mind throughout our
organization.
5 Is credited with getting us started on supply chain security.
6 Provides incentives for us to develop a supply chain security strategy.
Customer Pressures are forces, persuasions, or invitations that are applied both
implicitly and explicitly by customers.
Our customers that are crucial to us…
1 Require us to develop a supply chain security strategy.
2 Are likely to leave us if we do not develop a supply chain security strategy.
(adapted from Khalifa and Davidson 2006)
3 Encourage us to develop a supply chain security strategy. (adapted from
Khalifa and Davidson 2006)
4 Pressure us into adopting a supply chain security strategy.
5 Demand more security in the supply chain.
Competitor Pressures are pressures applied by the competitive marketplace which
creates the desire to appear similar to others by mimicking structures, practices, or
outputs.
Our main competitors that have adopted supply chain security practices…
1 Pressure us into adopting supply chain security practices.
2 Are critical in putting supply chain security as top of mind throughout our
organization.
3 Are a driving force behind our supply chain security efforts.
4 Have benefited greatly compared to us. (Adapted from Teo, Wei, and
Benbasat 2003)
5 Have realized great success.
6 Are more competitive. (adopted from Khalifa and Davidson 2006)
7 Are perceived more favorably by customers. (Adapted from Teo, Wei, and
Benbasat 2003 and Khalifa and Davidson 2006)
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Table 8 continued
8
9
10

Are perceived more favorably by suppliers. (Adapted from Teo, Wei, and
Benbasat 2003)
Are perceived more favorably by others in the same industry. (Adapted from
Teo, Wei, and Benbasat 2003)
Are perceived more favorably by the U.S. Government. (Adapted from Teo,
Wei, and Benbasat 2003)

Societal Pressures are cultural values and norms in which organizations attempt to
benefit society through organizational behavior.
In general, society…
1 Benefits from our supply chain security strategy.
2 Requires us to develop a supply chain security strategy.
3 Is considered when our organization thinks about supply chain security.
4 Is a safer place as the result of our supply chain security strategy.
5 Is a driving force behind our supply chain security efforts.

SCS Activities
The qualitative research served as the foundation for creating construct definitions
and measurement items for numerous SCS activities. For each of the 19 identified SCS
activities (12 intraorganizational and 7 interorganizational), construct definitions were
crafted and guided the development of multiple scale items to measure each of the
identified activities. As the SCS activities emerged from the qualitative research,
measurement items failed to exist for most of the activities and as a result, initial items
were generated to measure each of the SCS activities. The initial items generated to
measure each of the intraorganizational SCS activities are presented in Table 9.
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Table 9
Scale Items Measuring Intraorganizational SCS Activities
INTRAORGANIZATIONAL SCS ACTIVITIES
Supply Chain Security Culture is the overall organizational philosophy that
creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing
and projecting norms and values of vigilance to support secure activities.
Our company…
1 Creates a supply chain security focus among all employees.
2 Makes sure that supply chain security is the first thing on the mind of all
employees.
3 Makes supply chain security the norm for all employees.
4 Dedicates efforts to create a security-focused workforce.
5 Makes sure that that all employees are vigilant toward security.
Avoidance is the security activity of actively staying away from suppliers,
customers, or geographic locations, which pose a potential threat to supply chain
security.
Our company avoids…
1 Risky supply chain situations.
2 Anything that may cause harm to our supply chain.
3 Suppliers who present high risk.
4 Customers who present high risk.
5 Business in parts of the world that presents high risk.
Operation Modification is an organizational change to core supply chain
activities, including operational procedures, inventory levels, and transportation in
an effort to create supply chain security.
Our continuously makes changes to…
1 The way our supply chain operates.
2 Specific supply chain activities.
3 Our core business processes.
4 How our supply chain operates with suppliers.
5 How our supply chain operates with customers.

153

Table 9 continued
Quality is the use and deployment of the best available resources, technology, and
processes to enhance security efforts.
Our company…
1 Focuses on quality with all supply chain operations.
2 Makes sure all of our processes/procedures are the best they can be.
3 Procures best in class products and services.
4 Spends the extra money to make sure that anything best in class is procured.
5 Uses quality to create security.
6 Puts time and effort into making sure we have quality built into our supply
chain.
7 Makes sure everything in our supply chain is done to the best of our ability.
Facilities Hardening is any effort taken within the organization to physically
secure and prevent supply chain security breaches from occurring.
Our company takes extra care to…
1 Consider how our facilities might be breached and cause harm to our supply
chain.
2 Consider how to prevent supply chain security breaches at our facilities.
3 Create physical facilities that will not suffer a security breach.
4 Make our facilities secure from supply chain breaches.
5 Make our facilities impenetrable.
Access Restriction is the process of allowing those who should have access to
facilities have access, only in appropriate areas, while also limiting and monitoring
the access of individuals who are not part of the organization.
Our company takes extra care to…
1 Create restricted access areas at our facilities.
2 Create designated areas where visitors are allowed within our facilities.
3 Strictly control all access to our facilities.
4 Restrict the access of visitors to our facilities.
5 Control the access of our employees throughout our facilities.
6 Know where everyone is within our facilities at all times.
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Table 9 continued
Combating Complacency are the activities taken to prevent the overindulged sense
of accomplishment and satisfaction that promotes the reluctance for more proactive
engagement in security activities.
Our company…
1 Conducts supply chain security exercises in order to combat complacency.
2 Makes employees continuously engage in security activities.
3 Finds ways to eliminate complacency among our employees.
4 Never allows our employees to let their guard down when it comes to supply
chain security.
5 Keeps our employees motivated toward creating supply chain security.
Security Services are the outsourcing of security initiatives to external
organizations or persons specializing in providing security to supply chain
management activities.
Our company…
1 Works with external parties who specialize in security to create supply chain
security.
2 Creates security in the supply chain by working with security firms.
3 Chooses to place the responsibility of supply chain security on security firms.
4 Outsources supply chain security activities to private security firms.
5 Has made an internal decision to not bear the entire burden of supply chain
security.
Monitoring is the process through which firms continually evaluate their
environments to determine if current processes and activities are within the
predetermined process limits.
Our company has the ability to…
1 Know where everything is at all times.
2 Keep a very close watch on everything in an effort to know when a potential
breach may be occurring.
3 Conduct continuous analysis to make sure everything is normal (or within
predetermined ranges).
4 Know that all operations are going as planned.
5 Immediately know when something is not going as planned.
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Table 9 continued
Inspection is the process of checking products and processes to stop security
breaches from occurring in a secure network.
Our company…
1 Conducts analysis of product/services to ensure adequacy.
2 Proactively makes sure that our product/services are as planned.
3 Checks for any contraband in our product/services to prevent them from
being distributed.
4 Takes efforts to check for potential security breaches before our
product/service is delivered.
5 Diligently looks at products and processes before being delivery to prevent
security breaches
Security Department is an organizational change process by which executive
management roles and specific departments are specific roles within the
organization.
Our company…
1 Dedicates internal departments to exclusively work on supply chain security.
2 Involves upper management to deal with supply chain security.
3 Dedicates a senior management position solely to security efforts.
4 Allocated resources for full time employment for supply chain security
efforts.
5 Views supply chain security as a priority and provides full-time employees to
manage it.
Security Sourcing and Audits are organizational efforts to ensure the number,
quality, and type of suppliers fit with the overall security strategy.
Our company…
1 Tries to bring on suppliers who enhance our security initiatives.
2 Creates a supply base that fits with our supply chain security strategy.
3 Develops a supply base that is dedicated to our security initiatives.
4 Uses detailed audit to assess supplier security capabilities.
5 Dedicates resources to finding suppliers who fit with our security strategy.
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Since some of interorganizational activities are common to SCM terminology, previous
literature could be reviewed to assist in item generation.
Each of the interorganizational SCS activities and the items used to measure them
are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10
Scale Items Measuring Interorganizational SCS Activities
INTERORGANIZATIONAL SCS ACTIVITIES
Partnering is defined as a tailored, deep relationship built on security where
supply chain partners (including government agencies) dedicate their own assets
and share responsibilities.
Our company…
1 Shares security responsibilities with other members of our supply chain.
2 Dedicates security assets with other supply chain members.
3 Cultivates deep relationships for security purposes.
4 Partners with the U.S. government for security purposes.
5 Partners with other members in our supply chain for security purposes.
Learning is the security process by which supply chain members gain knowledge
and understanding of supply chain security efforts of other supply chain members
(including government agencies) which results in modified behaviors and
ultimately in security for the entire supply chain.
Our company works to…
1 Adjust our common understanding of security needs. (adapted from Selnes and
Sallis 2003)
2 Evaluate security measures in the supply chain. (adapted from Selnes and
Sallis 2003)
3 Continually improve our security measures. (Adapted from Sujan, Weitz, and
Kumar 1994)
4 Understand exactly what other firms expect from us in terms of security.
5 Modify the security efforts of other members of the supply chain.
6 Make sure supply chain members know about the nature of our security
requirements.
7 Make sure supply chain members abide by our security requirements.
8 Learn about supply chain security requirements from other supply chain
members.
9 Learn about supply chain security requirements from the U.S. Government
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Table 10 continued
Adopting is the integration of new security practices and measures with existing
practices as suggested by other supply chain members or government agencies.
Our company works to…
1 Incorporate the supply chain security practices of our partners into our own
actions.
2 Integrate existing and new supply chain security measures.
3 Bring together new supply chain security practices with existing measures.
4 Adopt supply chain security practices of our supply chain members.
5 Adopt supply chain security practices suggested by the U.S. Government.
Collaboration is a supply chain security activity in which supply chain partners
(including government agencies) work together jointly on security behaviors,
attitudes, efforts and decisions in the supply chain.
Our company works with…
1 Other members of our supply chain to exploit security opportunities. (Adapted
from Sinkovics and Roath 2004)
2 Other supply chain members to create supply chain security.
3 Supply chain members to look for synergistic ways to create security.
(Adapted from Sinkovics and Roath 2004)
4 Supply chain members to develop new security efforts.
5 Supply chain members to share proprietary security information. (Adapted
from Sinkovics and Roath 2004)
6 The U.S. Government to create supply chain security.
Compromising is the process by which organizations participate in security
activities or initiatives in which they normally would not or do not want to as a
result of the desire to secure the supply chain.
Our company…
1 Takes efforts to stop unpleasant security activities with a supply chain
member. (Adapted From Kozan et al. 2006)
2 Makes proposals to establish some middle ground on security issues. (Adapted
From Kozan et al. 2006)
3 Takes efforts to find resolve for security issues with a supply chain member.
(Adapted From Kozan et al. 2006)
4 Makes compromises for supply chain security practices with our supply chain
members.
5 Makes compromises for supply chain security practices with the U.S.
Government.
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Table 10 continued
Communication is the ability for all supply chain members (including government
agencies) to grant, share and transmit critical information to one another to ensure
security.
Our company makes sure…
1 That our supply chain members keep us informed of security issues. (Adapted
from Morgan and Hunt 1994)
2 To keep our supply chain partners informed on security issues. (Adapted from
Morgan and Hunt 1994)
3 Our supply chain members keep us informed of new security developments.
(Adapted from Knemeyer et al. 2003)
4 Our supply chain members communicate their security expectations clearly.
(Adapted from Knemeyer et al. 2003)
5 Our supply chain members let each other know as soon as possible of any
unexpected problems with security. (Adapted from Anderson and Narus 1990)
6 Our supply chain members agree to share critical information among all chain
members to ensure security.
7 To communicate with other supply chain members to ensure supply chain
security.
8 To communicate with the U.S. Government to ensure supply chain security.
Camaraderie is the process by which competing firms share information or work
together on security issues to ensure the overall supply chain is safe.
Our company…
1 Works with our competitors on supply chain security issues.
2 Would let our competition know about a serious supply chain security breach.
3 Will work with our competition in order to make our supply chain more
secure.
4 Cooperates with competing organizations to make supply chains more secure.
5 Will work with our competition in order to make our supply chain more
secure.
6 Feels that supply chain security requires the involvement of our competitors.
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Performance
The final objective of this research was to understand how organizational
performance varies among the different types of SCS categories. The various
organizational performance constructs were based on previous literature and supported by
the qualitative research. The four organizational performance constructs measured here
are: firm performance, market performance, customer performance, and supply chain
performance. Each is described in more detail below.
First, the overall performance of the firm was assessed. The firm performance is
financial outcomes of the organization, as in comparison to its main competitors.
(Matsuno, Mentzer, and Ozsomer 2002). Firm performance is most often measured
subjectively in marketing and strategic management research (Golden 1992; Verhage and
Waarts 1988). Although financial performance has been of interest to researchers, what
constitutes firm performance and how it is measured is ambiguous.
There have been many, similarly proposed constructs for firm performance of an
organization. Firm performance evaluates the performance of profit levels, profit
margins, and ROI compared to the largest competitor (Hooley et al. 2005). Firm
performance of an organization has also been evaluated in a comparative nature to the
industry average through return on investment, return on all sales, and profit (Claycomb,
Germain, and Droge 1999). Also, comparative organizational performance compares
organizations to the industry average on profits, return on assets, and inventory turnover
ratio (Badri, Raghunathan, Bagchi 1994).
It is possible that various constructs for performance have been created because
determining actual performance of the firm has proved to be a difficult task for
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researchers. Often, performance of the firm is based on an attitudinal measurement of
performance, as opposed to using actual performance data (e.g., Powell 1992, Powell and
Dent-Micallef 1997; Tan 2002). Using attitudes toward firm performance has been found
to be a strong surrogate for actual performance, using key informants (e.g, Morgan,
Kaleka, and Katsikeas 2004). For example, Tan, Kannan, and Handfield (1998) used a
nine item scale for firm performance that were highly correlated with financial indicators
from a sub-sample of 75 companies in the Dun and Bradstreet financial database, thus
suggesting that attitudinal performance measures are a strong surrogate for actual
financial performance. Sample items from that research include: return on assets, overall
production costs, and annual sales growth. Other work has suggested that measures for
firm performance include growth of market share, percentage of new product sales to
total sales, and return on investment (Matsuno et al. 2002). Ellinger, Daugherty, and
Keller (2000) posit that performance is relative to the largest competitor, where
respondents evaluated profitability, sales growth, and overall customer satisfaction.
Finally, firm performance has also been viewed as the level at which an organization met
its expectations, exceeded the competition, and satisfied top management (Olson, Slater,
and Hult 2005). These items are listed in Table 11.
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Table 11
Scale Items Measuring Firm Performance
Firm performance is financial outcome of the organization, as in comparison to its
main competitors.
Percentage of sales generated by new products (From Matsuno, Mentzer, and
1 Özsomer 2002)
2 Return on investment (From Matsuno, Mentzer, and Özsomer 2002)
3 Profitability (Ellinger, Daugherty, and Keller 2000)
4 Sales growth (Ellinger, Daugherty, and Keller 2000)
5 Return on assets (Tan, Kannan, and Handfield 1998)
The second performance measure is market performance. It has been suggested
that performance of the firm be measured not only by financial performance, but also
with important operational (or nonfinancial) performance measures (Ittner and Larcker
1997; Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986). This is an important distinction, as financial
measures may not tell the entire story of how an organization performs. Market
performance includes market share, new product introduction, product quality, marketing
effectiveness, and manufacturing value-add (Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986).
Researchers have used this suggestion to assess the construct of market performance
(e.g., Bonner et al. 2005; Hooley et al. 2005; Lee and Cavusgil 2006). Formally, market
performance is the non-financial performance of an organization, as in comparison to its
main competitors (adapted from Ittner and Larcker 1997; Venkatraman and
Ramanujam1986). These nonfinanical goals include evaluations of market share, product
quality, market performance, and marketing effectiveness.
Frequently, this construct has been measured with four items asking a manager’s
perception of their organization relative to the largest competitors. The items of
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measurement include sales growth, market share, market development, and product
development (e.g. Bonner et al. 2005; Lee and Cavusgil 2006). Additional items of
measurement have included sales volume (Hooley et al. 2005). These items are listed in
Table 12.
Table 12
Scale Items Measuring Market Performance
Market Performance is the non-financial performance of an organization, as in
comparison to its main competitors.
1 Sales volume (Venktraman and Ramanujam 1986)
2 Market share (Venktraman and Ramanujam 1986)
3 Market development (Venktraman and Ramanujam 1986)
4 New product/Service development (Venktraman and Ramanujam 1986)
5 Brand equity (Venktraman and Ramanujam 1986)
Third, the customer performance of the firm was assessed. Customer loyalty and
satisfaction are dominant concepts in the marketing literature. Creating satisfied and
loyal customers is a primary goal of marketing initiatives (Dick and Basu 1994; Hooley
et al. 2005). As a result, all marketing activities should focus on satisfaction and loyalty
(Hooley et al. 2005). Market orientation supports this, suggesting that all organizational
activities are geared toward the customer (e.g., Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and
Slater 1990). Previous research on customer performance has used measures of customer
loyalty and customer satisfaction levels, as compared to competitors (Hooley et al. 2005).
Interest in customer performance is not exclusive to the domain of marketing.
Successful SCM involves integrating suppliers and customers (Tan et al. 1999). As a
result, understanding how supply chain activities enhance customer performance is of
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utmost importance for the organization. As adapted from Hooley et al. (2005), customer
performance is formally defined as the organizational performance of satisfying
customers and retaining customers (including customer loyalty, satisfaction, and
commitment), in comparison to main competitors. These items are listed in Table 13.
Table 13
Scale Items Measuring Customer Performance
Customer Performance is the organizational performance of satisfying customers
and retaining customers (including customer loyalty, satisfaction, and
commitment), in comparison to main competitors.
1 Customer loyalty (Adapted from Hooley et al. 2005)
2 Customer satisfaction (Adapted from Hooley et al. 2005)
3 Customer commitment (Adapted from Hooley et al. 2005)
Finally, the performance of the supply chain was assessed. Supply chain
performance has been heavily researched (Maloni and Benton 2000; McCarthy and
Golicic 2002; Thron, Nagy, and Wassan 2006). Constructs similar to supply chain
performance have also been introduced. For example, Stank, Crum, and Arango (1999)
present an absolute performance of logistics, which is a general account of productivity
and performance that was adapted from several guides from logistics organizations
(example measure: “our firm has seen a decrease in warehousing”). Others have
measured supply chain performance through responsiveness, product availability,
assurance, optimized inventory, and increased revenue and earnings (McCarthy and
Golicic 2002).
There has been strong interest in supply chain performance, yet no clear definition
of supply chain performance exists. In following other performance measures, supply
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chain performance is conceptualized as a perception of efficiency in the flow of goods as
compared to competitors. Specifically, supply chain performance is the performance of
an organization in the flow of goods from raw material to end user, as in comparison with
its main competitors (adapted from Maloni and Benton 2000). Table 14 presents the
items generated to measure supply chain performance.
Table 14
Scale Items Measuring Supply Chain Performance
Supply Chain Performance is the performance of an organization in the flow of
goods from raw material to end user, as in comparison with its main competitors.
1 Purchasing costs (N/A for service providers) (Brewer and Speh 2000)
2 Inventory management (N/A for service providers) (Brewer and Speh 2000)
3 Defect rate (N/A for service providers) (Ramdas and Spekman 2000)
4 Order processing time (Ramdas and Spekman 2000)
5 Quality (Brewer and Speh 2000)
6 Delivery failure (Brewer and Speh 2000)
7 Nonvalue-added time (Brewer and Speh 2000)
Variety of product offered to our customers (adopted from Brewer and Speh
8 2000)
Variety of service offered to our customers (adopted from Brewer and Speh
9 2000)
10 Cycle time (adopted from Brewer and Speh 2000)
11 Shipment accuracy (Ramdas and Spekman 2000)
Scale Development Procedures
The previous section describes the item generation to develop scales to capture
the constructs of interest in this research. As the majority of these items have been newly
created for the purpose of this dissertation, Churchill (1979) served as a guide for
developing accurate scales to measure each construct. In particular, continuing from the
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initial steps above, the following steps were followed to assist in the scale development
process:
Step 4: Use an academic panel to assess content validity. Modify items and
definitions as needed to reflect comments by the experts
Step 5: Use an industry expert panel to assess face validity. Modify items and
definitions as needed to reflect comments by the experts
Step 6: Conduct pretest. Purify measures by assessing reliability,
dimensionality, and validity.
IRB Approval
Once the draft of the survey was completed, it was submitted to the Internal
Review Board (IRB) at Mississippi State University prior to proceeding with step four
through six listed above. This application was an extension of the IRB approval gained
to conduct the qualitative analysis.
Consistent with requirements of the IRB, when distributing the survey to the
subjects, efforts were taken to ensure they understood their rights as human subjects.
This was accomplished by the respondents reading a statement concerning participant
rights before starting the survey. By reading the statement and continuing with the
survey, they were agreeing to participate. A critical part of this approval and
participation by the subjects was the clarification that this research is strictly confidential.
Expert Panels
Once IRB approval was received, multiple subject matter experts were used to
evaluate content and face validity, instructions, clarity of items, and representativeness.
This is an essential part of generating new measurement items. Content validity is
defined as the degree to which items are representative of the construct of interest
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(Haynes et al. 1995). Face validity is defined as an instrument (or an item) that appears
to be valid, in addition to being actually being valid (Nevo 1985).
Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma (2003) suggest that all parts of the survey,
including items, responses formats, scale points, and directions should be expertly
reviewed for representativeness by expert judges. They recommend using five expert
judges for content validity and five target population judges for face validity to assess
definition and domain. Following this recommendation, two expert panels were used for
this research.

Academic Expert Panel
The first expert panel consisted of academics, who were asked to review the
survey for content validity. All experts were contacted via email, which included a link
to the online survey. For this expert panel, the online survey provided all construct
names, definitions and a list of questions generated to assess the construct. The scaling
used a Likert 1-7 format (1=Does not fit the definition at all; 7=Completely fits the
definition), where academic experts assessed the degree to which the measurement item
fit with the construct definition. Immediately following the measurement items, openended text boxes were presented. This allowed the experts the ability to write comments
and provide feedback.
Eight academic experts, who were designated to be experts in either scaling
procedures or SCM, agreed to participate in the expert panel. These eight individuals
were sent an email with a link to the survey and directions. The academics were asked to
provide a response time in 10 days. In all, five responses were received. The academic
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expert panel provided in-depth analysis and feedback, which allowed for multiple
changes to be made. For example, in addition to the reviewing the individual items, the
respondents also provided feedback that resulted in wording changes to the item stem.
For each measurement item, average response scores were calculated. To implement
these changes, decision rules were formed. The decision rules were:
1. If not comments were provided, only items that had high average response
scores (above 6.0) would be retained in the scale. Those with low average
scores would be dropped.
2. Items with high average response scores would be retained, but could be
slightly revised, if comments were directly related to the question.
3. Items with low average response scores could be retained if specific
comments were made on the item that allowed the wording to be
improved.
Changes included dropping 17 items and making wording changes to 43 others. A
complete review of all changes academic panel is shown in Table 15. In this table, only
items or stems which were changed or dropped are presented. Also, the original item
number from Tables 8-14 is presented in the first column. Additionally, the question as
originally stated is presented in the column named “previous”. In the middle column, the
average response score across the five panelists rating how the well the item fit the
definition is presented. Finally, in the last column, named “revised,” illustrates the
updated item from the industry experts is shown (note that if a change to the item stem
was implemented, it is indicated by an *).
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Table 15
Changes Made to the Survey Based on Academic Expert Review
Item
Number

Average
Previous
Score
Customer Pressure
Average
Score

5

Our customers that are
crucial to us…
Require us to develop a
supply chain security
strategy.
Are likely to leave us if we
do not develop a supply
chain security strategy.
Encourage us to develop a
supply chain security
strategy.
Pressure us into adopting a
supply chain security
strategy.
Demand more security in the
supply chain.

2

Government Pressure
Average
Score
The U.S. Government…
Pressures us into adopting
their supply chain security
practices.
6.6

3

Is likely to deploy sanctions
if we do not develop a supply
chain security strategy.

1
2
3
4

4
5

Is critical in putting supply
chain security as top of mind
throughout our organization.
Is credited with getting us
started on supply chain
security.

170

Revised

6.8

Our customers that are
crucial to us…
Require us to develop
supply chain security
activities.
Are likely to leave us if
we do not develop supply
chain security activities.
Encourage us to create a
supply chain security
activities.
Pressure us into adopting
a supply chain security
activities.

5.2

Dropped Item

6.2
7
6

5.8

The U.S. Government…
Pressures us into
adopting its supply chain
security activities.
Is likely to deploy
sanctions if we do not
develop supply chain
security activities.
Is responsible for making
supply chain security a
priority to our
organization.

5.2

Dropped Item

6.8

Table 15 continued

6

Provides incentives for us to
develop a supply chain
security strategy.

5.6

Dropped Item

Competitor Pressure

1

Our main competitors that
have adopted supply chain
security practices…
Pressure us into adopting
supply chain security
practices.

Average
Score
5.6

4
5

Are critical in putting supply
chain security as top of mind
throughout our organization.
Are a driving force behind
our supply chain security
efforts.
Have benefited greatly
compared to us.
Have realized great success.

6

Are more competitive.

7

Are perceived more
favorably by customers.

4.4

8

Are perceived more
favorably by suppliers.

4.4

2
3

4
5.4
3
3.4

4
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Our main competitors
that have adopted supply
chain security
practices…
Have created pressure for
us to adopt supply chain
security activities.
Are responsible for
making supply chain
security a priority to our
organization.
Create the need for us to
copy their supply chain
security efforts.
Dropped Item
Dropped Item
Are more competitive,
which has resulted our
mimicking of their
supply chain security
activities.
Are perceived more
favorably by customers,
which has resulted our
mimicking of their
supply chain security
activities.
Are perceived more
favorably by suppliers,
which has resulted our
mimicking of their
supply chain security
activities.

Table 15 continued

9
10

Are perceived more
favorably by others in the
same industry.
Are perceived more
favorably by the U.S.
Government.

4.2

Are perceived more
favorably by others in the
same industry, which has
resulted our mimicking
of their supply chain
security activities.

3.8

Dropped Item

Societal Pressure
Average
Score

2

In general, society…
Benefits from our supply
chain security strategy.
Requires us to develop a
supply chain security
strategy.

4

Is a safer place as the result
of our supply chain security
strategy.

4

5

Is a driving force behind our
supply chain security efforts.

6.8

1

3.8
6.8

In general, society…
Benefits from our supply
chain security activities.
Requires us to develop a
supply chain security
activities.
Needing to becoming a
safer place results in us
developing supply chain
security activities.
Is a driving force behind
our supply chain security
activities.

Operation Modification

*

In order to create supply
chain security, our
company has made
changes to…

Our company continuously
makes changes to…
Quality

*
5

Our company…
Uses quality to create
security.
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Average
Score

In order to create supply
chain security, our
company…

5.6

Dropped Item

Table 15 continued
Facilities Hardening
Our company takes extra
care to…

1
2
3
4
5

4
6

Consider how our facilities
might be breached and cause
harm to our supply chain.
Consider how to prevent
supply chain security
breaches at our facilities.
Create physical facilities that
will not suffer a security
breach.

Average
Score

6.4
6.4
7

Make our facilities secure
from supply chain breaches.
7
Make our facilities
impenetrable.
5.8
Access Restriction
Average
Our company takes extra
Score
care to…
Restrict the access of visitors
to our facilities.
5.8
Know where everyone is
within our facilities at all
times.
5.8

Our company takes extra
care to…
Consider how our
facilities might be
breached and cause harm
to our supply chain.
Consider how to prevent
supply chain security
breaches at our facilities.
Create physical facilities
that will not suffer a
security breach.
Make our facilities
secure from supply chain
breaches.
Dropped Item
Our company takes extra
care to…
Dropped Item
Dropped Item

Security Services

1

Our company…

Average
Score

Works with external parties
who specialize in security to
create supply chain security.

6.6
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Our company…
Works with external
security firms who
specialize in security to
create supply chain
security.

Table 15 continued

2

3
4

5

6.2

Creates security in the
supply chain by working
with external security
firms.
Chooses to place the
responsibility of supply
chain security on external
security firms.
Outsources supply chain
security activities to
external security firms.

4.2

Dropped Item

Average
Score

Our company has the
ability
to …

5.8

Dropped Item

Creates security in the supply
chain by working with
security firms.
Chooses to place the
responsibility of supply
chain security on security
firms.
Outsources supply chain
security activities to private
security firms.
Has made an internal
decision to not bear the
entire burden of supply chain
security.

6.6

5.6

Monitoring

1

Our company has the ability
to …
Know where everything is at
all times.

Inspection
Average
Score

1
2

5

Our company…
Conducts analysis of
product/services to ensure
adequacy.
4.8
Proactively makes sure that
our product/services are as
planned.
3.8
Security Department
Our company…
Views supply chain security
as a priority and provides
full-time employees to
manage it.
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Average
Score

6.2

Our company…
Conducts analysis of
product/services to
ensure security.
Dropped Item

Our company…
Provides full-time
internal employees to
manage security.

Table 15 continued
Learning

1
3
5
7

Average
Score

Our company works to …

5

Dropped Item

5

Dropped Item

5.6

Dropped Item

5

Dropped Item

Our company works to …
Adjust our common
understanding of security
needs.
Continually improve our
security measures.
Modify the security efforts of
other members of the supply
chain.
Make sure supply chain
members abide by our
security requirements.
Adopting
Our company works to …

Average
Score

1

Incorporate the supply chain
security practices of our
partners into our own
actions.

6.6

4

Adopt supply chain security
practices of our supply chain
members.

6.6

Our company works to …
Incorporate the supply
chain security practices
of our partners that are
determined to be
effective into our own
actions.
Adopt supply chain
security practices of our
supply chain members
that are determined to be
effective.

Collaboration

3
5

Our company works with …
Supply chain members to
look for synergistic ways to
create security.
Supply chain members to
share proprietary security
information.
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Average
Score
6.6
6.4

Our company works with
…
Supply chain members to
look for synergistic ways
to enhance security.
Supply chain members to
exchange proprietary
security information.

Table 15 continued

6

The U.S. Government to
create supply chain security.

5

{Stem for this question is
‘Our company’}
Collaborates with the
U.S. Government to
enhance supply chain
security.

Compromising
Our company…

Average
Score

1

Takes efforts to stop
unpleasant security activities
with a supply chain member.

4.4

2

Makes proposals to establish
some middle ground on
security issues.

3.2

3

Takes efforts to find resolve
for security issues with a
supply chain member.

3.8

4

5

Makes compromises for
supply chain security
practices with our supply
chain members.
Makes compromises for
supply chain security
practices with the U.S.
Government.

5.8

5.6
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Our company…
Takes efforts to stop
unreasonable security
activities with a supply
chain member.
Works with other supply
chain members to
establish supply chain
security activities that all
members agree to.
Works with other supply
chain members to
determine acceptable
supply chain security
activities.
Makes compromises with
our supply chain
members in order to
bolster supply chain
security practices.
Makes compromises with
the U.S. Government in
order to bolster supply
chain security practices.

Table 15 continued
Supply Chain Performance
In your best judgment, how
do you feel your organization
performs, relative to your
major competitor, with
Average
respect to each of the
Score
criteria?
1

Purchasing costs (N/A for
service providers).

7

2

Inventory management (N/A
for service providers).

7

3

Defect rate (N/A for service
providers).

7

5

Quality.

6.25

6
Delivery failure.
* Indicates a stem change

6.25

In your best judgment,
how do you feel your
organization performs,
relative to your major
competitor, with respect
to each of the criteria?
Purchasing costs for raw
materials (N/A for
service providers).
Overall inventory
management of all
inventory (N/A for
service providers).
Defect rate on production
of new products (N/A for
service providers).
Quality of final
product/service.
Delivery failure of
goods/service.

Industry Expert Panel
Once feedback was obtained from the academic experts, the updated survey was
distributed to an industry expert panel. The industry expert panel consisted of 10 experts
who were acquaintances of the author. The industry experts had a vast working
knowledge of SCM, some specifically with SCS. In addition, these experts held positions
that would be similar to the final sample (CEO, VP, etc.). These experts were asked to
review the survey for face validity. As a result, the survey distributed to the industry
experts was identical to the survey that would later be distributed to the samples (pretest
and main data collection). The only variation was that comment boxes were included
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throughout the online survey for the industry experts to make comments. The industry
experts were also asked to review the survey for readability, particularly of the
measurement items.
Industry experts were initially contacted via email asking for participation. Those
who agreed were subsequently sent another email which included a link to the online
survey. The industry experts were asked to complete the survey in 7 days. These 10
industry experts were sent an email including the link to the survey and directions.
Specifically, each was asked to read through the survey, including the directions,
question stems, items, and scaling points. The respondents were asked to include any
comments, criticisms, or suggestions in the provided text boxes.
The industry experts provided detailed and critical feedback. In all, seven of the
10 experts responded. Following the presentation of the results from the academic
experts, the industry expert panel changes are presented in Table 16. In Table 16, the
original item number from Tables 8-14 is presented in the first column. Next, the
original question is presented in the column named “previous”. Finally, the third column,
named “revised,” presents the updated item based on feedback from the industry experts
(note that if a change to the item stem was implemented, it is indicated by an *). Several
consistent comments resulted in a global change to the survey. These comments were
concerning the stems and questions in the second section of the survey, which measure
the specific SCS activities. When presented to the industry experts, these questions were
determining the level of importance of the SCS activities. Respondents were presented a
7-point Likert scale, ranging from extremely unimportant to extremely important.
However, industry experts pointed out the stem and scale item did not match the scaling
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points. As a result, scaling points were modified to be 1-7 strongly disagree to strongly
agree, instead of the original importance scale. This is an important distinction as the
stem was changed to match the scaling for this section.
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Table 16
Changes Made to the Survey Based on Industry Expert Review
Item
Number

4

Previous
Revised
Customer Pressure
Our customers that are crucial to
Our customers that are crucial
us…
to us…
Encourage us to create a supply
Encourage us to create supply
chain security activities.
chain security activities.
Pressure us into adopting a supply
Pressure us into adopting supply
chain security activities.
chain security activities.

1

Government Pressure
Our customers that are crucial to
Our customers that are crucial
us…
to us…
Requires us to adopt security
Requires us to adopt supply
activities.
chain security activities.

*

Competitor Pressure
Our main competitors that have
Our primary competitors that
adopted supply chain security
have adopted supply chain
practices…
security practices…

3

2
4

4
5

Societal Pressure
In general, society…
In general, society…
Requires us to develop a supply
Requires us to develop supply
chain security activities.
chain security activities.
Needing to become a safer place
results in us developing supply chain
security activities.
Dropped item
Supply Chain Security Culture
Our company…
Our company…
Dedicates efforts to create a
Dedicates efforts to create a
supply chain security-focused
security-focused workforce.
workforce.
Makes sure that all employees
Makes sure that all employees are
are vigilant toward supply chain
vigilant toward security.
security.
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Table 16 continued
Quality

6

Our company…
Focuses on quality with all supply
chain operations
Puts time and effort into making
sure we have quality built into our
supply chain

3

Facilities Hardening
Our company takes extra care
Our company takes extra care to…
to…
Create physical facilities that
Create physical facilities that will
will not suffer a supply chain
not suffer a security breach
security breach.

1

Our company…
Focuses on building quality into
supply chain operations
Dropped item

3

Combating Complacency
Our company
Our company
Makes employees continuously
Makes employees continuously
engage in supply chain security
engage in security activities.
activities.
Finds ways to eliminate supply
Finds ways to eliminate security
chain security complacency
complacency among our employees. among our employees.

1

Security Services
Our company…
Our company…
Works with external security firms
Chooses to work with
who specialize in security to create
specialized security firms to
supply chain security.
create supply chain security.

2

1
5

Security Department
Our company…
Our company…
Dedicates a senior management
Dedicates a senior management
position solely to supply chain
position solely to security efforts.
security efforts.
Provides full-time internal
Provides full-time internal
employees to manage supply
employees to manage security.
chain security.
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Table 16 continued

3
4
5

Security Sourcing and Audits
Our company…
Our company…
Develops a supply base that is
Develops a supply base that is
dedicated to our supply chain
dedicated to our security initiatives. security initiatives.
Uses detailed audit to assess
Uses detailed audit to assess supplier supplier supply chain security
security capabilities.
capabilities.
Dedicates resources to finding
Dedicates resources to finding
suppliers who fit with our security
suppliers who fit with our supply
strategy.
chain security strategy.
Partnering
Our company…

1

Shares security responsibilities with
other members of our supply chain.

3

Dedicates security assets with other
supply chain members.
Cultivates deep relationships for
security purposes.

5

Partners with other members in our
supply chain for security purposes.

2

Learning
Our company works to…
Evaluate security measures in the
supply chain

4

Understand exactly what other firms
expect from us in terms of security.

7

Make sure supply chain members
know about the nature of our
security requirements.

2
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Our company…
Shares supply chain security
responsibilities with other
members of our supply chain.
Dedicates supply chain security
assets with other supply chain
members.
Cultivates deep relationships for
supply chain security purposes.
Partners with other members in
our supply chain for supply
chain security purposes.

Our company works to…
Evaluate supply chain security
measures in the supply chain
Understand exactly what other
firms expect from us in terms of
supply chain security.
Make sure supply chain
members know about the nature
of our supply chain security
requirements.

Table 16 continued

1

Adopting
Our company works to …
Incorporate the supply chain security
practices of our partners that are
determined to be effective into our
own actions.
Collaboration
Our company works with…

1

Other members of our supply chain
to exploit security opportunities.

3

Supply chain members to look for
synergistic ways to create security.

4

Supply chain members to develop
new security efforts.

5

Supply chain members to exchange
proprietary security information
Compromising
Our company…

1

Takes efforts to stop unreasonable
security activities with a supply
chain member
Communication
Our company makes sure…

1
2
3

Our company works to …
Incorporate our supply chain
partner's security practices into
our own actions, when they are
determined to be effective.

Our company works with…
Other members of our supply
chain to exploit supply chain
security opportunities.
Supply chain members to look
for synergistic ways to create
supply chain security.
Supply chain members to
develop new supply chain
security efforts.
Supply chain members to
exchange proprietary supply
chain security information

Our company…
Takes efforts to stop
unreasonable supply chain
security activities with a supply
chain member

Our company makes sure…
That our supply chain members
That our supply chain members keep keep us informed of supply
us informed of security issues.
chain security issues.
To keep our supply chain
To keep our supply chain partners
partners informed on supply
informed on security issues.
chain security issues.
Our supply chain members keep us
Our supply chain members keep
informed of new security
us informed of new security
developments.
developments.
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4

Our supply chain members
communicate their security
expectations clearly.

5

Our supply chain members let each
other know as soon as possible of
any unexpected problems with
security.

Our supply chain members agree to
share critical information among all
6
chain members to ensure security.
*Indicates a stem change

Our supply chain members
communicate their supply chain
security expectations clearly.
Our supply chain members let
each other know as soon as
possible of any unexpected
problems with supply chain
security.
Our supply chain members agree
to share critical information
among all chain members to
ensure supply chain security.

Pretest
After refining the survey instrument through expert panels, researchers have
suggested that pretesting may be beneficial (e.g., Clark and Watson 1995). The pretest is
used to assess internal consistency, inter-item correlations, and factor structure. In
addition, the pretest should indicate empirically when items are not working, which
allowed for wording adjustments (Netemeyer et al. 2003). As a result, a pretest was
conducted with a representative sample to identify problems with measurement items.
This research targets executives and upper management for its final sample. As
these respondents are difficult to acquire, a convenience sample was used for the pretest.
A selected group of graduates of a large mid-western undergraduate logistics program
were asked to participate in the pretest. Importantly, the pretest was representative of the
industries targeted for the final sample (manufacturers, carriers, 3PLs,
wholesalers/distributors, and retailers). These respondents were solicited with an email
containing a link to the survey. Following Dillman (2000), who suggests a multiple
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contact strategy for the pretest, multiple contacts with the sample was used. First, an
email was distributed to the sample introducing the research. A second email was sent
with directions and a link to the survey. A third and final email was sent as a reminder to
complete the survey.
The email invitations were launched to 288 individuals. Of the 288 names, 62
emails were returned as undeliverable. Another 14 respondents responded indicating
they no longer work in the logistics or supply chain business or have ample knowledge to
answer the questions. Discounting these individuals, this resulted in a sample size of
212. The pretest generated 65 responses (30% response rate). A visual inspection of the
data was conducted to detect any problematic responses (e.g., acquiescence bias). This
resulted in eliminating three responses in which all responses were all “strongly agree,”
(i.e., all 7’s in the data), leaving 62 useable responses for the pretest. The final remaining
pretest respondent industry and position data is summarized in Tables 17 and 18.
Table 17
Organizational Position in the Supply Chain among Pretest Respondents
Primary Role in the Supply Chain
Manufacturer
Carrier
Freight Forwarder
3PL Logistics Provider
Warehouser
Wholesaler/Distributor/Retailer
Other

Responses
28
6
0
21
1
4
2
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% of Respondents
45%
9%
0%
33%
1%
6%
3%

Table 18
Primary Industry Focus among Pretest Respondents
Primary Industry Focus
Automotive
Medical/Pharmaceutical
Apparel/Textiles
Electronics
Industrial Products
Consumer Packaged Goods
Chemical/Plastics
Appliances
Apparel/textiles
Agriculture
Other

Responses
29
3
2
7
0
11
4
0
0
0
7

% of Respondents
46%
4%
3%
11%
0%
17%
6%
0%
0%
0%
11%

The pretest analysis results are presented below. First, descriptive statistics and
reliability estimates are discussed. Next, the results of tests for unidimensionality are
presented. Finally, assessments of convergent and discriminant validity are shown.
Within each of these sections, the results are presented for each portion of the model: the
drivers of SCS, the SCS activities, and organizational performances.

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability
The pretest descriptive results for all items and scales are shown in Tables 19-21,
with a separate table for drivers of SCS, SCS activities, and organizational performances.
In these tables, means, standard deviations, and item-to-total correlations are presented
for each scale item. In addition, the reliabilities and average inter-item correlation are
given for each scale.
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Table 19
Drivers of SCS Descriptive and Reliability Pretest Results

Construct
Customer
Pressure
Cust_1
Cust_2
Cust_3
Cust_4

Government
Pressure
Gov_1
Gov_2
Gov_3
*Gov_4

Competitor
Pressures
*Com_1
Com_2

Scale Item

Our customers that are crucial to us…
Require us to develop supply chain
security activities.
Are likely to leave us if we do not
develop supply chain security activities.
Encourage us to create supply chain
security activities.
Pressure us into adopting supply chain
security activities.
Alpha=.918
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.740

The U.S. Government…
Requires us to adopt security activities.
Pressures us into adopting its supply
chain security activities.
Is likely to deploy sanctions if we do
not develop supply chain security
activities.
*Is responsible for making supply chain
security a priority to our organization.
Alpha=.873
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.630

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Item-ToTotal
Correlation

5.52

1.53

0.84

4.56

1.65

0.78

5.16

1.52

0.86

4.31

1.67

0.77

5.50

1.69

0.73

4.87

1.81

0.83

4.38

1.73

0.75

4.35

1.61

0.60

Our primary competitors that have
adopted supply chain security
practices…
*Have created pressure for us to adopt
supply chain security activities.
Are responsible for making supply
chain security a priority to our
organization.

187

4.03

1.51

0.55

3.46

1.42

0.82

Table 19 continued

Com_3
Com_4

Com_5

Com_6

Com_7

Societal
Pressures
Soc_1
Soc_2
Soc_3
Soc_4

Create the need for us to copy their
supply chain security efforts.
Are more competitive, which has
resulted our mimicking of their supply
chain security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by
customers, which has resulted our
mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by
suppliers, which has resulted our
mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by others
in the same industry, which has resulted
our mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Alpha=.938
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.682

In general, society…
Benefits from our supply chain security
activities.
Requires us to develop supply chain
security activities.
Is considered when our organization
thinks about supply chain security.
Is a driving force behind our supply chain
security activities.
Alpha=.856
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.605

3.08

1.39

0.72

3.02

1.47

0.77

3.25

1.72

0.89

3.14

1.66

0.92

3.22

1.67

0.93

5.59

1.27

0.66

4.80

1.50

0.68

4.90

1.46

0.78

4.43

1.72

0.70

*Indicates item deleted after reliability analysis on the pretest
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Table 20
SCS Activities Descriptive and Reliability Pretest Results

Construct

SCS Culture
SCSC_1
SCSC_2
SCSC_3
SCSC_4
SCSC_5

Scale Item
Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Creates a supply chain security focus
among all employees.
Makes sure that supply chain security is
the first thing on the mind of all
employees.
Makes supply chain security the norm
for all employees.
Dedicates efforts to create a supply
chain security-focused workforce.
Makes sure that all employees are
vigilant toward supply chain security.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Item-ToTotal
Correlation

4.57

1.77

0.86

3.36

1.83

0.83

4.07

1.83

0.93

4.12

1.83

0.93

4.07

1.81

0.93

Alpha=.963
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.840

Avoidance
Avoid_1

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company avoids…
5.59

1.33

0.67

Avoid_2

Risky supply chain situations.
Anything that may cause harm to our
supply chain.

5.53

1.28

0.66

Avoid_3

Suppliers who present high risk.

5.64

1.23

0.79

Avoid_4

Customers who present high risk.
Conducting business in parts of the
world that present high risk

5.12

1.38

0.69

4.76

1.66

0.52

Avoid_5

Alpha=.846
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.543

Operation
Modification

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company makes changes
to…

OM_1

The way our supply chain operates.

5.43

1.08

0.88

OM_2

Specific supply chain activities.

5.53

1.06

0.84

*OM_3

*Our core business processes.
How our supply chain operates with
suppliers.

4.91

1.55

0.70

5.47

1.17

0.84

OM_4
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Table 20 continued
OM_5

How our supply chain operates with
customers

5.36

1.41

0.76

5.36

1.21

0.75

5.09

1.43

0.86

4.55

1.56

0.80

4.11

1.67

0.73

4.89

1.55

0.81

5.22

1.34

0.78

5.19

1.34

0.80

4.76

1.51

0.80

4.98

1.30

0.83

Alpha=.915
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.717

Quality
Qual_1
Qual_2
Qual_3
Qual_4
Qual_5

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Focuses on building quality supply
chain security activities into supply
chain operations.
Makes sure all of our supply chain
security processes/procedures are the
best they can be.
Procures best in class supply chain
security products and services.
Spends the extra money to make sure
that supply chain security best in class
products and services are procured.
Makes sure everything with supply
chain security is done to the best of our
ability.
Alpha=.915
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.694

Facilities
Hardening
FH_1
FH_2
FH_3
FH_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Considers how our facilities might be
breached and cause harm to our supply
chain.
Considers how to prevent supply chain
security breaches at our facilities.
Creates physical facilities that will not
suffer a supply chain security breach.
Makes our facilities secure from supply
chain breaches.
Alpha=.912
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.726
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Access Restriction
AR_1
AR_2
AR_3
*AR_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Creates restricted access areas at our
facilities.
Creates designated areas where visitors
are allowed within our facilities.
Strictly controls all access to our
facilities.
*Controls the access of our employees
throughout our facilities.

5.74

1.40

0.76

5.66

1.46

0.80

5.28

1.65

0.83

5.02

1.84

0.62

3.90

1.51

0.83

4.09

1.70

0.85

4.09

1.48

0.91

3.88

1.57

0.93

3.90

1.65

0.93

3.68

1.77

0.78

3.95

1.81

0.82

3.25

1.51

0.68

Alpha=.880
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.666

Combating
Complacency
*CC_1
CC_2
CC_3
CC_4
CC_5

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
*Conducts supply chain security
exercises in order to combat
complacency.
Makes employees continuously engage
in supply chain security activities.
Finds ways to eliminate supply chain
security complacency among our
employees.
Never allows our employees to let their
guard down when it comes to supply
chain security.
Keeps our employees motivated toward
creating supply chain security.
Alpha=.959
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.827

Security Services
SS_1
SS_2
SS_3

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Chooses to work with specialized
security firms to create supply chain
security.
Creates security in the supply chain by
working with external security firms.
Chooses to place the responsibility of
supply chain security on external
security firms.

191

Table 20 continued
SS_4
SS_1

Outsources supply chain security
activities to external security firms
Chooses to work with specialized
security firms to create supply chain
security.

3.48

1.50

0.77

3.68

1.77

0.78

4.45

1.45

0.71

4.52

1.48

0.84

4.72

1.20

0.71

4.53

1.38

0.68

5.09

1.26

0.62

4.76

1.57

0.84

4.72

1.39

0.76

4.62

1.50

0.84

4.36

1.88

0.80

Alpha=.889
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.671

Monitoring
Mon_1
Mon_2
Mon_3
Mon_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Keeps a very close watch on everything
in an effort to know when a potential
breach may be occurring.
Conducts continuous analysis to make
sure everything is normal (or within
predetermined ranges).
Knows that all operations are going as
planned.
Has the ability to immediately know
when something is not going as
planned.
Alpha=.874
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.636

Inspection
*Insp_1
Insp_2
Insp_3
Insp_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
*Conducts analysis of product/services
to ensure security.
Checks for any contraband in our
product/services to prevent them from
being distributed.
Takes efforts to check for potential
security breaches before our
product/service is delivered.
Diligently looks at products and
processes before being delivered to
prevent security breaches.
Alpha=.891
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.667

Security
Departments
SD_1

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Dedicates internal departments to
exclusively work on supply chain
security.
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SD_2
SD_3
SD_4
SD_5

Involves upper management to deal
with supply chain security.
Dedicates a senior management
position solely to security efforts.
Allocates resources for full time
employment for supply chain security
efforts.
Provides full-time internal employees
to manage supply chain security.

4.91

1.72

0.76

3.88

1.95

0.80

4.03

1.97

0.88

4.05

1.93

0.89

4.44

1.50

0.79

4.60

1.39

0.83

4.33

1.47

0.87

4.26

1.56

0.77

4.05

1.44

0.81

4.46

1.39

0.83

4.00

1.41

0.83

4.33

1.53

0.82

4.40

1.47

0.82

Alpha=.934
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.737

Security Sourcing
and Audits
SSA_1
SSA_2
SSA_3
SSA_4
SSA_5

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Tries to bring on suppliers who
enhance our security initiatives.
Creates a supply base that fits with our
supply chain security strategy.
Develops a supply base that is
dedicated to our supply chain security
initiatives.
Uses detailed audit to assess supplier
supply chain security capabilities.
Dedicates resources to finding suppliers
who fit with our supply chain security
strategy.
Alpha=.929
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.725

Partnering
Part_1
Part_2
Part_3
Part_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Shares supply chain security
responsibilities with other members of
our supply chain.
Dedicates supply chain security assets
with other supply chain members.
Cultivates deep relationships for supply
chain security purposes.
Partners with other members in our
supply chain for supply chain security
purposes.
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*Part_5

*Partners with the U.S. government for
supply chain security purposes.

4.56

1.56

0.82

4.66

1.39

0.72

4.71

1.46

0.81

4.71

1.45

0.82

4.52

1.32

0.74

5.11

1.57

0.56

4.70

1.27

0.76

4.94

1.31

0.93

4.78

1.34

0.88

4.81

1.35

0.87

5.22

1.67

0.54

Alpha=.872
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.585

Learning
*Learn_1
Learn_2
Learn_3
Learn_4
*Learn_5

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
*Evaluates supply chain security
measures in the supply chain.
Understands exactly what other firms
expect from us in terms of supply chain
security.
Makes sure supply chain members
know about the nature of our supply
chain security requirements.
Learns about supply chain security
requirements from other supply chain
members.
*Learns about supply chain security
requirements from the U.S.
Government.
Alpha=.887
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.617

Adopt_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Incorporates our supply chain partner’s
security practices into our own actions,
when they are determined to be
effective.
Integrates existing and new supply
chain security measures.
Brings together new supply chain
security practices with existing
measures.
Adopts supply chain security practices
of our supply chain members that are
determined to be effective.

*Adopt_5

*Adopts supply chain security practices
suggested by the U.S. Government.

Adopting

Adopt_1
Adopt_2
Adopt_3

Alpha=.912
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.702
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Collaboration
Coll_1
Coll_2
Coll_3
Coll_4
*Coll_5
*Coll_6

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company works with…
Other members of our supply chain to
exploit security opportunities.
Other supply chain members to
enhance supply chain security.
Supply chain members to look for
synergistic ways to create supply chain
security.
Supply chain members to develop
supply chain new security efforts.
*Supply chain members to exchange
proprietary security information.
*The U.S. Government to enhance
supply chain security.

4.37

1.17

0.77

4.61

1.19

0.87

4.67

1.26

0.91

4.56

1.27

0.84

4.07

1.29

0.56

4.85

1.57

0.41

4.77

1.32

0.73

4.79

1.39

0.82

4.75

1.33

0.82

3.77

1.30

0.52

4.25

1.67

0.43

4.96

1.33

0.83

4.96

1.37

0.89

Alpha=.889
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.601

Compromising
Comp_1

Comp_2
Comp_3
*Comp_4
*Comp_5

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company...
Takes efforts to stop unreasonable
supply chain security activities with a
supply chain member.
Works with other supply chain
members to establish supply chain
security activities that all members
agree to.
Works with other supply chain
members to determine acceptable
supply chain security activities.
*Makes compromises with our supply
chain members in order to bolster
supply chain security practices.
*Makes compromises with the U.S.
Government in order to bolster supply
chain security practices.
Alpha=.842
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.535

Communication
Comm_1
Comm_2

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company makes sure…
That our supply chain members keep
us informed of supply chain security
issues.
To keep our supply chain partners
informed on supply chain security
issues.
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Comm_3
Comm_4

Comm_5

Comm_6
Comm_7
*Comm_8

Our supply chain members keep us
informed of new supply chain security
developments.
Our supply chain members
communicate their supply chain
security expectations clearly.
Our supply chain members let each
other know as soon as possible of any
unexpected problems with supply chain
security.
Our supply chain members agree to
share critical information among all
chain members to ensure supply chain
security.
To communicate with other supply
chain members to ensure supply chain
security
*To communicate with the U.S.
Government to ensure supply chain
security.

4.84

1.33

0.89

4.89

1.38

0.88

4.91

1.42

0.80

4.67

1.42

0.84

4.87

1.32

0.84

5.22

1.72

0.54

3.36

1.58

0.77

3.64

1.74

0.82

3.81

1.56

0.87

3.59

1.52

0.90

3.76

1.63

0.92

3.64

1.65

0.74

3.74

1.60

0.93

Alpha=.946
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.705

Camaraderie
*Cam_1
*Cam_2
Cam_3
Cam_4
Cam_5
*Cam_6
Cam_7

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
*Works with our competitors on supply
chain security issues.
*Would let our competition know
about a serious supply chain security
breach.
Will work with our competition in
order to make our supply chain more
secure.
Cooperates with competing
organizations to make supply chains
more secure.
Will work with our competition in
order to make our supply chain more
secure.
Feels that supply chain security
requires the involvement of our
competitors.
Will share information with
competitors when it helps to make all
supply chains more secure.
Alpha=.958
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.769

*Indicates item deleted after reliability analysis on the Pretest
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Table 21
Organizational Performances Descriptive and Reliability Pretest Results

Construct

Scale Item

In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
Firm
you feel your company performs
Performance relative to your main competitors?
Percentage of sales generated by new
products/service
FP_1
FP_2
Return on investment
FP_3
Profitability
FP_4
Sales growth
FP_5
Return on assets
Alpha=.914
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.685
In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
Customer
you feel your company performs
Performance relative to your main competitors?
CP_1
Customer loyalty
CP_2
Customer satisfaction
CP_3
Customer commitment
Alpha=.926
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.811
In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
Market
you feel your company performs
Performance relative to your main competitors?
MP_1
Sales volume
MP_2
Market share
MP_3
Market development
MP_4
New product/Service development
MP_5
Brand equity
Alpha=.818
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.485
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Mean

Std.
Dev.

Item-ToTotal
Correlation

4.75
4.85
4.84
4.64
4.72

1.29
1.35
1.39
1.47
1.19

0.62
0.85
0.85
0.76
0.85

5.18
5.21
5.18

1.06
1.20
1.03

0.86
0.86
0.84

4.65
4.43
4.52
4.28
4.68

1.55
1.60
1.11
1.37
1.31

0.63
0.66
0.70
0.54
0.57

Table 21 continued
In your best judgment, with respect to
Supply
each of the following criteria, how do
Chain
you feel your company performs
Performance relative to your main competitors?
Purchasing costs for raw materials (N/A
for service providers)
SCP_1
SCP_2
SCP_3
SCP_4
SCP_5
SCP_6
SCP_7
SCP_8
SCP_9
SCP_10
SCP_11

Overall inventory management of all
inventory (N/A for service providers)
Defect rate on production of new
products (N/A for service providers)
Order processing time
Quality of final product/service
Delivery failure of goods/service
Nonvalue-added time
Variety of product offered to our
customers
Variety of service offered to our
customers
Cycle time
Shipment accuracy
Alpha=.861
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.368

4.51

1.10

0.45

4.24

1.19

0.53

4.22
4.42
4.91
4.60
4.38

1.17
0.99
1.13
1.12
1.01

0.54
0.63
0.55
0.57
0.60

4.89

1.03

0.48

5.18
4.47
4.96

1.05
0.94
0.93

0.33
0.77
0.71

The first step of the pretest is to examine the descriptive statistics for each scale
item. This includes examining the mean and standard deviation of each scale item.
DeVellis (2003) recommends looking for means close to the middle of the scale range for
each item, coupled with large standard deviations. The assessment of all scale items
suggests that items preformed adequately in terms of means and standard deviation.
Second, the pretest was conducted to analyze the reliability of the scale items.
Reliability also a necessary condition for validity and is defined as the “degree to which
measures are free from error and therefore yield consistent results,” (Peter 1979 p. 6).
For this research, reliability estimates were computed using Cronbach’s (1951) alpha.
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This measure is often used to assess the reliability of multi-item measures. The
coefficient alpha is the variance that is common among the items. It is the proportion of
variance created by a common source (Netemeyer et al. 2003). Different parameters
have been given for establishing reliability. Many previous researchers have set
recommended levels for reliability measures. For example, Nunnally and Bernstein
(1994) suggest that alpha levels should be .7 or greater. Cronbach’s alpha for scales in
this research exceeded the threshold presented by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). In the
pretest, alphas for all scales were above .8, suggesting reliability.
Two additional measures of reliability were generated and assessed. First, is the
average inter-item correlation. Clark and Watson (1995) suggest that average inter-item
correlation is a better measure of reliability than Cronbach’s alpha. Following these
researchers notion, a range of 0.15 to 0.50 for inter-item correlation is acceptable
(depending on the complexity of the construct). All scales met or exceeded the range
suggested by Clark and Watson (1995).
Next, is item-to-total correlation, which is an alternative to Cronbach’s Alpha for
assessing reliability. This correlation is the degree to which one item is related to the
other items in a measurement set (Netemeyer et al. 2003). Items with low correlations
would be strong candidates for deletion; however, there is no hard line rule for
determining high or low item-to-total correlations. Lower item-to-total correlations were
identified for several items, which caused further evaluation of the item in relation to the
construct definition.
Finally, the pretest was conducted in order to determine scale items that did not
work well. This was important for this research as many of the scales were newly created
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or adapted from existing scales. Scales were not only evaluated for items that did suggest
sound psychometric properties. They were also evaluated for parsimony. The final
sample for this dissertation was to include senior level executives (CEO, COO, SVP, etc).
These types of respondents have limited time to complete surveys, thus creating a survey
that minimized items, while also accurately capturing the constructs of interest was a top
priority. Thus, if items could be dropped from a scale without affecting the alpha levels,
they were considered for deletion.
Drivers of SCS
Item-to-total correlations indicated slight issues with measures. Gov_4 was
deleted as the item-to-total was low in comparison to the other items. This item (The
U.S. government is responsible for making supply chain security a priority to our
organization), may have preformed poorly as respondents may not have seen the
government as a cause of making SCS a priority, but rather an encouraging factor for
SCS. In addition, the competitor pressures construct to measure the pressure that
competition applies to organizations to adopt SCS saw Com_1 dropped as it had a lower
item-to-total correlation.
SCS Activities
One item was dropped from the operation modification scale. In comparison to
the other items, this item-to-total correlation was low. OM_3 (Thinking about our supply
chain strategy, our company makes changes to our core business processes), was likely
too generic and as a result, this item was eliminated from the scale.
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In the pretest scale, access restriction had four measures. AR_4 (In regard to our
supply chain strategy, our company controls the access of our employees throughout our
facilities) did not perform as strongly as the other items on the item-to-total correlation.
As a result, this item was dropped.
CC_1 was dropped from the combating complacency scale. This item (Thinking
about our supply chain strategy, our company conducts supply chain security exercises to
combat complacency) was likely too specific for measuring combative practices for SCS.
This item was removed without having any impact on the alpha level.
Analyzing the scale for inspection, it was determined that Insp_1 was a candidate
for deletion. The item (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company conducts
analysis of product/services to ensure security) was broad in comparison to the other
measures, which may have resulted in a lower item-to-total correlation. As a result, this
item was eliminated from the scale.
With the interorganizational activities, several items were developed to assess
how organizations worked with the U.S. government in addition to working with
individual organizations. These items proved to exhibit low reliability. As a result, these
items were removed from their representative scales. Part_5 was dropped because its
removal had no effect on the level of alpha. Adopt_5, Coll_5, Coll_6, Comp_4, Comp_5,
and Comm_8 were all removed as they also removed had very low item-to-total
correlations.
Additionally, Learn_1 was removed from the learning scale. In reviewing this
item, (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company evaluates supply chain
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security measures in the supply chain), it was determined that this item did not fit the
construct definition well and it also had a low item-to-total correlation.
Finally, while not having issues with low item-to-total correlations, the
camaraderie scale offered several candidates for deletion. Cam_1, Cam_2 and Cam_6
were removed from the camaraderie scale for parsimony. These items were removed
with no effect to the level of alpha (in fact, with the removal of Cam_2, the alpha level
improved slightly).
Organizational Performance
Several items on the market and supply chain performance scales had low itemto-total scores: MP_4 (.54), MP_5 (.57), SCP_1 (.45), SCP_8 (.48), and SCP_9 (.33).
These items may be possible candidates for deletion. However, they were retained for
now as these scales were established and used previously by a number of researchers.
In summary, the assessment of reliability led to 18 items being eliminated from
the scales (note those items are identified in Tables 8 through 10 with an *). With items
removed from the scale, alpha levels were reassessed and compared to the original alpha
level. Table 22 presents the original alpha compared to the new alpha after the items
were deleted for each respective scale. In each instance, the alpha either stayed the same
after deleting items, allowing for parsimony, or increased as the result of the deletions.
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Table 22
Comparison of Cronbach’s Alpha for Original Scales Versus
Scales with Items Removed

Construct
Government Pressure
Competitor Pressure
Operation Modification
Access Restriction
Combating Complacency
Inspection
Partnering
Learning
Adopting
Collaboration
Compromise
Communication
Camaraderie

Original
Number of
Alpha Level
Items Deleted
Drivers of SCS
0.873
1
0.938
1
SCS Activities
0.915
1
0.880
1
0.959
1
0.891
1
0.872
1
0.887
2
0.912
1
0.889
2
0.842
2
0.946
1
0.958
3

Alpha Level After
Deletion(s)
0.883
0.950
0.922
0.906
0.959
0.908
0.917
0.908
0.954
0.931
0.887
0.964
0.962

Unidimensionality
Unidimensionality is considered an important part of scale construction (Gerbing
and Anderson 1988; Netemeyer et al. 2003). Formally, a measure that is considered
unidimensional has statistical properties demonstrating that its items underlie a single
construct or factor (Netemeyer et al. 2003).
Principle Components Analysis (PCA) using Varimax rotation was used to assess
unidimensionality of each scale. Items that only measure a single construct are
considered to be unidimensional. Each scale was assessed individually to determine its
dimensionality.

203

For the drivers of SCS, each scale possessed unidimensionality as indicated by
high factor loadings on a single factor. The same was true for all intraorganizational and
interorganizational activities. It is noted that while loading on one component, two items
had lower factor loadings. Avoid_5 had a factor loading of 0.658 and Coll_1 had a factor
loading of 0.890. While these factor loadings are significant, they were flagged (for
further evaluation later) as having a much lower factor loading than the other items in
their respective scale.
For the scales measuring organizational performances, there were minor issues
with dimensionality for market performance and supply chain performance. This might
be expected as the reliability analysis indicated issues with some items. Further, all of
the performance measures were borrowed from previous research and in some instances,
multiple measures were combined to create one measure. For example, since no one
single measure exists to measure supply chain performance, multiple measures from
previous research were combined to create one scale for supply chain performance.
With market performance, MP_1 and MP_2 loaded strongly on component 2,
with MP_3, MP_4, and MP_5 loading strongly on component 1. This may be expected
as MP_1 measures sales volume and MP_2 measures market share. The market
performance construct is intended to measure non-financial aspects of the organization.
Sales volume and market share may be considered to be financial performance, thus the
strong loading on a second factor.
PCA for supply chain performance revealed three components. In the rotated
component matrix, the second component had significant loadings from SCP_3 (defect
rate), SCP_5 (quality), and SCP_11 (shipment accuracy). The third component had
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significant factor loadings from SCP_8 (variety of product offered) and SCP_9 (variety
of service offered). These issues with unidimensionality for organizational performance
are noted as further analysis is conducted. These items may be considered for deletion.

Validity
PCA with Varimax rotation was used to assess discriminant and convergent
validity. Eigenvalues, communality, and component scores were all of interest. In
particular, component scores were used to make initial assessments of convergent and
discriminant validity. Convergent validity is the degree to which items measuring the
same construct are interrelated (Netemeyer et al. 2003). With PCA, evidence of
convergent validity is established if each measurement item loads highly on their
component (e.g., Netemeyer et al 2003). Discriminant validity is the extent to which
measures are able to distinguish themselves from other constructs from which they might
be related. With PCA, discriminant validity is evident when measurement items do not
load on components to which they are not supposed to be associated. A general rule of
thumb, items with component loadings between 0.40 and 0.90 are considered significant
(Netemeyer et al. 2003). However, given the small sample size of the pretest, factor
loadings of 0.60 and higher would be considered high factor loadings (Hair et al. 2006)
and provide evidence of validity.
For each PCA, a test for sampling adequacy was conducted. Kaiser-Meyer-Olin
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was calculated for all scales. In general, values
closer to 1 are deemed better, with a value of less than 0.60 miserable (Hair et al. 2000).
For all PCA, the sample was considered adequate, with the exception of the
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intraorganizational SCS activities, which had a KMO value of 0.176. This is an
extremely low score and it likely due to the number of items (50) compared to the
number of responses (62). As a result, the intraorganizational items were divided and
PCA was conducted in two groups: Group 1) Supply chain security culture, avoid,
operation modification, quality, facilities hardening, and access restriction; Group 2)
Combating complacency, security services, monitoring, inspection, security departments,
and security sourcing and audits. Conducting PCA in two groups for intraorganizational
activities achieved adequate KMO scores (0.818 and 0.822 respectively). Results of PCA
are presented below.
Drivers of SCS
The results of the rotated PCA indicated that four components exist (four
components with Eigenvalues greater than 1), explaining 80.178% of the variance. In
addition, items loaded highly and only on the appropriate component, providing evidence
of discriminant and convergent validity. The results are presented in Table 23 (nothing
that throughout the dissertation all factor loadings less than .4 were omitted).
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Table 23
Rotated Factor Matrix for Drivers of SCS
1
Cust_1
Cust_2
Cust_3
Cust_4
Gov_1
Gov_2
Gov_3
Com_2
Com_3
Com_4
Com_5
Com_6
Com_7
Soc_1
Soc_2
Soc_3
Soc_4
Eigenvalue
Percent of
Variance
Explained

Component
2
3
0.903
0.840
0.919
0.804

4

0.826
0.897
0.857
0.821
0.781
0.854
0.943
0.957
0.958

5.692

4.033

0.770
0.741
0.909
0.857
2.436

33.483

23.725

14.331

1.469
8.639

Communalities
0.843
0.754
0.880
0.755
0.776
0.868
0.778
0.744
0.676
0.739
0.891
0.922
0.921
0.696
0.710
0.842
0.836

SCS Activities
The first PCA for SCS activities was conducted on the intraorganizational
activities. In total, twelve intraorganizational SCS activities were identified in the
qualitative research. Two groups of six factors were created for the analysis. As
expected, each group had six components with Eigenvalues greater than one. The first
group explained 82.408 of the total variance, while the second explained 84.184.
The two rotated component matrixes indicated high factor loadings on the
different components. This suggests that the items exhibit evidence of convergent
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validity. There were a few instances of cross-loadings above 0.40, which suggest issues
with discriminant validity. In the first group of intraorganizational SCS activities,
Avoid_5, Qual_1, and Qual_5 show cross-loadings. In the second group, Mon_1,
Mon_2, Insp_3, Insp_4, SD_1, and SSA_1 show cross-loadings above 0.40. However,
despite the cross-loadings of these few items, all the items were retained for the main data
collection as it was believed these cross-loadings may not appear in a larger sample. The
rotated component matrixes, with communalities are shown in Tables 24 and 25.
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Table 24
Rotated Factor Matrix for Group 1 of Intraorganizational SCS

1
0.858
0.811
0.910
0.881
0.889

SCSC_1
SCSC_2
SCSC_3
SCSC_4
SCSC_5
Avoid_1
Avoid_2
Avoid_3
Avoid_4
Avoid_5
OM_1
OM_2
OM_4
OM_5
Qual_1
0.411
Qual_2
Qual_3
Qual_4
Qual_5
FH_1
FH_2
FH_3
FH_4
AR_1
AR_2
AR_3
Eigenvalue 11.055
Percent of
Variance
Explained 42.520

2

Component
3
4

0.840
0.786
0.923
0.735
0.472

5

6

-0.400

0.921
0.848
0.850
0.754
0.417
0.601
0.815
0.677
0.661

0.440
0.759
0.865
0.779
0.785

4.020

2.475

1.687

0.837
0.825
0.829
1.129 1.059

15.463

9.519

6.490

4.343 4.074
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Communality
0.880
0.830
0.938
0.927
0.937
0.737
0.696
0.880
0.661
0.595
0.915
0.910
0.863
0.783
0.747
0.844
0.856
0.713
0.836
0.823
0.879
0.833
0.861
0.833
0.795
0.858

Table 25
Rotated Factor Matrix for Group 2 of Intraorganizational SCS

1

2
0.821
0.912
0.883
0.890

Component
3
4

CC_2
CC_3
CC_4
CC_5
SS_1
SS_2
SS_3
SS_4
Mon_1
0.494
Mon_2
0.578
Mon_3
Mon_4
Insp_2
Insp_3
0.423
Insp_4
0.472
SD_1
0.705
SD_2
0.658
SD_3
0.844
SD_4
0.847
SD_5
0.872
SSA_1
0.698
SSA_2
0.857
SSA_3
0.885
SSA_4
0.794
SSA_5
0.894
Eigenvalue 11.005 3.031 2.613
Percent of
Variance
Explained 44.020 12.125 10.450
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5

6

0.761
0.784
0.851
0.915
0.452
0.584
0.826
0.798
0.789
0.665
0.568
0.440

0.430

1.802

1.513

1.082

7.208

6.052

4.329

Communality
0.808
0.906
0.919
0.924
0.852
0.904
0.855
0.868
0.710
0.870
0.796
0.748
0.872
0.814
0.810
0.845
0.721
0.863
0.855
0.879
0.846
0.833
0.868
0.805
0.874

A third PCA was conducted on the interorganizational SCS activities. In total,
seven interorganizational SCS activities were identified in the qualitative research. For
the PCA with Varimax rotation, seven factors were specified before running the analysis.
However, the results indicate that five components, not seven, emerge. The
Eigenvalue greater than one rule indicates that five component exist, explaining 85.630
percent of the variance. The sixth and seventh components only explain an additional 2.4
and 1.7 percent of the variance, respectively. As such, the rotated component matrix has
one significant factor loading on component six and none on component seven.
Convergent validity was evident as factor loadings were high on the respective
components. However, there were issues with discriminant validity as a number of items
loaded highly on multiple components, as suggested by five components emerging and
the high factor loadings on those components. This may be expected as the
interorganizational SCS activities are activities that are fundamental to SCM. For
example, partnerships have long been discussed in SCM literature (e.g., Lambert,
Emmelhainz, and Gardner 1996), but were also identified in the qualitative research as
being critical for SCS. As these activities are fundamental to all SCM, it can be expected
that many of the core SCM factors fail to discriminate from one another. In particular,
partnerships and collaboration load on one component, as do learning and adopting. This
is likely the result of respondents viewing partnerships as a higher level of a relationship,
which requires collaborative efforts to achieve. Similarly, if an organization learns about
SCS from a supply chain member, it is likely that they will adopt these measures. This
may explain why those four distinct activities load significantly onto two components.
The results of the rest of the interorganizational PCA are presented in Table 26.
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Table 26
Rotated Factor Matrix for Interorganizational SCS
Component
1
2
Part_1
0.662
Part_2
0.693
Part_3
0.876
Part_4
0.838
Learn_2
Learn_3
Learn_4
Adopt_1
Adopt_2
0.453 0.452
Adopt_3
0.470
Adopt_4
0.432
Coll_1
0.603
Coll_2
0.717
Coll_3
0.666
Coll_4
0.761
Comp_1
Comp_2
0.442
Comp_3
0.408 0.498
Comm_1
0.712
Comm_2
0.787
Comm_3
0.797
Comm_4
0.763
Comm_5
0.828
Comm_6
0.845
Comm_7
0.822
Cam_3
Cam_4
Cam_5
Cam_7
Eigenvalue 16.801 3.574
Percent of
Variance
Explained 57.933 12.326

3
0.470

4

5

6

7

0.579

0.791
0.801
0.775
0.822
0.684
0.628
0.673
0.449
0.408
0.430
0.835
0.661
0.599
0.469
0.403

0.931
0.946
0.957
0.937
2.039 1.417 1.002

0.689

0.488

7.030 4.885 3.456

2.376

1.683
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Communalities
0.847
0.905
0.922
0.888
0.864
0.833
0.878
0.881
0.930
0.853
0.871
0.867
0.937
0.896
0.886
0.918
0.926
0.911
0.890
0.925
0.906
0.904
0.923
0.903
0.845
0.895
0.936
0.960
0.910

Convergent validity among the five components is evident as items have high
factor loadings on the components. There were multiple issues with discriminant
validity. Adopt_2 and Comp_3 may be candidates for deletion as they have significant
loadings on three different components. As there are still multiple items measuring
communication, Comm_1 and Comm_2 may also be candidates for deletion due to their
cross-loadings.
Organizational Performances
Finally, organizational performance measures were assessed for validity
estimates. As noted earlier, there were issues with unidimensionality of market and
supply chain performance. In total, four performance constructs were selected as
outcomes of SCS efforts, which resulted in four factors being specified during the PCA
with Varimax rotation. The four components explain 68.183 percent of the variance.
The results of the PCA are presented in Table 27.
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Table 27
Rotated Factor Matrix for Organizational Performances

FP_1
FP_2
FP_3
FP_4
FP_5
CP_1
CP_2
CP_3
MP_1
MP_2
MP_3
MP_4
MP_5
SCP_1
SCP_2
SCP_3
SCP_4
SCP_5
SCP_6
SCP_7
SCP_8
SCP_9
SCP_10
SCP_11
Eigenvalue
Percent of
Variance
Explained

1
0.606
0.926
0.889
0.768
0.860

Component
2
3
0.511

4

0.799
0.850
0.841
0.715
0.707

0.402
0.839
0.826
0.776
0.550
0.727
0.435
0.784

0.539
0.733

0.665
0.690
0.660
0.468
8.527

0.765
0.616
3.190

2.631

2.011

35.530

13.290

10.962

8.381
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Communality
0.700
0.878
0.887
0.754
0.833
0.781
0.793
0.840
0.653
0.670
0.779
0.726
0.622
0.686
0.605
0.516
0.667
0.760
0.503
0.567
0.514
0.283
0.731
0.611

High factor loadings provide evidence of the existence of convergent validity.
Discriminant validity appears to be an issue, as indicated by the multiple cross-loadings.
Following earlier observations, MP_1 and MP_2 load significantly on component 1,
which is the firm performance measure. These two items are measuring financial
measures of the firm, not non-financial measures. FP_1 (Percentage of sales generated
by new products/service) loaded significantly with the market performance component.
As there a numerous items with supply chain performance, those with significant crossloadings (SCP_3, SCP_5, SCP_8, and SCP_9) are candidates for deletion. The
elimination of SCP_8 and SCP_9 is further justified from their low commonality scores.
An additional assessment of convergent and discriminant validity was preformed
through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS 5.0. In this analysis,
convergent validity is assessed through evaluating λ-x parameter estimates. The λ-x path
is the path between the latent variables and their indicators and convergent validity is
evident when these paths are statistically significant. Byrne (2001) suggests looking for a
critical ratio, which is the parameter estimate divided by the standard error, greater than
1.96 for significance. Alternatively, discriminant validity is assessed through evaluating
the modification indices for λ-x. Discriminant validity is not evident when modification
indices greater than 5 are present. The results of the CFA analysis for the drivers of SCS,
SCS activities, and organizational performances are presented next.
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Drivers of SCS
For the drivers of SCS, evidence for convergent validity was found as the paths
from the latent variables to their indicators were all in the correct direction, indicate a
strong magnitude, and were significant as the critical ratios were all well above 1.96.
There were two issues with discriminant validity. Soc_3 and Soc_4 could not
discriminate from the competition construct. In addition, there were problems with the
modification indices in the theta-delta matrix. These modification indices indicated that
some error terms were correlating together (including within and between constructs).
However, these two items were retained in the analysis. Eliminating these two items
would result in a two-item scale.
SCS Activities
For the intraorganizational activities, evidence for convergent validity was
exhibited through the paths from the latent variables to their indicators all in the correct
direction, indicate a strong magnitude, and were significant as the critical ratios were all
well above 1.96.
There was one issue with discriminant validity. SSA_1 could not discriminate
from the several constructs, including security departments, monitoring, and security
services competition construct. In addition, there were problems with the modification
indices in the theta-delta matrix. These modification indices indicated that some error
terms were correlating together (including within and between constructs).
For the interorganizational activities, evidence of convergent validity was
exhibited. The paths from the latent variables to their indicators were all in the correct
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direction, indicate a strong magnitude, and were significant as the critical ratios were all
well above 1.96.
Discriminant validity was also evident as no modification indices greater than 5
were present. However, there were problems with the modification indices in the thetadelta matrix. These modification indices indicated that some error terms were correlating
together (including within and between constructs).
Organizational Performances
For organizational performance, evidence of convergent validity was exhibited for
all paths, except SCP_1 and SCP_9. The critical ratio was 1.941 and 1.747, respectively.
These items may be candidates for deletion.
There was one issue with discriminant validity. SCP_5 could not discriminate
from the customer performance construct. Further, there were problems with the
modification indices in the theta-delta matrix. These modification indices indicated that
some error terms were correlating together (including within and between constructs).
Through the assessment of convergent and discriminant validity, it is evident that
items in this research may be problematic. As a result, several items have been identified
for deletion. A summary of deletions are presented in Table 28.
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Table 28
Items Identified for Possible Elimination after Pretest CFA
Item
Comm_1
Comm_2
SSA_1
SCP_5
SCP_8
SCP_9

Reason for Deletion
Lack of discriminant validity and parsimony
Lack of discriminant validity and parsimony
Lack of discriminant validity
Lack of discriminant validity
Lack of convergent validity
Lack of convergent validity

The pretest conducted as part of this research proved valuable. Assessments of
reliability, unidimensionality, and validity were made based on this pretest data.
Importantly, analysis of pretest data allowed for item reduction. The final version of the
survey instrument is presented in Appendix B.
Main Data Collection
The purpose of this research is to make generalizations about SCS categories,
what causes them, and the impact on various performance outcomes. The target
population for this study is all U.S. based organizations operating critical roles in the
creation or physical movement of goods in a supply chain. Therefore, the sampling
frame was executives working in supply chain functions in U.S. based firms in applicable
industries.
Given the nature and scope of this research, survey methodology is best suited for
data collection. All data captured for the purpose of the research is metric data. First,
research on security can be confidential or proprietary, thus creating a feeling of
reluctance in divulging information. Surveys can create the perception of anonymity
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(Boyd and Westfall 1955). Also, survey research allows collecting many responses in a
short period, at low cost, and with great geographical reach (Kanuk and Berenson 1975).
All of the aforementioned issues were critical for this research.
With the time frame and cost structure of this research, a cross-sectional survey
method provided an excellent option for data collection. Data were collected using
surveys following the tailored design method presented by Dillman (2000). The survey
allowed the researcher to assess attitudes about supply chain activity selection and
identified outcomes.
To reach the target population efficiently and effectively, a web-based survey was
deployed. This was chosen based on the recommendation of Dillman (2000), who states
that workers in organizations and members of professional organizations generally have
internet access, thus helping to substantiate the use of electronic surveys for data
collection. In addition, logistics researchers Griffis, Goldsby, and Cooper (2003) find
that web-based surveys are superior for large sample sizes. Importantly, these
researchers found no difference in the data collected online and the data gathered via
mail. Finally, researchers have suggested that given the time constraints that business
professionals face, they prefer electronic surveys (Nesbary 2000). As a result, this study
delivered surveys and allowed respondents to enter responses electronically. This was
accomplished through resources available in Mississippi State University’s College of
Business and Industry.
While online surveys have many benefits, their pitfalls are acknowledged here.
Web-based surveys have been criticized for generating lower response rates in
comparison to mail surveys (Sills and Song 2002, Weible and Wallace 1998). There has
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been indication of web-based surveys introducing sampling errors as a result of omission
from the sample due to lack of web access (Couper 2000, Kaye and Johnson 1999, Sills
and Song 2002). However, given the nature of this research, the positive aspects
outweigh the potential negatives. For example, Dillman (2000) reports that electronic
surveys offer many advantages over traditional types of surveys such as telephone or
paper and pencil. The advantages include 1) great reduction in the costs of paper,
postage, mailing, and data entry; 2) great reduction in the time for implementation; and 3)
greater ability for dynamic interaction between the respondent and the questionnaire.
With any survey, non-response bias is a potential issue. This is the bias that
results from the people who did not respond to the survey as they may have answers that
are very different from those who did respond. For instance, a researcher needs to
understand if those who did not respond to survey would respond differently if they
would have responded. This is problematic as the bias can raise doubts about the
findings and severely limit generalizability (Walker et al. 1987). For example, if the nonrespondents are different from the respondents, a researcher cannot say that the sample
responded in a certain way, which prevents one from generalizing to the population
(Armstrong and Overton 1977).
With the nature of this research about a sensitive topic, tactics were implemented
with the design to reduce non-response bias. In the email to the sample, an explanation
of the research and why it is important was written in a manner that was quick and easy
for the reader to understand (Aiken 1998). The email explanation of the research was
short, discussed the incentive of an executive summary, and importantly promised
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confidentially. Also, the research was conveyed as an intermediary between the person
(respondent) and the problem (Walker, Kirchmann, and Conant 1987).
The main sample database was purchased from the Council of Supply Chain
Management Professionals (CSCMP), which defines itself as the preeminent organization
for individuals involved with SCM (CSCMP website 2007). It has over 9,000 members,
dominated by members from the private sector. All members in the membership
database are classified on characteristics such as industry classification and job title.
Five selected industry segments were chosen as the most applicable to this
research and were available from the professional organization. In total, there were 18
business environments (industry classifications) in which CSCMP members’
organizations are classified by CSCMP. Because this dissertation is focused on the
security of the physical movement of goods, only those firms involved in some capacity
with physical goods in the supply chain were included. As a result, certain industries
were eliminated from the assessment, such as information technology, consultants, health
care providers, academics, telecommunications, and executive recruiting. According to
the classification of CSCMP, the business environments which were included in the
sample include: manufacturing, carriers, 3PLs, warehousers/distributors, and retailers.
Through assessing a number of industries, obtaining an acceptable level of external
validity should be possible (Cook and Campbell 1979) and help with the generalizability
of the results.
This dissertation is interested in SCS. This topic is likely to be best understood by
individuals working in direct functions with responsibilities for the flow of product. The
respondents representing their organizations had titles including: president, CEO, vice
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president, director, corporate officer, and manager. This sample only included
respondents who were mid-to-top level management within the organization. These
potential respondents for this study were specifically targeted as they are believed to have
a higher degree of knowledge of the variables being assessed (i.e., organizational supply
chain activities and the overall performance of the organization). This was supported by
the qualitative research, whereby all respondents were mid-management and above (with
a minimum of 15 years of experience) and were able to describe in detail SCS activities
and organizational performance. The unit of analysis was the respondents’ perception of
the SCS categories within their organizations and of the performance of the
organizations. Each variable was measured through the perceptions of the respondents,
with each respondent representing his or her respective organization. The sample
purchased from CSCMP included 2,996 individuals who met the criteria listed above.
Eliminating organizational redundancies from the database resulted in a sample size of
1,753 firms.
Data Analysis, Description, and Interpretation of Results
The remaining part of this chapter presents information regarding the statistical
procedures used to obtain insight into the main research questions for this dissertation.
Three different types of analysis were appropriate for this research. Cluster
analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, and multiple analysis of variance were utilized to
analyze the hypotheses. Each is briefly discussed.
Cluster analysis was used to address research question one and its subsequent
hypotheses. Cluster analysis is used to create homogenous groups based on the view of
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the respondents. As such, the clusters are created in such a way that the homogeneity of
the members of the group is maximized, while at the same time maximizing the
heterogeneity between the groups (Hair et al. 2006). Cluster analysis provides many
benefits for this exploratory research. First, as the qualitative portion of this research has
indicated, many organizations view their security efforts differently. The qualitative
research provides a base of SCS approaches that organizations partake in across a wide
range of industries. The quantitative portion of this research allows respondents to
indicate the degree to which security activities are part of the overall SCS taxonomy.
Further, the qualitative research indicated that many firms have similar if not identical
activities when it comes to SCS measures. However, through the interviews, it was clear
that different firms viewed the same security related activity differently. As a result,
cluster analysis offers an excellent option for this research to understand a SCS
taxonomy. Thus, cluster analysis was used to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
The second main research question was to gain understanding into what causes
organizations to partake in SCS categories. Specifically, this research attempts to explain
how pressure from the external environment impact SCS category types. This was
accomplished using discriminant analysis.
Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) uses continuous independent variables to
account for variation in categorical dependent variables (Hair et al. 2006). MDA creates
a discriminant function which emphasizes the differences between the groups (dependent
variables). MDA assists in understanding the differences in groups and also serves as an
avenue for classification of cases into the group it most closely resembles (Klecka 1980).
While MDA has many objectives, there is one in particular that makes this technique
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applicable to this research: determining which independent variables account for the
differences in the dependent variables. Thus, MDA was chosen for its ability to identify
how SCS drivers (customers, governments, competitors, and society) impact the
dependent variables, which are the SCS categories. Multiple discriminant analysis was
used to test Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The final research question of this dissertation is aimed at understanding the
relationship between SCS categories and organizational performance. To help answer
this question, multivariate analysis of variance was conducted (MANOVA). Specifically,
this technique provides insight into whether or not organizational performance measures
vary among different SCS categories. MANOVA was the chosen technique for this
analysis as it evaluates the effect of categorical independent variables on multiple
dependent variables, all at one time. The categorical independent variables for the
MANOVA resulted from the cluster analysis, which was used to form SCS categories.
The dependent variables were the various performance measures, which were metric,
interval data. As a result, the MANOVA provides insight into how different SCS
categories result in different organizational performance measures. MANOVA was used
to test Hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9. A summary of all hypotheses and the analysis
techniques are presented in Table 29.
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Table 29
Summary of Hypotheses and Analysis
Hypothesis
Number
1a
1b

2

3

4

5
6
7
8
9

Hypothesis
A multi-categorical supply chain security
taxonomy exists.
Taxonomy categories based on the firms’
supply chain security activities are
significantly different from one another.
Government pressures result in
organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy
category.
Customer pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity
congruent with their taxonomy category.
Competitive pressures result in
organizations engaging in a level of SCS
activity congruent with their taxonomy
category.
Societal pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity
congruent with their taxonomy category.
Firm performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.
Organizational market performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.
Organizational customer performance
varies depending on the supply chain
security taxonomy category.
Organizational supply chain performance
varies depending on the supply chain
security taxonomy category.
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Analysis
Technique
Cluster Analysis
Cluster Analysis
MDA

MDA

MDA

MDA

MANOVA
MANOVA
MANOVA
MANOVA

For each of the statistical techniques, adequate sample size was a consideration.
First, for cluster analysis, there are no standards or rules of thumb for minimum sample
sizes (Hair et al. 2006). For the second technique, MDA, a general rule of thumb states
that a sample size of five observations for every independent variable is a minimum.
However, for generalizability, it is suggested that 15 to 20 observations for each
independent variable, with the same for each of the categorical dependent variables (Hair
et al. 2006). This research has four independent variables, thus this would require a
minimum sample size of 80 to suffice minimum sample sizes for MDA. For the third
technique, MANOVA, where the dependent variables are the performance measures of a
firm, there are also considerations for sample size. For instance, 1) the sample of each
group needs to be greater than the number of dependent variables, 2) minimum cell size
is 20, and 3) large sample sizes can reduce sampling error to a level such that minor
differences are statistically significant (Hair et al. 2006). These standards were
considered for this research. Since cluster analysis will be used determine a SCS
taxonomy, groups and their populations are not yet known.
Conclusion
This chapter provides detailed information concerning the research design of this
dissertation. Specifically, this chapter provides descriptions of survey development,
construct definitions, and measurement. The scale development procedures were
discussed, which included academic and expert panels, along with a pretest and results.
Finally, the chapter concludes with discussion of main data collection and the techniques
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used for analysis. The following chapters discuss the testing of the hypotheses and a
discussion of the results.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter presents analysis procedures and the results of the hypotheses tests
for this study. First, the preliminary data analysis is presented, which includes sample
size, response rates, non-response bias, and multivariate assumptions. Second, the
psychometric properties are presented, which include assessments of reliability,
unidimensionality, and validity. Finally, the hypotheses are tested, using a variety of
statistical techniques.
Preliminary Data Analysis
Response Rates
In total, 65 responses were obtained from the CSCMP sample. Three responses
were eliminated; one due to incomplete data, one due to a duplicate submission by the
same person, and one due to suspected acquiescence bias. As a result, the effective
response rate was 3.5% (62/1,753). This response rate is similar to other research using
the CSCMP database. Lewis (2006) recorded a response rate of 3.8% of CSCMP male
members in upper management positions within 3PLs, 4PLs, carrier, manufacturing,
warehousing, and distributor industries.
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Due to the low number of responses, a second sample was procured from a
marketing research firm. This firm specializes in email marketing campaigns and was
able to provide a large sample for this study. The same criteria as with the CSCMP
database were implemented with the second database: one executive level contact per
organization and working in applicable industries (manufacturing, carriers, 3PLs,
warehousers/distributors, and retailers). The procured sample included 3,500 firms, with
names and contact information for key personnel. The second sample was carefully
compared to the first to make sure that no organization was contacted more than once.
Further, the sample was scrutinized to make sure that the organizations listed were
appropriate (i.e., was a consulting firm listed accidentally?). This resulted in eliminating
a number of firms from the sample. The final number of exclusive firms that remained in
sample two was 3,211.
When delivering the email to the second sample, there was trouble with email
address failure. When the sample was emailed requesting participation in the survey,
there were 712 delivery failures received back. As a result, the final sample size of the
second sample was 2,499. From the adjusted sample size, there were 89 responses, of
which two were discarded (one for acquiescence bias and one was a duplicate submission
by the same person). This resulted in a response rate of 3.5% (87/2,499)
A third sample was obtained from the same marketing research firm previously
discussed. A sample of 319 firms was obtained, with key contacts (executive level) for
each. Each of the sample members were called by phone and notified of the pending
email survey, which was followed by an email with the survey link. Thirty two calls
were unable to be made due to invalid phone numbers and twelve emails were returned as
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undeliverable, leaving a third sample size of 275. Fifteen surveys were returned, with
two surveys being eliminated due to incomplete data and acquiescence bias, respectively.
This resulted in a response rate of 4.7% (13/275) for the third sample.
Low response rates are not new to social science research and in particular,
strategy research. Numerous other published marketing, logistics, and supply chain
academic studies have suffered from low response rates and low total responses. For
example, the following illustrates response rates from a selection of leading marketing
and logistics journals (response rate/total responses):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Dorsch, Swanson, and Kelly (1998) (9.6%/94) – Purchasing executives
Larson and Gammelgaard (2001) (11.5%/75)
New and Payne (1995) (2.5%/273)
Rabinovich et al. (1999) (4.3%/463)
Skjoett-Larsen, Thernoe, and Andresen (2003) (7.6%/218)
Slater and Narver (2000) (7%/66)
Sum and Teo (1999) (11.1%/51)
In his research on logistics and supply chain published studies from 1989 to 2003,

Larson (2005) reports response rates as low as 2.5%. He also reported that response rates
in survey research have been declining at the rate of about 1% per year. His research also
indicated that The Council of Logistics Management (now CSCMP) was the association
most heavily used in providing survey support. This finding indicates that the
organization may be overused with survey research, which may contribute to the low
response rates.
There are many reasons for low response rates. Larson and Poist (2004) suggest
being very careful about requesting sensitive information when conducting logistics and
supply chain research. Similarly, Rabinovich et al. (1999) cite their low response rate
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due to the sensitive nature of their questions. Stank, Keller, and Daugherty (2001)
suggest reasons such as length and comprehensive nature of surveys, confidential nature
of the subject matter, little free time of executives and their over surveying all led to low
responses in logistics research. Finally, Murphy and Poist (2002) cite “newness” of their
subject matter to logistics for their low response rates. Likewise, SCS is also considered
to be a new stream of SCM research. For example, Thibault et al. (2006) encountered
issues when asking companies to participate in their SCS research; many firms declined
participation due to the nature of the topic.
The level of personnel surveyed for each organization (executives) also likely
contributed to the low response rate. The target of this study, executive management, is a
very difficult group to gather responses from (cf. Baruch 1999). Also, this research used
an electronic survey method for data collection. Recent research indicates higher
response rates from mail surveys as opposed to email when surveying U.S. based
executives (Roy and Berger 2005).
The survey and data collection method for this research likely suffered from all of
above listed reasons, for an overall low response rate. A informal non-scientific followup with a around two hundred respondents indicated the following reasons for not
responding to the survey: the subject matter was too sensitive, it was against company
policy, the survey too long, and not enough time.
While the response rates for this research are less than desirable, researchers have
debated the necessity of high response rates. It is suggested that surveys with lower
response rates can actually be more accurate than surveys with higher response rates
(Krosnick 1999). Hunt (1990) suggests that impact of research not be discarded because
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of response rates and non-response bias. Salant and Dillman (1994) suggest that
demonstrating the lack of non-response bias is much more important that achieving high
response rates.
Non-Response Bias
Following Armstrong and Overton (1977), who suggest that respondents who
respond to a survey request late may be more similar to non-respondents than to earlier
respondents, the means of all constructs were tested for differences between early and
late respondents in each individual sample. Each of the three databases was divided into
two groups (early and late) based on the electronic time stamps that were recorded upon
submission. Early respondents were the first 15% of respondents; late respondents that
were the last 15% of those who responded, according to the received time stamp.
Differences between means were evaluated using T-tests. No differences were found in
regard to early versus late respondents in any of the three samples (two-tailed test; α
=.025). This suggests that the non-response bias was not an issue with this study.
An additional test of non-response bias was conducted following the suggestion
of Mentzer and Flint (1997) and others (e.g., Min, Mentzer, and Ladd 2007). Nonresponse bias was further tested by calling non-respondents and gathering verbal
responses information on three key questions. In total, 175 (suspected) non-respondents
were contacted, with 17 providing verbal answers (response rate of 9.7%). Next, the
answers gathered verbally from the non-respondents were compared to the three other
samples using ANOVA (noting that the first question asked is non-significant at α =.01;
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The other two questions are non-significant at α =.05). The ANOVA results suggest nonsignificance between all groups, as shown in Table 30.
Table 30
ANOVA Results for Non-Response Bias Assessment
FρValue value

Question
In general, society benefits from our supply chain security
activities.
Our company makes our facilities secure from supply chain
breaches.
Our company works with other members of our supply chain to
exploit security opportunities.

2.88

0.038

0.31

0.818

1.549

0.204

The findings from each of the non-response bias tests indicate that non-response
bias was not an issue in this.
Finally, the main question with the three separate samples was whether or not the
data should be combined as one group. An ANOVA was conducted for 27 constructs
across all three samples. The results indicate no significant differences between any
sample (noting that market performance is non-significant at α =.01). The three different
samples were conducted to increase the number of overall responses, which would
ultimately increase the generalizability of the results. The samples obtained were of
similar nature: key decision makers within a specific pre-identified industry. Thus, all
three data sets were combined. This resulted in a total of 162 useable responses (overall
response rate of 3.6%; 162/4,527).
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Missing Data
With survey research, missing data can be a very common problem. There are
several techniques to address missing data, including pairwise data, listwise data, and
imputing values for the missing data. Missing data was not a major problem with this
research, as the majority of respondents filled out each question (and those respondents
with many missing data points were eliminated). A conservative approach to missing
data was chosen and all analysis was conducted with a listwise approach. The listwise
approach to missing data is considered more conservative as it only examines
observations with complete data. With this method, values are not imputed and inserted
for missing values, which can result in misleading results (Hair et al. 2006). Another
method, pairwise, uses all available data. Hair et al. (2006) also note problems with this
method, such as out-of-range correlations or negative Eigenvalues. While no method for
dealing with missing data is perfect, the listwise approach was chosen as there were not
many instances of missing data and it does not alter the findings, as imputing values can.
Evaluating Multivariate Assumptions

Normality
The calculated skewness values for all items ranged from .549 through -1.9
indicating that there may be some departure from normality. Kurtosis values ranged from
-1.49 through 4.2 also indicating some departure from normality. However, visual
inspection of the The Normal Q-Q plots and Detrended Normal Q-Q plots indicate that
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the data display normal tendencies. As such, normality of data is assumed for this
research.
Linearity
Following Hair et al. (2006), linearity was evaluated by creating bivariate
scatterplots for each possible combination. The results indicated the majority of points
following a straight line, which provides strong evidence of linearity.

Multicollinearity
For the known predictor variables, multicollinearity was assessed by investigating
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each construct that may potentially be an
independent variable. Hair et al. (2006) suggest that low VIF values represent the
absence of multicollinearity (i.e., VIF values less than 10). All investigated constructs
exhibited very low VIF values.

Outliers
Outliers were detected using box plots as suggested by Pallant (2005). Using
SPSS, outliers are present when they are one and a half box-lengths from the edge of the
box; extreme values are indicated when they are more than three box lengths away from
the box. Additional outliers were evident through the examination of the scatterplots. It
is acknowledged that some outliers exist in this research. Their existence in
acknowledged, but no action was taken on them. Retaining the outliers follows the
philosophy suggested by Hair et al. (2006) and is followed here as eliminating the
outliers would limit the generalizability of the research.
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Sample Characteristics

Respondent Titles and Number of Reports
A main goal of the data collection was to make sure that the appropriate person at
each organization was contacted. This meant reaching individuals with relatively large
amounts of responsibility and knowledge of the questions being asked. Responses from
titles such as CEO, VP, Director, and Manager were sought and obtained. Figure 4
illustrates these results.
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Figure 4
Respondents Job Titles
The highest proportions of respondents were Directors (25%) and Vice Presidents
(25%), followed closely by Managers (21%). Presidents and CEOs accounted for 13
percent of the respondents. The smallest proportion of respondents were other C-Level
positions (Chief Operating Officer, Chief Security Officer, etc; 8%) and other variations
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of Vice Presidents (Executive and Senior Vice President; 8%). In addition, to ensure that
the person contacted was the correct person within the organization to respond to the
strategic questions, his or her direct number of reports within the organization was also
captured. From those who responded (n=117), the average number of reports was 98
people, with ranges from 1 to 3,000.

Position in the Supply Chain
The majority of the respondents identified themselves as manufacturers (46%).
The second largest group of respondents was 3PLs (19%). Other supply chain members
who responded to the survey included transportation carriers (7%), wholesaler
distributors (9%), freight forwarders (2.5%), warehousers (6%), and retailers (7%).
Seven respondents (4%) reported themselves as “other.” Figure 5 illustrates the position
in the supply chains.
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Figure 5
Respondents Firms’ Supply Chain Position

Sales
Respondents were also asked to identify their organization’s annual sales amount.
The respondents indicate a good dispersion of firm size, based on sales. The majority of
firms indicated sales as greater than $1B (36%). Other notable sizes were $501 thousand
to $1M (17%) and $2M to $25M (18%). Two respondents indicated small sales, with
$301-$400 thousand and $401-$500 thousand as sales figures, respectively. The rest of
the respondents were distributed throughout various sales amount in the millions of
dollars. The compiled results of the annual sales are show in Figure 6.
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Annual Sales

Greater than $1 billion
$901 million-$1 billion
$801-$900 million
$701-$800 million
$601-$700 million
$401-$500 million
$301-$400 million
$201-$300 million
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$2-$25 million
$501-$1 million
$401 -$500 thousand
$301-$400 thousand
0
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Number of Respondents

(n=160)
Figure 6
Respondents Firms’ Annual Sales Amount
Psychometric Properties
Before conducting analysis to test the hypotheses, evaluation of all measures was
conducted. Psychometrically sound measures are needed to evaluate relationships
between latent constructs. Specifically, evaluations of reliability, unidimensionality, and
validity were conducted. The following section presents each of those assessments,
which were done in the same manner as for the pretest.
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Reliability
For this research, reliability estimates were computed using Cronbach’s alpha
(1951). Reliability is demonstrated when alpha levels are .7 or above (Nunnally and
Bernstein 1994). Two additional measures of reliability were generated and assessed, as
were in the pretest. The first additional assessment of reliability is the item-to-total
correlation. Items with low correlations would be strong candidates for deletion;
however, there is no hard line rule for determining high or low item-to-total correlations.
The second additional assessment is the average inter-item correlation. A range of .15 to
.50 for an inter-item correlation is typically acceptable (Clark and Watson 1995). The
results from all three reliability assessments are presented in Tables 31-32.
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Table 31
Drivers of SCS Descriptive and Reliability Results

Construct
Customer
Pressure
Cust_1
Cust_2
Cust_3
Cust_4

Government
Pressure
Gov_1
Gov_2
Gov_3

Competitor
Pressures
Com_1(a)
Com_2
Com_3

Scale Item

Our customers that are crucial to us…
Require us to develop supply chain
security activities.
Are likely to leave us if we do not
develop supply chain security activities.
Encourage us to create supply chain
security activities.
Pressure us into adopting supply chain
security activities.
Cronbach Alpha=.922
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.748
N=161

The U.S. Government…
Requires us to adopt security activities.
Pressures us into adopting its supply
chain security activities.
Is likely to deploy sanctions if we do
not develop supply chain security
activities.
Cronbach Alpha=.879
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.709
N=160
Our primary competitors that have
adopted supply chain security
practices…
Are responsible for making supply
chain security a priority to our
organization.
Create the need for us to copy their
supply chain security efforts.
Are more competitive, which has
resulted our mimicking of their supply
chain security activities.
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Std.
Dev.

Item-Total
Correlation

4.74

2.00

0.85

4.09

1.93

0.76

4.72

1.85

0.84

3.89

1.88

0.84

5.38

1.69

0.77

4.84

1.78

0.81

4.60

1.79

0.72

3.32

1.67

0.74

3.15

1.55

0.84

2.82

1.46

0.88

Mean

Table 31 continued

Com_4

Com_5

Com_6

Are perceived more favorably by
customers, which has resulted our
mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by
suppliers, which has resulted our
mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by others
in the same industry, which has resulted
our mimicking of their supply chain
security activities.
Cronbach Alpha=.951
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.771
N=160

2.89

1.46

0.89

2.83

1.41

0.89

2.92

1.49

0.87

5.50

1.33

0.62

4.57

1.51

0.66

5.01

1.48

0.75

4.31

1.70

0.75

Societal
Pressures

In general, society…
Benefits from our supply chain security
Soc_1
activities.
Requires us to develop supply chain
Soc_2
security activities.
Is considered when our organization
Soc_3
thinks about supply chain security.
Is a driving force behind our supply
Soc_4
chain security activities
Cronbach Alpha=.851
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.590
N=158
Notes: If deleted, (a) alpha would increase to .956
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Table 32
SCS Activities Descriptive and Reliability Results

Construct

SCS Culture
SCSC_1
SCSC_2
SCSC_3
SCSC_4
SCSC_5

Scale Item

Mean

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Creates a supply chain security focus
among all employees.
Makes sure that supply chain security is
the first thing on the mind of all
employees.
Makes supply chain security the norm
for all employees.
Dedicates efforts to create a supply
chain security-focused workforce.
Makes sure that all employees are
vigilant toward supply chain security.

Std.
Dev.

Item-Total
Correlation

5.01

1.69

0.85

4.11

1.77

0.86

4.68

1.70

0.92

4.70

1.78

0.91

4.84

1.70

0.91

Cronbach Alpha=.960
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.830
N=162

Avoidance
Avoid_1

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company avoids…
5.79

1.23

0.65

Avoid_2

Risky supply chain situations.
Anything that may cause harm to our
supply chain.

5.78

1.28

0.71

Avoid_3

Suppliers who present high risk.

5.95

1.14

0.67

Avoid_4

Customers who present high risk.
Conducting business in parts of the
world that present high risk

5.30

1.61

0.60

5.27

1.53

0.48

Avoid_5 (a)

Cronbach Alpha=.816
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.492
N=159

Operation
Modification

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company makes changes
to…

OM_1

The way our supply chain operates.

5.71

1.19

0.87

OM_2

Specific supply chain activities.
How our supply chain operates with
suppliers.

5.81

1.08

0.92

5.76

1.07

0.85

OM_3
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Table 32 continued
OM_4 (b)

How our supply chain operates with
customers.

5.53

1.30

0.70

5.58

1.40

0.80

5.50

1.40

0.86

4.86

1.63

0.90

4.63

1.67

0.89

5.43

1.46

0.79

5.80

1.33

0.86

5.83

1.26

0.86

5.47

1.34

0.81

5.62

1.27

0.85

Cronbach Alpha=.926
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.767
N=160

Quality
Qual_1
Qual_2
Qual_3
Qual_4
Qual_5

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Focuses on building quality supply
chain security activities into supply
chain operations.
Makes sure all of our supply chain
security processes/procedures are the
best they can be.
Procures best in class supply chain
security products and services.
Spends the extra money to make sure
that supply chain security best in class
products and services are procured.
Makes sure everything with supply
chain security is done to the best of our
ability.
Cronbach Alpha=.942
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.694
N=161

Facilities
Hardening
FH_1
FH_2
FH_3
FH_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company
Considers how our facilities might be
breached and cause harm to our supply
chain.
Considers how to prevent supply chain
security breaches at our facilities.
Creates physical facilities that will not
suffer a supply chain security breach.
Makes our facilities secure from supply
chain breaches.
Cronbach Alpha=.934
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.781
N=161
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Table 32 continued
Access
Restriction
AR_1
AR_2
AR_3

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Creates restricted access areas at our
facilities.
Creates designated areas where visitors
are allowed within our facilities.
Strictly controls all access to our
facilities.

6.05

1.34

0.67

6.13

1.21

0.75

5.98

1.27

0.68

5.28

1.53

0.84

5.09

1.45

0.92

4.91

1.56

0.91

5.01

1.47

0.88

3.93

1.79

0.82

4.06

1.85

0.79

2.65

1.43

0.65

3.04

1.70

0.76

Cronbach Alpha=.837
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.634
N=160

Combating
Complacency
CC_1
CC_2
CC_3
CC_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Makes employees continuously engage
in supply chain security activities.
Finds ways to eliminate supply chain
security complacency among our
employees.
Never allows our employees to let their
guard down when it comes to supply
chain security.
Keeps our employees motivated toward
creating supply chain security.
Cronbach Alpha=.954
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.840
N=162

Security
Services
SS_1
SS_2
SS_3 ©
SS_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Chooses to work with specialized
security firms to create supply chain
security.
Creates security in the supply chain by
working with external security firms.
Chooses to place the responsibility of
supply chain security on external
security firms.
Outsources supply chain security
activities to external security firms.
Cronbach Alpha=.885
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.658
N=162
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Monitoring
Mon_1
Mon_2
Mon_3
Mon_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Keeps a very close watch on everything
in an effort to know when a potential
breach may be occurring.
Conducts continuous analysis to make
sure everything is normal (or within
predetermined ranges).
Knows that all operations are going as
planned.
Has the ability to immediately know
when something is not going as
planned.

5.01

1.61

0.78

5.12

1.50

0.88

5.45

1.36

0.86

5.17

1.50

0.79

5.58

1.67

0.84

5.42

1.58

0.87

5.43

1.62

0.89

4.57

1.90

0.82

5.31

1.73

0.63

3.82

2.22

0.79

3.93

2.17

0.84

Cronbach Alpha=.924
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.758
N=160

Inspection
Insp_1
Insp_2
Insp_3

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Checks for any contraband in our
product/services to prevent them from
being distributed.
Takes efforts to check for potential
security breaches before our
product/service is delivered.
Diligently looks at products and
processes before being delivered to
prevent security breaches.
Cronbach Alpha=.934
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.826
N=161

Security
Departments
SD_1
SD_2 (d)
SD_3
SD_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Dedicates internal departments to
exclusively work on supply chain
security.
Involves upper management to deal
with supply chain security.
Dedicates a senior management
position solely to security efforts.
Allocates resources for full time
employment for supply chain security
efforts.
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Table 32 continued
SD_5

Provides full-time internal employees
to manage supply chain security.

3.95

2.26

0.87

5.08

1.46

0.74

4.86

1.55

0.85

4.78

1.67

0.75

4.72

1.66

0.76

5.34

1.46

0.78

4.39

1.75

0.66

4.79

1.62

0.80

5.01

1.66

0.80

5.25

1.53

0.71

Cronbach Alpha=.918
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.689
N=160

Security
Sourcing and
Audits
SSA_1
SSA_2
SSA_3
SSA_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Creates a supply base that fits with our
supply chain security strategy.
Develops a supply base that is
dedicated to our supply chain security
initiatives.
Uses detailed audit to assess supplier
supply chain security capabilities.
Dedicates resources to finding suppliers
who fit with our supply chain security
strategy.
Cronbach Alpha=.898
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.690
N=157

Partnering
Part_1
Part_2 (e)
Part_3
Part_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company…
Shares supply chain security
responsibilities with other members of
our supply chain.
Dedicates supply chain security assets
with other supply chain members.
Cultivates deep relationships for supply
chain security purposes.
Partners with other members in our
supply chain for supply chain security
purposes.
Cronbach Alpha=.887
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.670
N=159

Learning
Learn_1

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Understands exactly what other firms
expect from us in terms of supply chain
security.
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Learn_2
Learn_3 (f)

Makes sure supply chain members
know about the nature of our supply
chain security requirements.
Learns about supply chain security
requirements from other supply chain
members.

5.33

1.58

0.84

4.96

1.56

0.63

5.27

1.44

0.85

5.37

1.52

0.93

5.36

1.45

0.95

5.30

1.48

0.93

4.73

1.52

0.88

5.04

1.50

0.91

4.91

1.51

0.93

4.83

1.53

0.89

Cronbach Alpha=.855
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.661
N=161

Adopting

Adopt_1 (g)
Adopt_2
Adopt_3
Adopt_4

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Incorporates our supply chain partner’s
security practices into our own actions,
when they are determined to be
effective.
Integrates existing and new supply
chain security measures.
Brings together new supply chain
security practices with existing
measures.
Adopts supply chain security practices
of our supply chain members that are
determined to be effective.
Cronbach Alpha=.966
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.876
N=160

Collaboration
Coll_1
Coll_2
Coll_3
Coll_4

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company works with…
Other members of our supply chain to
exploit security opportunities.
Other supply chain members to
enhance supply chain security.
Supply chain members to look for
synergistic ways to create security.
Supply chain members to develop new
security efforts.
Cronbach Alpha=.961
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.862
N=160
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Table 32 continued
Compromising
Comp_1 (h)

Comp_2
Comp_3

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Takes efforts to stop unreasonable
supply chain security activities with a
supply chain member.
Works with other supply chain
members to establish supply chain
security activities that all members
agree to.
Works with other supply chain
members to determine acceptable
supply chain security activities.

5.13

1.47

0.79

4.92

1.47

0.90

5.11

1.42

0.87

5.19

1.42

0.85

4.91

1.45

0.87

5.13

1.45

0.88

4.99

1.46

0.82

5.13

1.47

0.91

4.21

1.77

0.94

4.16

1.73

0.91

Cronbach Alpha=.926
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.808
N=160

Communication
Comm_1
Comm_2

Comm_3

Comm_4
Comm_5

In regard to our supply chain strategy,
our company makes sure…
Our supply chain members keep us
informed of new supply chain security
developments.
Our supply chain members
communicate their supply chain
security expectations clearly.
Our supply chain members let each
other know as soon as possible of any
unexpected problems with supply chain
security.
Our supply chain members agree to
share critical information among all
chain members to ensure supply chain
security.
To communicate with other supply
chain members to ensure supply chain
security
Cronbach Alpha=.951
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.797
N=159

Camaraderie
Cam_1
Cam_2

Thinking about our supply chain
strategy, our company…
Will work with our competition in
order to make our supply chain more
secure.
Cooperates with competing
organizations to make supply chains
more secure.
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Cam_3
Cam_4 (i)

Will work with our competition in
order to make our supply chain more
secure.
Will share information with
competitors when it helps to make all
supply chains more secure.

4.14

1.75

0.95

4.22

1.74

0.87

Cronbach Alpha=.967
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.879
N=159

Notes: If deleted, alpha would increase to: (a) .823; (b) .952; (c) .889; (d) .932; (e)
.896; (f) .883; (g) .973; (h) .944; (i) .969
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Table 33
Organizational Performances Descriptive and Reliability Results

Construct

Firm
Performance
FP_1(a)
FP_2
FP_3
FP_4
FP_5

Scale Item
In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative
to your main competitors?
Percentage of sales generated by new
products/service
Return on investment
Profitability
Sales growth
Return on assets
Cronbach Alpha=.923

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Item-Total
Correlation

5.01
5.02
4.98
4.78
4.93

1.22
1.30
1.35
1.28
1.32

0.66
0.87
0.87
0.75
0.83

5.68
5.68
5.58

1.02
1.10
1.12

0.79
0.83
0.84

4.85
4.91
4.92
4.94

1.36
1.47
1.32
1.38

0.71
0.82
0.79
0.60

Average Inter-Item Correlation=.704
N=158

Customer
Performance
CP_1
CP_2
CP_3

In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative
to your main competitors?
Customer loyalty
Customer satisfaction
Customer commitment
Cronbach Alpha=.911
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.774
N=160

Market
Performance
MP_1
MP_2
MP_3
MP_4(b)

In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative
to your main competitors?
Sales volume
Market share
Market development
New product/Service development
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MP_5

Brand equity
Cronbach Alpha=.883

5.23

1.29

0.66

In your best judgment, with respect to
each of the following criteria, how do you
Supply
feel your company performs relative to
Chain
Performance your main competitors?
Removed - not applicable to the entire
SCP_1
sample
Removed - not applicable to the entire
SCP_2
sample
Removed - not applicable to the entire
SCP_3
sample
SCP_4
Order processing time

4.94

1.1725

0.76

SCP_5

Delivery failure of goods/service

4.92

1.2487

0.67

SCP_6

Nonvalue-added time

4.55

1.1561

0.66

SCP_7

Cycle time

4.79

1.0995

0.79

SCP_8

Shipment accuracy

5.31

1.1682

0.71

SCP_9

Inventory turns

4.83

1.2757

0.63

Average Inter-Item Correlation=.601
N=153

Cronbach Alpha=.891
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.581
N=137

Notes: If deleted, alpha would increase to: (a) .929; (b) .886

Summary of Reliability Assessment
The results of the reliability assessment of Cronbach’s alpha for scales in this
research exceeded the threshold presented by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). Items were
flagged if the alpha level for the scale would increase if the item were not included,
although the increase in alpha in each case is very small. These items were identified for
further evaluation during additional psychometric analysis. The additional measures of
reliability indicated that the scales in this research were very reliable. The item-to-total
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correlations were all sufficiently high. Finally, the average inter-item correlations for all
scales fell into or exceeded the range suggested by Clark and Watson (1995).

Unidimensionality
Principle Components Analysis (PCA) was used to assess the unidimensionality
of each scale. Each scale was assessed individually to determine the dimensionality of
each individual scale.
For the drivers of SCS, each scale indicated unidimensionality as the result of
high factor loadings on a single factor. All intra- and interorganizational activities also
demonstrated unidimensionality as each item loaded highly on one factor. Finally, the
four organizational performance constructs each demonstrated strong indications of
unidimensionality. In summary, each scale in this research provided strong evidence of
unidimensionality. With unidimensionality of each construct established, validity was
assessed.

Validity
Two types of validity were investigated: convergent and discriminant. Three
different assessments of each type of validity were made. First, PCA with Varimax
rotation was used to provide evidence of convergent validity. PCA was used to see if
each measurement item loaded highly on its respective component (e.g., Netemeyer et al.
2003). In addition, discriminant validity is evident in PCA when the measurement items
do not load on components in which they are not supposed to be associated. High factor
loadings (0.40 and 0.90 are considered high according to Netemeyer et al. 2003). PCA
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with a Varimax rotation was run separately for drivers of SCS, intraorganizational
activities, interorganizational activities, and organizational performances.
Second, a more stringent assessment was performed with a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) using AMOS 5.0. Conducting CFA in this manner requires evaluating
parameter estimates and modification indices for evidence of convergent and
discriminant validity. In this analysis, convergent validity is assessed through evaluating
λx parameter estimates. The λx path is the path between the latent variables and their
indicators and convergent validity is evident when these paths are statistically significant.
Byrne (2001) suggests looking for a critical ratio, which is the parameter estimate divided
by the standard error, greater than 1.96 for significance. Alternatively, discriminant
validity is assessed through evaluating the modification indices associated with for λx.
Discriminant validity is not evident when modification indices greater than 5 are present.
Finally, Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommend the average variance extracted
(AVE) as an assessment of convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is
evident if the AVE for a construct is greater than 0.5. Evidence of discriminant validity
exists if the AVE of a construct is greater than the shared variance, which is the squared
correlation, of the construct with all other constructs in the measurement model.
Validity assessments were made for drivers of SCS, SCS activities, and
organizational performances. The following section presents the results of PCA, the
CFA, and AVE for each group.
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Drivers of SCS
First, PCA with Varimax rotation was conducted to obtain preliminary convergent
and discriminant validity assessments. With all PCA, a test for sampling adequacy was
conducted using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO). The
calculated value was extremely high, indicating that the sample for each PCA was
considered appropriate. Also, communalities for item were assessed and each exceeded
the .50 threshold suggested by Hair et al. (2006).
The PCA with Varimax rotation indicated that four components exist, which was
determined by the Eigenvalue greater than one rule. These four factor components
explain 78.9 percent of the variance. The results of the PCA are presented in Table 34.
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Table 34
Rotated Factor Matrix for Drivers of SCS
Component
2
3
0.886
0.815
0.859
0.867

1
Cust_1
Cust_2
Cust_3
Cust_4
Gov_1
Gov_2
Gov_3
Com_1
Com_2
Com_3
Com_4
Com_5
Com_6
Soc_1
Soc_2
Soc_3
Soc_4
Eigenvalue
Percent of
Variance
Explained

4

0.859
0.905
0.817
0.750
0.844
0.909
0.915
0.912
0.903
0.673
0.716
0.873
0.887
2.080

6.874

2.909

1.560

40.435

17.112 12.237 9.175

The first assessment of validity using PCA and Varimax rotation provided
evidence for validity among the measures for drivers of SCS.
Second, CFA was used to assess convergent and discriminant validity for SCS
drivers. Convergent validity was confirmed as the paths from the latent variables to their
indicators were all in the correct direction, indicated a strong magnitude, and were
significant as the critical ratios were all well above 1.96 (Byrne 2001).
The CFA results indicated six issues with discriminant validity, as some items
associated with constructs that they were not intended to. Com_1 (Our primary
256

competitors that have adopted supply chain security practices are responsible for making
supply chain security a priority to our organization) was associated with customer
pressure, as was Soc_1 (In general, society benefits from our supply chain security
activities). Soc_2 (In general, society requires us to develop supply chain security
activities) was associated with governmental pressure and competitor pressure. Soc_3 (In
general, society is considered when our organization thinks about supply chain security)
was associated with competitor pressure. Finally, Soc_4 (In general, society is a driving
force behind our supply chain security activities) was associated with government. Each
of the items measuring societal pressure had minor issues with discriminating from other
pressures. This is theoretically understandable as all of the other sources of pressure (the
government, competitors, and customers) are also part of society. Thus is it possible that
the questions measuring society do not discriminate from other measures of pressure. No
immediate action was taken with the scale items for society, but they were identified for
further analysis. The association of Com_1 with customer pressures may be explained by
the fact that organizations have competitors who are also suppliers and customers.
However, because of this cross-loading and the increase to alpha for the competitor scale,
Com_1 was deleted from this research.
The final assessment of convergent and discriminant validity for SCS Drivers was
done using the AVE and shared variance. As shown in Table 35, this method indicates
provides evidence that convergent and discriminant validity exists.

257

Table 35
AVE and Shared Variance for Drivers of SCS
Customer Government Competitor Societal
Variable
Customer
0.727
Government
0.075
0.651
Competitor
0.139
0.074
0.803
Societal
0.140
0.155
0.066
0.595
NOTE: The AVE for each construct is on the diagonal and in bold.
The shared variance between constructs resides on the off diagonal.
In summary, the validity estimates for drivers of SCS indicate evidence of
convergent and discriminant validity. There was concern with discriminant validity for
societal pressures with CFA assessments, however, the calculation of the shared variance
compared to the AVE indicated strong discriminant validity.
SCS Activities - Intraorganizational Activities
First, PCA with Varimax rotation was conducted to obtain preliminary convergent
and discriminant validity assessments. A test for sampling adequacy was conducted
using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO). The calculated
value was extremely high, indicating that the sample for each PCA was considered
appropriate. Communalities for item were assessed and each exceeded the .50 threshold
suggested by Hair et al. (2006).
Twelve factors were specified during the PCA with Varimax rotation. These
components explained 83.8 percent of the variance. The results of the PCA are presented
in Table 36.
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Table 36
Rotated Factor Matrix for Intraorganizational SCS
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SCSC_1
SCSC_2
SCSC_3
SCSC_4
SCSC_5
Avoid_1
Avoid_2
Avoid_3
Avoid_4
Avoid_5
OM_1
OM_2
OM_3
OM_4
Qual_1
Qual_2
Qual_3
Qual_4
Qual_5
FH_1
FH_2
FH_3
FH_4

1
0.851
0.831
0.890
0.854
0.866

2

3

4

5

Component
6
7

8

9

10

0.763
0.829
0.756
0.520
0.578

0.664

0.863
0.890
0.872
0.690
0.509
0.551
0.544
0.596
0.548
0.412
0.412

0.544
0.426
0.418
0.451
0.410

11

0.512
0.511
0.644
0.644

12

Table 36 continued
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AR_1
AR_2
AR_3
CC_1
CC_2
CC_3
CC_4
SS_1
SS_2
SS_3
SS_4
Mon_1
Mon_2
Mon_3
Mon_4
Insp_1
Insp_2
Insp_3
SD_1
SD_2
SD_3
SD_4
SD_5
SSA_1
SSA_2
SSA_3
SSA_4
Eigenvalue
Percent of
Variance
Explained

0.661
0.805
0.750
0.568
0.635
0.647
0.666
0.806
0.775
0.844
0.869
0.408

0.403
0.410

0.612
0.740
0.756
0.788
0.787
0.809
0.411
0.419

0.465

0.597
0.771
0.852
0.854

23.3682

0.784
0.782
0.541
0.656
3.354

2.664

2.378

2.193

1.494

1.367

1.250

1.061

.961

.806

.688

47.365

6.707

5.327

4.756

4.386

2.988

2.734

2.500

2.123

1.923

1.612

1.377

This first assessment of validity using PCA and Varimax rotation indicated that
there were minor issues with discriminant validity. This was evident from the crossloadings for items on factors of other than the factor their other scale items loaded on.
For example, Avoid_4 loads significantly on with the other avoidance items on
component 7 (indicating convergent validity), but it also significantly loads on
component 11.
Next, CFA was used to assess convergent and discriminant validity for
intraorganizational activities. For the intraorganizational activities, convergent validity
was evident. The paths from the latent variables to their indicators were all in the correct
direction, indicated a strong magnitude, and were significant as the critical ratios were all
well above 1.96 (Byrne 2001).
There were multiple issues with discriminant validity with the intraorganizational
activities. Each is presented below.
•

SD_2 (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company involves upper
management to deal with supply chain security) was highly associated with
quality. This is likely due to general nature of the item and the construct.

•

SD_1 (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company dedicates internal
departments to exclusively work on supply chain security) was highly associated
with, inspection. Internal security departments are likely to be involved in the
process of inspecting for security breaches.

•

Mon_1 (In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company keeps a very close
watch on everything in an effort to know when a potential breach may be
occurring) was highly associated with security services. This is a very general
question and thus is it reasonable to understand its association monitoring. Also,
part of the responsibility of a security services would likely take on a role of
monitoring.
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•

OM_4 (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company makes changes to
how our supply chain operates with customers) was highly associated with supply
chain security culture.

•

SS_4 (In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company outsources supply
chain security activities to external security firms) was highly associated with
supply chain security culture.

•

CC_1 (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company makes employees
continuously engage in supply chain security activities) was associated with
access restriction. Part of the process of continuously engaging with supply chain
security might involve restricting access.

•

Qual_1 (In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company focuses on building
quality supply chain security activities into supply chain operations) was highly
associated with security sourcing audits.

•

Avoid_4 (In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company avoids risky supply
chain situations) was associated with supply chain security culture. This particular
item is quite global. Avoiding risky situations could very well be part of an
organizational culture.

•

SSA_4 (In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company dedicates resources
to finding suppliers who fit with our supply chain security strategy) was
associated with security services. This association seems logical as an outsourced
security service will be provided by a supplier of some kind.
As a result of the CFA, the nine items listed above were removed from the

analysis, one at a time. The removal of these items had positive impact on the
problematic associations. It is noted that a few minor issues remained with modifications
greater than 5.0 (ranging from 5.0-6.5). These items included SSA_4, FH_4, FH_3,
OM_1, Insp_1, SSA_3, SD_3, Mon_2, and SS_3. However, these items were retained in
the research for two reasons. First, the modifications indices with other constructs were
above the 5.0 threshold, but only very slightly. Second, the elimination of these items
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would result in scales with less than three items. With those two considerations, these
items were retained in the analysis.
The final assessment of convergent and discriminant validity for the SCS
intraorganizational activities was done using the AVE and shared variance. As shown in
Table 37, this method of validity assessment provides evidence for convergent and
discriminant validity.
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Table 37
AVE and Shared Variance for SCS Intraorganizational Activities

Variable

SCSC

AVOID

OP_
MOD

QUALITY

FAC_
HARD

ACC_
RES

SEC_
COMBAT SERV

MONITOR

INSPEC

SEC_
DEP
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SCSC

0.881

AVOID

0.110

0.598

OP_MOD

0.154

0.096

0.888

QUALITY

0.588

0.210

0.186

0.857

FAC_HARD
ACC_RES

0.417

0.146

0.220

0.557

0.894

0.141

0.117

0.245

0.247

0.343

0.690

COMBAT

0.615

0.142

0.217

0.635

0.536

0.267

0.905

SEC_SER

0.115

0.036

0.057

0.157

0.110

0.107

0.148

0.744

MONITOR

0.317

0.103

0.186

0.464

0.465

0.273

0.482

0.109

0.832

INSPEC

0.242

0.101

0.132

0.436

0.497

0.228

0.439

0.112

0.395

0.846

SEC_DEP

0.222

0.008

0.100

0.212

0.235

0.164

0.234

0.241

0.230

0.200

0.841

SEC_AUDIT

0.318

0.063

0.253

0.514

0.461

0.274

0.442

0.094

0.447

0.321

0.206

SEC_
AUDIT

0.806

NOTE: The AVE for each construct is on the diagonal and in bold. The shared variance between constructs resides on
the off diagonal.

In summary, the validity estimates for intraorganizational SCS activities indicate
evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. There was concern with discriminant
validity for several constructs with the PCA and CFA assessments. After confounding
items were removed, the final assessment using AVE and shared variance indicate
discriminant validity for these measures.
SCS Activities – Interorganizational Activities
First, PCA with Varimax rotation was conducted to obtain preliminary convergent
and discriminant validity assessments. A test for sampling adequacy was conducted
using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO). The calculated
value was extremely high, indicating that the sample for each PCA was considered
appropriate. Communalities for item were assessed and each exceeded the .50 threshold
suggested by Hair et al. (2006).
Seven factors were specified during the PCA with Varimax rotation. The seven
factors explained 88 percent of the variance. The results of the PCA are presented in
Table 38.
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Table 38
Rotated Factor Matrix for Interorganizational SCS

1
0.533

2

Part_1
Part_2
Part_3
0.512
Part_4
0.736
Learn_1
Learn_2
0.460 0.422
Learn_3
0.495
Adopt_1
0.520
Adopt_2
0.611
Adopt_3
0.680 0.402
Adopt_4
0.717
Coll_1
0.829
Coll_2
0.834
Coll_3
0.840
Coll_4
0.816
Comp_1
Comp_2
0.461
Comp_3
0.561 0.467
Comm_1
0.705
Comm_2
0.749
Comm_3
0.783
Comm_4
0.787
Comm_5
0.768
Cam_1
Cam_2
Cam_3
Cam_4
Eigenvalue 16.460 3.116
Percent of
Variance
Explained 60.963 11.540

Component
3
4

5

6
0.461
0.717
0.546
0.434

7

0.838
0.568
0.413
0.535
0.424
0.403

0.795
0.726
0.560

0.942
0.928
0.958
0.908
1.300 1.030 .704

.637

.520

4.815 3.814 2.608 2.359 1.925
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The results from PCA indicated that evidence of convergent validity exists.
Factor loadings were high on all respective components. However, there were issues
with discriminant validity as a number of items loaded highly on multiple components.
Similar issues were evident with the pretest PCA. Further, as mentioned previously, this
may be expected as the interorganizational SCS activities are activities that are “core” to
SCM relationships. As these activities are fundamental to all SCM, it can be expected
that many of the core SCM factors fail to discriminate from one another. In particular,
partnerships, collaboration, compromising, learning, and adopting load on one
component. This is likely the result of respondents viewing partnerships as a higher level
of a relationship, which requires collaborative efforts and compromises to achieve.
Similarly, if an organization learns about SCS from a supply chain member, it is likely
that they will adopt these measures. This may explain why those five distinct activities
load significantly onto one component.
Next, CFA was used to assess convergent and discriminant validity for SCS
drivers. For the interorganizational activities, evidence of convergent validity was
exhibited. The paths from the latent variables to their indicators were all in the correct
direction, indicated a strong magnitude, and were significant as the critical ratios were all
well above 1.96 guideline (Byrne 2001).
There was one issue with discriminant validity as Learn_3 (Thinking about our
supply chain strategy, our company learns about supply chain security requirements from
other supply chain members) was associated with collaboration and compromise. This
association is likely the result of learning SCS requirements from working together
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collaboratively with other organizations. Unfortunately, the elimination of Learn_3 does
leave the scale for learning with only two items, however the elimination was necessary
as this item was highly problematic. Leaving Learn_3 in the analysis was not an option
as it resulted in many other validity issues. Even though this leaves learning with two
scale items, it was necessary to eliminate Learn_3 from the analysis. When Learn_3 was
removed, Cam_3 (Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company will work with
our competition to make our supply chain more secure) became problematic as it became
associated with learning. Although is likely that some form of learning would be
engaged when in working with competition. As a result, Cam_3 was dropped.
The final assessment of convergent and discriminant validity for the SCS
interorganizational activities was conducted using the AVE and shared variance. As
shown in Table 39, this method of validity assessment provides evidence of the existence
of convergent and discriminant validity.
Table 39
AVE and Shared Variance for SCS Interorganizational Activities
Variable

PARTNER

LEARN

ADOPT

COLLAB

COMPRO

COMMUN

PARTNER

0.728

LEARN

0.516

0.807

ADOPT

0.679

0.620

0.895

COLLAB

0.675

0.450

0.734

0.881

COMPRO

0.506

0.408

0.542

0.567

0.850

COMMUN

0.535

0.543

0.627

0.522

0.572

0.815

CAMAR

0.096

0.106

0.118

0.123

0.070

0.134

NOTE: The AVE for each construct is on the diagonal and in bold.
The shared variance between constructs resides on the off diagonal.
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CAMAR

0.846

In summary, the validity estimates for drivers of SCS indicate evidence of
convergent and discriminant validity. There was concern with convergent and
discriminant validity for many of the interorganizational activities from the initial PCA
evaluation. However, the additional assessments using CFA, AVE, and shared variance,
indicate adequate discriminant validity after the elimination of problematic items.
Organizational Performances
First, PCA with Varimax rotation was conducted to obtain preliminary convergent
and discriminant validity assessments. A test for sampling adequacy was conducted
using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO). The calculated
value was extremely high, indicating that the sample for each PCA was considered
appropriate. Communalities for the items were assessed and each exceeded the .50
threshold suggested by Hair et al. (2006).
In total, four performances were selected as outcomes of SCS efforts, which
resulted in four factors being specified during the PCA with Varimax rotation. The four
components explain 74.6 percent of the variance. The results of the PCA are presented in
Table 40.

269

Table 40
Rotated Factor Matrix for Organizational Performances
Component
2
3
0.690
0.895
0.874
0.777
0.799

1
FP_1
FP_2
FP_3
FP_4
FP_5
CP_1
CP_2
CP_3
MP_1
MP_2
MP_3
MP_4
MP_5
SCP_4
SCP_5
SCP_6
SCP_7
SCP_8
SCP_9
Eigenvalue
Percent of
Variance
Explained

4

0.692
0.742
0.477 0.659
0.787
0.831
0.756
0.607
0.714
0.847
0.695
0.664
0.858
0.711
0.822
8.897

2.904

46.827

15.283 7.397 5.082

.411

1.405 .966

The first assessment of validity through PCA with Varimax rotation suggests that
convergent validity is evident, but there may be two minor issues with discriminant
validity. CP_3 has a high cross-loading with the market performance component. Also,
SCP_5 has a high cross-loading with customer performance.
Next, CFA was used to assess convergent and discriminant validity for
organizational performances. All four constructs of organizational performance (firm,
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customer, market, and supply chain) exhibited high levels of convergent validity. The
critical values for each path greatly exceeded the 1.96 threshold (Byrne 2001).
However, there were minor issues with discriminant validity. FP_2 (Return on
investment) and FP_5 (Return on assets) were associated with supply chain performance.
This is theoretically understandable as ROI and ROA would likely impact supply chain
measures. As discussed earlier, supply chain performance is a very global construct.
Also, SCP_8 (Shipment accuracy) was associated with market performance. This
association is plausible since on time and accurate deliveries are likely to lead to
increased market share. Additionally, each of the measures of performance have been
used many times together in conjunction with one another. Also, the associations
between the listed items and constructs are theoretically understandable. As a result, no
actions were taken on the four constructs of organizational performance.
The final assessment of validity for organizational performances was conducted
by determining the AVE and shared variance. The AVE and shared variance provide
evidence for the existence of convergent and discriminant validity for the organizational
performance variables. The results are shown in Table 41.
Table 41
AVE and Shared Variance for Organizational Performances
Variable F_PERF C_PERF M_PERF SC_PERF
F_PERF
0.771
C_PERF
0.304
0.771
M_PERF
0.437
0.411
0.668
SC_PERF
0.128
0.335
0.135
0.609
NOTE: The AVE for each construct is on the diagonal and in bold. The
shared variance between constructs resides on the off diagonal.
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In summary, the validity estimates for organizational performances present
evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. There was concern with discriminant
validity after conducting PCA and CFA. However, the final assessment of AVE and
shared variance confirms discriminant validity for the organizational performance
measures.

Summary of Validity Assessments
Through the assessment of two types of validity and the discrepancy in results, it
was evident that items in this research may be problematic. Specifically, there were
issues with discriminant validity. However, by identifying these issues and addressing
them, efforts were taken to increase confidence in validity. Each time the final
assessment of validity, AVE and shared variance, indicated that each construct scale in
the research exhibits evidence of validity.

Summary of Psychometric Properties
Reliability for each scale was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha, item-to-total
correlations, and average inter-item correlations. Reliability estimates for each construct
scale were acceptable. Additionally, unidimensionality was assessed for each scale
separately using PCA. All scales exhibited unidimensionality. Finally, construct validity
was assessed using PCA, CFA, and AVE and shared variance. All scales offered
evidence of convergent validity across all assessments. There were some issues with
discriminant validity; however, those issues were addressed and an assessment of
discriminant validity using shared variance compared to AVE indicated that all constructs
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were different measures. As a result of these tests, the construct scales in this research
have illustrated adequate psychometric properties. These constructs were then used to
test the hypotheses that were presented in Chapter III.
Hypothesis Testing and Results
The final section of this chapter discusses the techniques and statistical tests used
to assess Hypotheses 1 through 9. These results are presented under each research
question.
Research Question 1: Does a taxonomy of SCS exist?
For the first part of the hypothesis testing, cluster analysis was used to identify
SCS categories based on SCS activities within the sample of firms. This technique
categorizes respondents into homogenous groups based on pre-selected variables. For
this application, the criterion variables were the SCS intra- and interorganizational
activities. When using cluster analysis, the goal it to identify the overall categories that
organizations use to secure their supply chains.
A three-step process as used to create and accurately identify the SCS categories.
A multiple step clustering process follows the suggestion of previous research (i.e.,
Reynolds and Beatty 1999). This was done because the determination of the appropriate
number of clusters is a subjective process as no statistical techniques exist to determine
how many clusters are appropriate. Using this multiple step approach is recommended
and should result in better within cluster homogeneity and between cluster heterogeneity
(Hair et al. 2006).
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In the first step, it is suggested that the appropriate number of clusters should be
approximately between n/60 and n/30, where n is the sample size (Lehmann 1979). This
technique is first used to help consider the number of clusters. In the second step,
hierarchical cluster analysis was used to identify the number of clusters, based on the
Ward’s method, with a squared Euclidian distance measure. This method is recognized
for its ability to maximize homogeneity within clusters, while at the same time
maximizing heterogeneity between clusters (Aldenderef and Blashfield 1984). The
squared Euclidian distance is recommended because it results in clusters with the smallest
sum of squares error (Arabie and Huber 1994). This procedure is confirmed using
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) and reviewing the classification rate of the
clustering variables and the clusters.
Finally, the last step to identify clusters is done using a non-hierarchical technique
(K-means). Non-hierarchical techniques do not use a step-wise function like hierarchical
techniques. Instead, this procedure assign cases to clusters once the optimal number of
clusters (seeds) have been identified (Hair et al. 2006). The classifying of cases is done
through moving the cases into groups when they are close to the mean vector of a group
(Landau and Everitt 2004). The results of each of these clustering steps are presented
next.
First, using the n/60 to n/30 rule of thumb, three to six clusters is deemed to be
appropriate for this research (162/60 and 162/30). Second, using hierarchical analysis,
the agglomeration coefficient is used to determine clusters. The agglomeration method is
where each observation starts out as its own cluster, and then the two most similar
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clusters are joined. This is then repeated until only one cluster exists (Hair et al. 2006).
The agglomeration coefficient helps to indicate changes in the distance between
dissimilar cases in clusters being combined. Thus, small changes in the agglomeration
coefficient represent homogenous clusters being combined, whereas large changes
indicate heterogeneous combination (Park, Chibnall, and Morrow 2005).
The largest percentage change in the agglomeration schedule was evaluated for
clusters between three and six (which were determined in the first step). According to
this result, the largest change in the agglomeration schedule comes when three clusters
are emerged into two. This lends indication that a three cluster solution may be most
appropriate for this sample. Results are shown in Table 42.
Table 42
Agglomeration Schedule from Hierarchal Cluster Analysis

Stage
134
135
136
137

End
Start
Number Number
of
of
Agglomeration
Clusters Clusters
Coefficient
2420.20
6
5
2544.02
5
4
2722.57
4
3
2971.10
3
2

Agglomeration
Coefficient Percent
Change
5.04%
4.87%
6.56%
8.37%

The case membership of the clusters was saved in SPSS as new variable. By
doing so, this allowed for further analysis in determining an appropriate number of
clusters. It is also noted that different clustering algorithms were utilized (betweengroups; within-groups) and all produced the same results.
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Next, MDA was used to help verify the number of hierarchical clusters by
predicting group membership. The grouping variable was set as the clusters derived in
the previous step. The independent variables were the 19 SCS intra- and
interorganizational activities that were used to derive the clusters. This technique is used
to determine how accurate group membership is predicted based on the clustering
variables.
With MDA, the Tests Equality of Group Means was first evaluated. This assists
in determining which variables are good at discriminating among the different groups. In
the three cluster solution, all 19 variables indicated significance. Next, the output of
interest is the percentage of cases classified correctly. Using MDA, 95.7% of the cases
were correctly classified into the clusters. The classification results are shown in Table
43.
Table 43
Classification Results from MDA
Classification Results
Predicted Group
Membership
Ward Method
1
2
3
36
0
2
1
3
84
0
2
1
0
14
3
95.7% of original grouped cases correctly classified
N=140
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Total
38
87
15

A chi-square test can be conducted to assess if the discriminant analysis is better
at classification than chance. This test, called Press’s Q, involves evaluating the sample
size and the number of correct classifications. The equation for this is:
[N-(nK)]2/N(K-1)
Where:
• N=total sample size
• n=the correct number of cases classified
• K=number of groups
(Hair et al. 2006)
The calculated Press’s Q is 245.16. The critical value at a .01 significance level is 6.63.
This is highly significant and it is concluded that the discriminant analysis is better at
classification than chance.
Finally, after hierarchal cluster analysis and MDA were used to indicate how
many clusters exist, a non-hierarchal cluster analysis was used to finalize cluster
membership. The non-hierarchical clustering procedure requires the researcher to
indicate a number of seed points before conducting the analysis. The numbers of clusters
determined during the hierarchical stage were used as seed points for the K-means
process. The K-means cluster analysis results provided three clusters with sizes of 87,
41, and 12, respectively. These cluster sizes are very similar to the number of correct
classifications in the MDA analysis.
From the many clustering techniques used, it is evident that three unique SCS
categories exist. This indicates support for Hypothesis 1a, which suggests that more than
one SCS category exists. The next step was to determine if the categories (clusters) were
distinct from one another.
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According to Hair et al. (2006), all clusters should be significantly different on all
clustering variables. With three clusters established, a test was conducted to determine if
differences among the clusters on all clustering variables were evident. A one-way
ANOVA was conducted with the three clusters as independent variables and all SCS
activities as the dependent variables. At the .001 level of significance, the ANOVA
results indicated that there were significant differences among the clusters on all
clustering variables. The F and ρ-values among all variables are shown in Table 44.
Table 44
ANOVA Results for Between Cluster Differences on Clustering Variables
FValue
SCSC
82.89
AVOID
9.96
OP_MOD
27.33
QUALITY
188.62
FAC_HARD
99.25
ACC_RESTR
33.96
COMB_COMP 151.62
SEC_SERV
18.94
MONITOR
61.50
INSPEC
67.25
SEC_DEP
30.73
SEC_AUDIT
80.83
PARTNER
110.07
LEARN
95.27
ADOPT
157.65
COLLAB
85.76
COMPRO
89.89
COMMUN
112.02
CAMAR
11.12
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ρvalue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Further post-hoc analysis of all the individual items using a Bonferroni correction
indicated that each individual cluster differed on each variable, with the exception of
three instances. Clusters 2 and 3 did not significantly differ on avoidance, security
departments, and camaraderie. However, the results overwhelmingly indicate that the
clusters are distinct and unique from one another. This finding indicates that a three
cluster solution represents unique SCS categories. As a result, Hypothesis 1b is partially
supported. The results for Hypotheses 1a and1b are presented in Table 45.
Table 45
Outcomes for Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Hypothesis
Number

Hypothesis

Outcome

Hypothesis 1a

A multi-categorical supply chain security
taxonomy exists.

Supported

Hypothesis 1b

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’ supply
chain security activities are significantly different
from one another.

Partially
Supported

Initial Cluster Interpretation and Profile
From the ANOVA results, it was indicated that the clusters have different mean
values on 19 SCS variables. The next step was to better understand the within cluster
priorities and compare those between clusters so that a greater understanding of the three
different supply chain security categories could be gained. The mean values for the
activities within each cluster were evaluated to establish an order of importance within
each cluster across the 19 clustering variables.
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The within cluster importance rankings were evaluated. For Cluster 1 the highest
scores were for access restriction, facilities hardening and inspection, while security
departments, camaraderie, and security services were the lowest. Cluster 2 scored
highest on access restriction, avoidance, and operation modification, with supply chain
security culture, security services, and security departments as the lowest. Finally,
cluster 3 scored highest on avoidance, operation modification, and access restriction
while the lowest were on combating complacency, security services, and security
departments. A summary of all the SCS activities scores across the clusters are shown in
Table 46.
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Table 46
Prevalence of SCS Activities among Clusters
Cluster
Intra- and Interorg SCS Activities
Supply Chain Security Culture
Within Cluster Rank
Avoidance
Within Cluster Rank
Operation Modification
Within Cluster Rank
Quality
Within Cluster Rank
Facilities Hardening
Within Cluster Rank
Access Restriction
Within Cluster Rank
Combating Complacency
Within Cluster Rank
Security Services
Within Cluster Rank
Monitoring
Within Cluster Rank
Inspection
Within Cluster Rank
Security Departments
Within Cluster Rank
Security Audits
Within Cluster Rank
Partnerships
Within Cluster Rank
Learning
Within Cluster Rank
Adopting
Within Cluster Rank
Collaboration
Within Cluster Rank
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1
5.55
16
5.99
8
6.21
4
5.99
7
6.39
2
6.48
1
5.81
10
3.98
19
5.92
9
6.28
3
4.74
17
5.63
15
5.64
13
6.05
6
6.14
5
5.64
14

2
3.54
17
5.43
2
5.31
3
4.01
15
4.79
4
5.66
1
4.17
12
3.31
18
4.56
5
4.53
6
2.72
19
4.12
13
4.21
11
4.29
10
4.41
8
4.10
14

3
1.98
15
4.92
1
4.50
2
2.21
11
3.65
4
4.22
3
1.89
17
1.53
18
2.97
6
2.97
5
1.42
19
2.19
12
1.92
16
2.38
8
2.21
10
2.13
13

Table 46 continued
Compromising
Within Cluster Rank
Communication
Within Cluster Rank
Camaraderie
Within Cluster Rank

5.73
12
5.74
11
4.59
18

4.41
9
4.52
7
3.71
16

2.25
9
2.07
14
2.47
7

The three clusters were interpreted as follows:
•

“SCS Pros” (Cluster 1): It is likely that this group of firms dedicate many
resources to enhancing SCS efforts. Their within group mean scores are all
extremely high. In fact, according to the ANOVA results in Table 44, this cluster
has mean scores that are significantly higher than the other two groups. All
activities, both intra- and interorganizational activities rank higher than any other
cluster. This illustrates that this group is dedicated to a holistic SCS approach.
This group also seems to be traditional in their holistic approach. That is, the
most important variables in this cluster are restricting access, facilities hardening,
and inspection operations. These intraorganizational activities can be
implemented within facilities by activities like coded doors, fences, and standard
operating procedures for checking products.

•

“Follow-the-leaders” (Cluster 2): As the title for this group indicates, this group
is likely to have watched other firms (SCS Pros) develop some SCS activities and
then have attempted to emulate some of those best practices – just not to the
degree to which the very proactive firms have. The within group mean scores
across all variables range from 2.72 (Security Departments) to 5.66 (Access
Restriction), with most scores falling in or around 4 (on a 7pt. scale). The
ANOVA results in Table 44 suggest that this group has mean scores across all
variables that are significantly different than the SCS Pros and from the third
group (with the exception of avoidance, security departments, and camaraderie).
These factors indicate that the firms within this group probably about ‘average’ or
‘middle of the road’ in their approach to SCS. They are not the proactive firms
like SCS Pros, but they are doing more than the bare minimum for SCS.

•

“Necessary Evils” (Cluster 3): It is likely that this group views SCS as a forced
requirement as opposed to a strategic activity. Their within group mean scores
range from 1.42 (Security Departments) to 4.92 (Avoidance). This range of
scores indicates significantly lower scores on all SCS activities, with the
exception of avoidance, security departments, and camaraderie (which there is not
a significant difference from the second group). They have likely given little
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thought to engaging holistic security activities and only view SCS in the short
term. Given that the highest within cluster activity is avoidance, followed by
operation modification, it would appear that a major priority of this group is to try
and avoid SCS all together.
Next, descriptive data were analyzed among cluster members to help build a
cluster profiles. Results are presented in Table 47.
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Table 47
Cluster Profiles Based on Descriptive Information
SCS
Follow the
Pros
Leaders
Position in the Supply Chain
Manufacturer
36%
10%
Carrier
7%
10%
Wholesaler/Distributor
9%
10%
Freight Forwarder
5%
3PL
24%
30%
Warehouser
7%
5%
Retailer
6%
30%
Other
6%
5%
Industry Grouping
Automotive
3%
3%
Medical/Pharmaceutical
8%
6%
Apparel/Textiles
3%
6%
Electronics
9%
9%
Industrial Products
4%
3%
Consumer Packaged Goods
27%
24%
Chemical/Plastics
7%
6%
Appliances
2%
3%
Apparel/textiles
2%
Agriculture
3%
6%
Other
28%
33%
Annual Sales
Less than $100 thousand
$101 thousand-$200
thousand
$201 thousand-$300
thousand
$301 thousand-$400
thousand
1%
$401 thousand-$500
thousand
1%
$501 thousand-$1 million
$2-$25 million
19%
15%
$26-$100 million
15%
25%
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Necessary
Evils
75%
8%

8%
8%
8%
8%
17%
8%

58%

17%
25%

Table 47 continued
$101-$200 million
$201-$300 million
$301-$400 million
$401-$500 million
$501-$600 million
$601-$700 million
$701-$800 million
$801-$900 million
$901 million-$1 billion
Greater than $1 billion

2%
1%
5%
1%
2%
5%
3%
3%
40%

3%
3%
3%
5%
5%

17%
8%

8%
5%
39%

25%

Security Pros primarily consist of manufacturers (36%) and 3PLs (24%), focused
on consumer products (27%) and other goods (28%), and are large firms in terms of sales
(40% are greater than $1B in sales). Follow-the-Leaders are comprised of 3PLs (30%)
and retailers (30%), are also focused on consumer products (24%) and other goods
(33%), and are large firms in terms of sales (39% are greater than $1B in sales). While
smaller in number, the Necessary Evils do offer some differences in terms of their profile.
This cluster is dominated by manufacturers (75%), handle other products (58%) and
electronics (17%), and is a mix of large and small firms in terms of annual sales (25% are
greater than $1B and 25% have $26 through $100M in sales).
Research Question 2: What causes organizations to partake in specific SCS
taxonomy categories?
To answer this question and test the specified hypotheses, the categories (clusters)
identified during the previous step served as dependent variables in MDA. The
independent variables are the institutional pressures of customers, government,
competitors, and society.
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Before conducting MDA, all assumptions were assessed. Most assumptions of
MDA were previously assessed before any analysis began (normality, linearity, and
collinearity). However, there was one assumption to satisfy before proceeding with
MDA: a test for the equality of the variance/covariance.
Traditionally, the test for this assumption is conducted with Box’s M, which is
used to test for similarity of the dispersion matrices of the independent variables among
the categorical dependent variables. In this test, non-significance is sought for support of
this assumption (Hair et al. 2006). In this analysis, the calculated significance level was
0.150. As a result, this assumption is considered satisfied and the MDA was continued.
The first assessment of MDA was done through analyzing the estimation of the
discriminant model and overall fit. This allows for identification of discriminating
independent variables for the dependent categorical variables. This is determined
through evaluating the Wilks’ Lambda. This statistical test indicates if there are overall
differences among the groups, or in other words, determines how many significant
functions exist. This is important as the discriminant functions explain the differences in
the dependent variables.
A stepwise estimation procedure was used to eliminate any variable that did not
contribute statistically in describing the groups. With stepwise, only variables that are
useful in determining the discriminant function are used, which can be a better set of
variables (Hair et al. 2006). Since there are three groups, two discriminant functions
were generated to discriminate between the groups. The results of that test indicate that
only one function is significant. The first function explains 99.9 percent of the variance,
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which indicates that almost all of the variance in the dependent variable was explained by
the function. Results are presented in Table 48 and Table 49.
Table 48
Test of Function Significance
Test of
Wilks'
ChiFunction(s)
Lambda
Square
df Sig
1 through 2
0.509
88.720 4 0.000
2
0.999
0.090 1 0.764
Table 49
Function Eigenvalues
Function Eigenvalue
1
0.962
2
0.001

% of
Variance
Cumulative %
99.9
99.9
0.1
100

Canonical
Correlation
0.700
0.026

The canonical correlation for function 1 is 0.700. Hair et al. (2006) suggest
squaring the canonical correlation for interpretation. In this instance, 0.7002 = 0.490,
which indicates that 49% of the variance in the dependent variables is accounted for by
the model, which included two independent variables: customers and society.
Next, the standardized discriminant coefficients were evaluated to understand the
largest contribution in determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant function.
Table 50 presents the standardized and unstandardized discriminant coefficients for the
variables used in the analysis. Customers (β=0.792) have the largest impact in
determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant function. Impact of society has
the second highest (β=0.533).
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Table 50
Standardized and Unstandardized Discriminant Coefficients
Standardized
Unstandardized
Descriptor
Variable Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2
Customers
0.792
-0.619
0.591
-0.462
Society
0.533
0.853
0.473
0.757
Constant
-4.852
-1.675
Finally, the structure matrix was evaluated. This identifies which predictor
variables have the greatest contribution to the function (in other words, where would the
discrimination occur if all variables were in the model) (Hair et al. 2006). Results are
shown in Table 51.
Table 51
Structure Coefficients Matrix
Function
Descriptor
Variable
1
2
Customers
0.848* -0.530
Competitors** 0.326* -0.002
Government** 0.264* 0.140
Society
0.616 0.788*
*Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any
discriminant function
**Variable not used in the analysis (these two variables were
not significant predictors of the dependent variables)

Validation of Results
The final step in evaluating model accuracy is to assess how well the developed
function predicts group membership. In essence, this is a measure of how well the
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function performs. Hair et al. (2006) suggest that MDA validation, or external validity, is
most commonly conducted by comparing the hit ratio to the occurrence of correct
classification by chance. Therefore, to assess external validity, there were two
procedures enacted. First, the hit ratio of the original cases was determined. Second, the
cross validated cases were evaluated.
The hit ratio is the percentage of cases correctly classified. In the original
classification, the MDA results show that 72.3 percent of the cases can be classified as
category 1, 2, or 3 members based on the discriminant function. The results are shown in
Table 52.
Table 52
MDA Original Classification Results
Predicted Group
Membership
1
2
3
66
19
0
1
8
24
9
2
0
2
9
3
Ungrouped Cases
14
6
1
72.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified
N=135

Total
85
41
11
21

One way to understand if the classification is better than chance is to evaluate
Press’s Q (Hair et al. 2006). The calculated Press’s Q for this classification is 104.53.
The critical value at a 0.01 level of significance is 6.63. Thus, the discriminant analysis
can be described as predicting group membership better than chance.
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Another approach to verifying classification is using a “leave one out” procedure.
With this, the discriminant function is derived from n-1 cases. The case that is left out is
then classified with the function. The procedure is repeated until all observations have
been the case left out. The hit ratio is again calculated for the total of the cross-validated
groups (Hair et al. 2006). In this case, the cross-validated groups are classified correctly
69.3 percent of the time. This is slightly below the classification of the original results.
The cross-validated results are presented in Table 53.
Table 53
Results of Cross Validated Classification Results
Predicted Group
Membership
Total
1
2
3
64
21
0
85
1
8
24
9
41
2
0
4
7
11
3
69.3% of the cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified
N=135
For the cross-validated cases, Press’s Q was also calculated. The calculated value
of Press’s Q was 83.3, which is highly significant. This again lends indication that the
discriminant analysis classifies cases better than chance. Thus, the discriminant function
does accurately classify cases into one of three clusters.

Interpretation of the MDA Results and Hypotheses Outcomes
The results of the MDA indicate that one discriminant function, which is a
combination of the independent variables, is appropriate for classifying respondents into
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one of three SCS categories. The total percentage of variance explained indicated that
almost all (99.9 percent) of the variance in the clusters can be explained by the first
function. The standardized and unstandardized coefficients indicated that customers had
the largest contribution in determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant
function.
Importantly, it is suggested that customers and societal impacts are the greatest
causes for firms enacting SCS categories. The other factors investigated here,
competitors and the government, did not significantly impact the prediction of group
membership. As a result, Hypotheses two and four were not supported, while three and
five were. The results are shown in Table 54.
Table 54
Outcomes for Hypotheses 2-5
Hypothesis
Number
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis
Government pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Customer pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Competitive pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Societal pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
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Outcome
Not
Supported
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported

Research Question 3: Do different SCS categories result in different organizational
performances?
To answer the third research question, multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was used. This procedure assists in modeling categorical independent variables with
continuous dependent variables (Hair et al. 2006). In this instance, the categorical
independent variables are the SCS three categories derived from the cluster analysis. The
continuous dependent variables were firm, customer, market, and supply chain
performance. The goal of this analysis was to understand if different types of SCS
categories result in significant differences across the four measures of organizational
performance.

Assumptions for MANOVA
Additional assumptions for MANOVA were assessed before proceeding with the
analysis. Normality was assessed by evaluating the Mahalanobis distance compared to a
critical value. The critical value for four dependent variables is 18.47 (Pallant 2005).
The calculated Mahalanobis value was 26.75, indicating that there were issues with
normality. Further evaluation of each case indicated only two cases where the
Malahanobis distance was greater than the critical value. As such, a decision was made
to allow both cases to remain in the dataset for the analysis.
Correlations among the dependent variables were also assessed. Highly
correlated dependent variables (0.8 and above) can also be problematic for MANOVA
(Pallant 2005). The highest correlation among the four performance variables was 0.649,
which was between firm performance and market performance.
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Homogeneity of variance was tested through the Box’s M Test of Equality of
Covariance Matrixes. This assumption is not violated when a value greater than 0.001 is
obtained (Pallant 2005). For this research, homogeneity of variance is established as a ρvalue of 0.559 was calculated.
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances indicates that the assumption of
equality of variance for each variance is also satisfied. Values less than .05 indicate a
violation. The reported ρ-values were 0.696 (firm performance), .653 (customer
performance), 0.606 (market performance), and 0.914 (supply chain performance).

Assessing the Differences among Clusters: A Multivariate Test of Overall Fit
Next, a one-way between-groups MANOVA was performed to investigate
organizational performance differences among SCS categories. There are many different
test statistics to use in determining significance, with Wilks’ Lambda typically the most
popular measure. With a 0.05 level of significance, Wilks’ Lambda indicated that there
was not a statistically significance difference between any category in terms of
organizational performance (F (df=8, 224)=1.40, p=0.198; Wilks’ Lambda=0.907;
partial eta squared=0.048, observed power=0.629). However, using another test of
significance statistic (Roy’s Largest Root) and a 0.10 level of significance there was a
statistically significance difference between categories and performance (F (df=4,
113)=2.02, p=0.096; Roys’ Largest Root=0.072; partial eta squared=0.067, observed
power=0.589). All results are shown in Table 55.
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Table 55
Results of MANOVA Multivariate Tests
Effect
Intercept

Clusters

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

Value

F

0.951
0.049
19.302
19.302
0.095
0.907
0.1
0.072

540.463
540.463
540.463
540.463
1.405
1.398
1.392
2.021

Hypothesis Error
Sig
df
df
4
112 0.000
4
112 0.000
4
112 0.000
4
112 0.000
8
226 0.196
8
224 0.198
8
222 0.201
4
113 0.096

No significant differences among the three SCS category types were discovered at
the 0.05 level of significance (Wilks’ Lambda=0.198). To better understand of why no
differences were found, the mean values and standard deviations for each category across
each performance measure were evaluated. Results are found in Table 56.
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Table 56
Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Performance Variables
Dependent
Variable
Category
1
2
3

Mean
5.014
4.772
4.380

SD
1.101
1.289
1.245

N
72
36
10

Customer
Performance

1
2
3

5.750
5.232
5.667

0.980
1.121
1.144

72
36
10

Market
Performance

1
2
3

5.039
4.583
4.800

1.069
1.405
1.143

72
36
10

Supply Chain
Performance

1
2
3

4.981
4.528
4.783

0.950
1.099
1.163

72
36
10

Firm
Performance

Across all performance measures, the first SCS category provides evidence for the
highest perceived levels of performance. In regard to firm performance, category three
(Necessary Evils) is the lowest. For customer, market, and supply chain performance, the
second category exhibits the lowest mean value. In reviewing the mean values in Table
56, it is evident that little variation exists among the mean values for each SCS category
type across the various performance measures, which make it understandable why no
differences were found.
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Interpretation of the MANOVA Results and Hypotheses Outcomes
The first step of the MANOVA procedure is to evaluate the overall model fit
statistics. There are multiple assessments to choose from. The results of this MANOVA
indicate that organizational performances do not vary based on the SCS category
deployed. The results for Hypotheses 6-9 are presented in Table 57.
Table 57
Outcomes for Hypotheses 6-9
Hypothesis
Number

Hypothesis

Outcome

Hypothesis 6

Firm performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7

Organizational market performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 8

Organizational customer performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 9

Organizational supply chain performance
varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Given of the findings from the hypothesis tests above, additional investigations
were undertaken. The additional analysis can be found in Appendix C and D.

Additional Investigation of Resiliency
As defined by Rice and Caniato (2003), resiliency is the “ability to react to
unexpected disruption and restore normal supply network operations,” (p.27). Although
not an explicit part of this study, resiliency was also explored in the analysis stage to
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understand if the ability to quickly restore operations after a SCS breach would have any
impact on organizational performance. Multiple items were included on the survey with
the intention of capturing how firms perceived they would continue operations after a
supply chain breach.
Before resiliency could be evaluated as a covariate, the psychometric properties
were first evaluated. The next section presents the reliability, unidimensionality, and
validity for resiliency.
Reliability
The Cronbach’s Alpha, item-to-total correlation, and average inter-item
correlation were calculated to assess reliability. These three measures all indicate strong
levels of reliability for the resiliency scale. Table 58 presents the reliability results for
resiliency.
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Table 58
Reliability Assessment for Resiliency
Resiliency
Res_1
Res_2
Res_3
Res_4
Res_5

Scale Item
Our firm would quickly bounce back from
a serious breach to our supply chain.
If a serious supply chain breach were to
happen, our firm would return to normal
operations in short order.
Our firm is prepared for major unexpected
supply chain disruptions.
Our firm would not have problems with
supply chain operations in the event of a
significant supply chain breach.
A serious breach in our supply chain
breach would have little effect on our
long-term supply chain operations.
Cronbach Alpha=.876
Average Inter-Item Correlation=.594
N=161

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Item -Total
Correlation

5.12

1.42

.758

5.25

1.31

.787

5.03

1.39

.625

4.47

1.63

.744

4.57

1.60

.645

The results of the three reliability assessments for resiliency indicate that it was a
reliable scale. Next, unidimensionality was assessed.
Unidimensionality
To test for unidimensionality, Principle Components Analysis (PCA) was used to
assess unidimensionality of the resiliency scale. The resiliency scale exhibited
unidimensionality as the result of high factor loadings on a single factor.
Validity
The final psychometric assessment for resiliency was that of validity. Convergent
validity was assessed by determining the AVE and discriminant validity was assessed by
comparing the shared variances of intra-, interorganizational, and organizational
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performance. The resiliency scale provided evidence of convergent validity with an AVE
greater than the .5 threshold (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The discriminant validity was
evident as the AVE was higher than any shared variance with any other construct.
Results are presented in Table 59.
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Table 59
AVE and Shared Variance for Resiliency
RESILIENCE
RESILIENCE
0.576*
SCSC
0.062**
AVOID
0.078**
OP_MOD
0.067**
QUALITY
0.081**
FAC_HARD
0.052**
ACC_RESTR
0.094**
COMB_COMP
0.081**
SEC_SERV
0.017**
MONITOR
0.045**
INSPEC
0.036**
SEC_DEP
0.045**
SEC_AUDIT
0.029**

RESILIENCE
PARTNER
LEARN
ADOPT
COLLAB
COMPRO
COMMUN
CAMAR

RESILIENCE
F_PERF
CUST_PERF
MARK_PERF
SC_PERF
*AVE
**Shared variance
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RESILIENCE
0.576*
0.041**
0.158**
0.067**
0.031**
0.018**
0.078**
0.000**
RESILIENCE
0.576*
0.183**
0.136**
0.130**
0.210**

From the reliability and validity assessments, it is evident that resiliency has
adequate psychometric properties.
The next step was to further investigate if resiliency was a candidate as a
covariate. Four simple regressions were conducted with resiliency as the independent
variable and each of the organizational variables as dependents. In each instance, the
model was significant and resiliency was shown to impact the performance measures. As
a result, additional analysis was conducted to investigate if resiliency changed the
relationship between SCS categories and organizational performance. A MANCOVA
was conducted to investigate this relationship
The results indicate that resiliency does not change the relationship between the
independent SCS categories and the dependent performance variables. This indicates that
resiliency is not a significant covariate. The results are shown in Table 60.
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Table 60
Results of MANOVA Multivariate Tests
Error
df

Value

Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest
Root
Resilience Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest
Root
Category Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest
Root

0.396 18.002
0.604 540.463
0.655 540.463

4
4
4

110
110
110

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.655 540.463
0.263
9.795
0.737
9.795
0.356
9.795

4
4
4
4

110
110
110
110

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.356
0.056
0.944
0.059

9.795
0.806
0.804
0.802

4
8
8
8

110
222
220
218

0.000
0.598
0.600
0.601

0.05

1.384

4

111

0.244

Intercept

F

Hypothesis
df

Effect

Sig

Conclusion
This chapter began with details of the sampling frame and response rates. This
was followed by assessing the psychometric properties for all items measuring constructs.
The second half of the chapter presented the results of the hypotheses tests. The next
chapter elaborates more on the findings from the hypotheses tests.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings. It has five primary sections.
First, a discussion of the results from the hypotheses tests is presented. Second, the
theoretical and managerial contributions are presented. Third, the limitations of the
given. Fourth, avenues for future research are presented. Finally, the chapter ends with
concluding remarks.
Discussion of the Findings
Following the suggestion of Dunn, Seaker, and Waller (1994), this research
utilized both theory building (inductive) and theory testing (deductive) approaches to
gain and advance knowledge on an emerging phenomenon: supply chain security. The
inductive approach was done using in-depth interviews; the deductive was done with
surveys and quantitative analyses. The qualitative theory building procedures assisted in
building knowledge of supply chain security and developing testable hypotheses. As
such, ten hypotheses were developed and presented in Chapter IV and the results of a
quantitative study to test the hypotheses were presented in Chapter V. Four of the ten
hypotheses were supported. Table 61 summarizes all the hypotheses and outcomes.
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Table 61
Hypothesis Test Summary Table
Hypothesis
Number
Hypothesis 1a

Hypothesis
A multi-categorical supply chain security
taxonomy exists.

Outcome
Supported

Hypothesis 5

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’
supply chain security activities are significantly
different from one another.
Government pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Customer pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Competitive pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Societal pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.

Hypothesis 6

Firm performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7

Organizational market performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 8

Organizational customer performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 9

Organizational supply chain performance
varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 1b
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
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Partially
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported

The following section elaborates more on these hypotheses test results relative to
the three main research questions (Is there a SCS taxonomy?; What causes the
organizations to partake in particular taxonomy categories?; Do SCS taxonomy
categories have an impact on organizational performance?).
Research Question 1: Is there a SCS taxonomy?
The first goal of this research was to understand if more than one approach to
SCS exists. The qualitative research suggested this notion; the interviewees across a
variety of industries indicated that there is no standard approach to SCS, which is likely
due to the newness of the phenomenon. Some of the interviewees indicated that their
firms were very proactive with their SCS efforts, while others indicated that their firms
only did the minimum security efforts to “get by.” By “getting by,” the firms were hoping
to avoid complaints from the government and from their customers. Additionally, other
interviewees indicated that their firms dedicate very few, if any, special resources to SCS
activities. This indicated that some firms often fail to establish SCS as a priority over any
other organizational initiatives, and as such these firms do very little to bolster SCS. The
cluster analysis supported this finding; the categories that emerged from the cluster
analysis followed a proactive (Security Pros), do the minimum necessary (Follow-theLeaders), and try to do as little as possible approach (Necessary Evils).
Another important finding from the qualitative research was that firms establish
numerous activities to create SCS categories. These activities can be classified into the
intra- and interorganizational taxonomy that is often used in marketing and supply chain
research. The SCS intraorganizational activities are those that the firm does to create
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security by itself. This can include activities as simple as restricting access to the
facilities, to more abstract and difficult things such as creating a supply chain security
culture. Alternatively, SCS interorganizational activities are those where organizations
work with other supply chain members to create a secure supply chain. The
interorganizational activities that emerged in the interviews were predominately core
business-to-business relational activities, which were modified to create security efforts.
For instance, creating SCS partnerships and extra communications for security efforts are
examples of interorganizational SCS activities. A surprising interorganizational activity
finding was that firms not only work with direct supply chain members for SCS, but also
sometimes work with their competitors to create a secure SCS for all firms. In all, 19
intra- and interorganizational SCS activities were identified and used to establish SCS
categories.
Given the information gained from the interviewees and the number of individual
activities that were identified during the qualitative research, it was hypothesized that
more than one SCS category exists. Using survey and scaled data collection methods,
data were captured for 19 of these SCS activities. The activities were analyzed using a
clustering technique, whereby natural groupings of the data emerge. The clusters that
were developed with the clustering techniques were considered to be a taxonomy of SCS
categories.
The analysis dictated that three primary SCS categories existed. These categories
were interpreted as: Security Pros, Follow-the-Leaders, and Necessary Evils.
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These three SCS categories have similarities to the strategic responses that Oliver (1991)
suggested exist in response to institutional pressures. The category called Security Pros
have implemented and embraced SCS. Their overall mean scores on all SCS activities
were well above the mean values. These firms view SCS as an opportunity and therefore
dedicate time and resources to SCS category. This response finding is similar to Oliver’s
acquiescence strategy and particularly the habit tactic she describes, which suggests that
firms will adopt the necessary actions unconditionally.
The Follow-the-Leaders category were all middle of the road on their SCS
activity scores. Thus, it is likely that they may not view SCS as a strategic activity.
However, they realize that other firms, possibly industry leaders, have implemented SCS
categories. Further, firms following this category may feel that more SCS requirements
are likely to come from the government, so they have the flexibility to adhere to them
once they are required. As a result, they implement their category without dedicating
unnecessary resources to them. This is also similar to Oliver’s strategy of acquiescence,
but similar to the tactic of compliance. In this tactic, organizations obey and adopt the
institutionalized norms from the environment. The Follow-the-Leaders are similar in this
tactic because while adopting some of the SCS activities, they are very unlikely to be
developing any innovative SCS security initiatives.
The final SCS category identified was the Necessary Evils. This group scored
very low across all SCS activities. Firms likely take this approach to SCS when they are
forced by another entity to adopt SCS activities. In many cases, these firms would likely
avoid all SCS activity, if they felt it were possible (and it is possible that they do avoid
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SCS activities all together). This may be due to the feeling of low risk or not having
resources to dedicate to SCS programs. This approach is in line with Oliver’s
compromise strategy. Specifically, the pacifying tactic associated with this strategy
implies that firms may resist institutional pressures, but also partially conform to them.
The low mean scores on all the SCS activities in this cluster suggest that these firms are
doing “something,” but that SCS is not a top priority.
From the work of Oliver (1991) and the research in this dissertation, it appears
that tactical level responses to environmental pressures may be the most appropriate for
categorizing strategic response. Oliver’s work on strategic responses created a typology
of five high level strategies for responding to environmental pressure. Subsequent
empirical testing of these strategies by other researchers (e.g., Clemens and Douglas
2005) indicates differing results on the strategies truly being unique from one another.
Using factor analysis, Clemens and Douglas (2005) find that the five original Oliver
(1991) strategies result in only two factors. In their analysis, compromise, acquiescence,
and manipulation strategies all loaded on the first factor, which they labeled “work within
the system.” Avoidance and defiance loaded on the second factor which was labeled
“fight the system.” This current research found three primary categories using an
alternative approach: using specific SCS activities to determine the overall taxonomy.
The developed categories have undertones of both Oliver’s (1991) and Clemens and
Douglas’s (2005) research on strategic response.
This dissertation found that each SCS category possesses unique SCS
characteristics. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 1a and partial support for

308

Hypothesis 1b, which suggests more than one SCS category exists and they are different
from one another.
Research Question 2: What causes organizations to engage in specific SCS
taxonomy categories?
Next, analysis was conducted to determine what causes organizations to enact
SCS in the first place, which were called ‘drivers’ for this dissertation. The qualitative
research indicated that four primary areas create pressure for SCS: customers, the
government, competitors, and society. Then, MDA was used to determine which, if any,
of the drivers influenced the SCS categories. The results of the MDA indicate that
customers and society are the significant influencers for SCS categories. As supply
chains become leaner, it is not surprising that customers are dictating SCS. Long-term
relationships, which have long been the focus of industrial distribution, marketing, and
supply chain research, all indicate that commitment, trust, and communication (among
other factors) are imperative for success. Security issues in supply chain relationships are
another issue that organizations must now address. As such, customers are creating
security requirements they feel best suite their needs and are pushing the initiatives up the
supply chain. Whether it is because of an existing long-term commitment or the desire to
create one, supplier firms are listening. It is important to note that the results of the
qualitative and quantitative assessments indicate that SCS initiatives flow one-way in the
supply chain: upward. In the qualitative research, there was no mention of suppliers
dictating security requirements to customers. Rather, customers were dictating and
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suppliers were adhering to the desired standards. As a result, customers were the only
direct member of the supply chain that was investigated empirically as a driver.
The other finding from the MDA was that, other than customers, societal reasons
were the only other reason that firms were initiating SCS activities. In recent years,
corporate social responsibility has become an important part of many organizational
categories. The empirical results indicate that organizations may also be including the
protection of their supply chains as an activity to benefit everyone, not just themselves.
From the findings, it is evident that firms feel a sense of responsibility to keep society a
safe place by dedicating resources to keep supply chains free from breaches that can harm
the general public. The qualitative results further support this; many interviewees
suggested that it is also likely that organizations feel pressure from society because they
do not want to be the next news story describing security negligence that led to harm for
the general public. In other words, by protecting society, firms are protecting their
brands.
The results of the hypotheses tests also indicate that two environmental factors did
not appear to affect the development of a SCS category. Qualitative research indicated
that competition and the government also contributed to SCS development. However, the
empirical research indicates that competitive forces do not yet cause firms to create or
enhance SCS activities. Part of this may be attributed to the fact that SCS is new enough
that no formalized environmental scanning of competitors is yet taking place. In other
words, competitors may be doing SCS activities, but other firms may not be ready or yet
able to identify those activities. Further, if it is an organization’s belief that SCS efforts
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do not lead to performance, they may intentionally avoid dedicating resources to
monitoring the competitive marketplace for SCS activities. As SCS becomes more
standardized, it is suspected that competitors (or the government) will become more
influential in SCS development.
Government requirements were also identified in the qualitative research as a
driving force of SCS. The quantitative assessment failed to support this notion. As was
suggested with competitors, the governmental forces may not yet be a driving force
because of lack of standards. Most the current programs that have been developed since
9/11 are voluntary programs. As such, firms may find the voluntary programs
unnecessary or possibly not stringent enough. As societal aspects were deemed to be
very important in creating SCS activities, firms may feel that the governmental initiatives
are not enough to protect their supply chains. Some firms may feel that they are not
targets of security breaches and as a result, they choose to ignore governmental pressures.
In other words, firms may be going above and beyond governmental pressures or
disregarding them altogether. In either case, the results indicate that governmental
pressures are not yet having enough impact to cause firms to create SCS.
Thus, the MDA indicates support for Hypotheses 3 and 5, which suggests that
customers and societal well-being are the primary reasons firms are creating SCS
categories. There was no support for Hypotheses 2 and 4.
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Research Question 3: Do different SCS categories result in different organizational
performances?
The final research question sought to understand if different SCS categories
resulted in different organizational performances. The qualitative research suggested
strong variations across numerous performance measures. Some interviewees felt that
their firms had realized strong benefits from their SCS efforts. Others indicated the
efforts made no difference or it was too difficult or too soon to yet understand. Finally
others indicated that SCS efforts were a hindrance and had a negative effect on overall
performance. The qualitative research resulted in hypotheses that suggested firms with
very different SCS orientations would have very different levels of organizational
performance. The four areas of organizational performance that were investigated
included firm performance, customer performance, market performance, and supply
chain performance.
After identifying three distinct SCS categories through cluster analysis,
MANOVA was used to evaluate different levels of performance across these categories.
The results indicate that there are no significant differences on any performance measure
between the three categories. In other words, the results indicate that performance does
not vary among SCS categories. These findings suggest that there is no support for
Hypotheses 6 through 9, which suggested that each of the four performance measures
varied among the SCS category types.
There are explanations for the lack of support for these hypotheses. First, as has
been mentioned throughout this dissertation, SCS is a very new phenomenon. As a
result, it may be very difficult at this time to fully understand the impact that SCS has on
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the performance of the firm. Until better identification and tracking of SCS strategy
types and better associations to the various types of performance, the linkage between
SCS strategy and performance may not be known. While some of the SCS activities used
to develop SCS categories have been implemented for a long time, others have not. SCS
may have to reach a certain level of maturation before having a strong impact on
organizational performance.
Second, there are likely many other variables that contribute to a firm’s level of
performance. This research attempted to isolate one factor, SCS, without accounting for
many others. Those other factors may have a strong confounding effect or even entirely
mask the impact of SCS on performance at this time. Had some of the other
environmental factors been accounted for, results of these tests may have been very
different.
Finally, the relationship between SCS categories and performance may be cyclical
in nature. If an organization has high firm performance, it may be the case that the
organization then has more resources to dedicate to SCS. The same can be said with
customer performance. This research has already indicated that customers are the key
drivers of SCS categories. Thus, it is reasonable to think that customer satisfaction, a key
component of customer performance, would be high. And to keep those customer
satisfaction levels high, more security efforts have to be implemented.
Contributions
This dissertation research had three primary research questions that were explored
through inductive and deductive approaches. These three main questions have many
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contributions for academic researchers and practioners alike. This research uses
Institutional Theory as a theoretical basis for explaining why firms initiate SCS and how
they might respond. The use of this theory makes contributions to the theory and also
advances the use of the theory into a new discipline: supply chain management. In
addition to the theoretical contribution, practioners will also benefit from this research.
SCS is a phenomenon that has been quickly brought upon the business community. As a
result, this research will help practioners by identifying the main sources of pressures for
creating SCS, some approaches to respond to those pressures, and what they might expect
from those responses in terms of performance. The theoretical and managerial
contributions are discussed below.
Theoretical Contributions
This research used Institutional Theory as the theoretical framework. The testing
of the institutional pressures in the SCS context is an important step in advancing and
understanding Institutional Theory within a supply chain context.
Above, it was noted that the SCS categories were similar to some of Oliver’s
(1991) strategies and more specifically, some of her identified tactical level responses.
This is an interesting finding that also provides a theoretical contribution to responses.
There were no similarities between the SCS categories developed in this dissertation and
Oliver’s avoidance, defiance, and manipulation strategies (and their tactical responses).
With no evidence of these categories in this research, it is suggested that a temporal
nature exists to response. In other words, SCS is relatively new, thus organizations may
have a limited number of responses that are currently applied to dealing with
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environmental pressure. For example, Oliver’s response of defiance is the process of
rejecting institutional pressures. This dissertation suggests that institutional pressures
come from customers and society. Firms have not yet had the opportunity to reject these
pressures; when it comes to SCS, customers are demanding better security in the flow of
goods and in order to remain competitive and profitable, firms are responding. Similarly,
if an organization had a serious SCS breach occurred and the organization had chosen to
reject the pressures applied by society, it would likely suffer consequences that would be
irreversible. Over the course of time, however, the pressures may change and the SCS
responses may become more diverse. The work of Clemens and Douglas (2005) is also
recognized as taking Oliver’s (1991) five strategies and reducing them to two primary
strategies: “working with the system” and “fighting the system.” The categories
developed in this dissertation are similar, with a third typology: “developing the system,”
which would come from the Security Pros. This group of firms is proactive enough with
SCS that they are likely setting the standards for many other organizations and even
government agencies.
Institutional Theory was also used as an explanatory theory of why organizations
adopt SCS practices. Institutional pressures from external environments have been
identified as having an impact on organizations in a number of applicable areas. For
example, management literature has evaluated how institutional pressures have caused
firms to adopt environmentally friendly practices (i.e., Bansal and Clelland 2004). With
the exception of Zsidisin, Melnyk, Ragatz (2005), Institutional Theory has been missing
as a theoretical foundation in supply chain research.
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The qualitative interviews revealed that organizations perceive pressure from
sources such as customers, governmental agencies, competitors, and society. This
presents a strong addition to theoretical knowledge concerning SCM. The results of the
empirical research also help to advance knowledge of Institutional Theory. In this case,
three specific environmental pressures were evaluated: coercive, normative, and mimetic
pressures.
First, coercive pressures are those that come through as force, persuasions, and
invitations to participate with other external environment members. Often, coercive
institutional pressures take the form of governmental regulations or laws. In this
research, coercive pressure was assessed through governmental pressures to adopt SCS.
However, from the qualitative research, it was also determined customers are also
exerting power and control when it comes to SCS. As a result, governmental and
customer pressures were examined as coercive pressures in this research. The results of
the hypotheses testing indicated that customers but not governmental forces had influence
on the creation of SCS categories.
Another interesting finding is that customers are requiring and responsible for
SCS categories. Force, persuasion, and coercion are not new topics to interorganizational
relationships. Discussions of channel power have been illustrated in academic literature
for well over thirty years (i.e., Hunt and Nevin 1974; Stern and El-Ansary 1977).
Security requirements may be a new twist to the power elements between firms, as
customers are causing supplying firms to enact security programs, whether these firms
want to. Further, customers making security requirements of their suppliers may also
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have an implication on relationships. Traditionally, relationship literature discusses
elements of commitment and trust. However, with customers creating security demands,
the sense of security may become standard in interorganizational relationships.
Second, it has been stated that organizations can conform to environmental
pressures because of moral and ethical obligations and it is what is expected of them
(Scott 1995). Essentially, these normative pressures are considered the legitimate way
that things should be done. For this research, normative pressure was operationalized as
pressure from general society well-being to keep everyone safe. The hypothesis test
indicated that societal pressure was in fact a significant key driver of SCS categories.
The suggestion that societal pressure is a primary reason that organizations are
initiating SCS supports the work of Sheffi (2005b). He suggests that organizations now
have a higher responsibility in securing their assets and operations. The findings from
the current research indicate that organizations are feeling and responding to the need for
security. This presents a new notion for interorganizational relationships: can multiple
firms work together to create a collective benefit for society? A related topic in supply
chain research is the “greening” of the supply chain (cf. Rao and Holt 2005).
The final pressure suggested by Institutional Theory is called mimetic. According
to Institutional Theory, mimetic pressures emerge when new or problematic situations
arise in an environment. The mimicking occurs when organizations model themselves
after other organizations that they believe are adequately managing their business to
survive environmental conditions. The hypotheses tests indicated that mimetic pressures
were not yet affecting organizational SCS activities.
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The findings in this research suggest that only coercive (customer) and normative
(societal) pressure are currently influencing SCS. In this study, there was not empirical
support that governmental (coercive) and competitor (mimetic) pressures yet exist in SCS
practices. This may be due to the infancy of the phenomenon; SCS truly took a new form
after 9/11 as focus shifted from mitigating products getting out of the supply chain to
focusing on not letting contraband enter the chain. Since that time, there have been
governmental programs established, but most are voluntary and some are still very early
in the implementation process. The governmental pressures may not have had time to
materialize. Competitor pressures have also been absent. This may be due to the lack of
standardized approaches to SCS. If competitors are environmentally scanning
competitors for SCS, they may find too many options to choose from. SCS was thrust
upon organizations so abruptly that many piecemeal activities have been combined to
prevent security breaches.
The findings here also suggest an interesting addition to environmental pressures
associated with Institutional Theory. The results from these tests indicate that there may
be a form of lifecycle effect to Institutional Pressures. In other words, this research
suggests that various environmental pressures may come before other environmental
pressures are even established. In this research, it is suggested that normative pressure
and one type of coercive (customer) pressure precede other forms of coercive pressures
and mimetic pressure.
Previous research has found that innovative companies implement security
initiatives and realize business value (Peleg-Gillai, Bhat, and Sept 2006). However, this
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research failed to identify security types. By using the categories presented in this
research, a more salient view of SCS and performance emerges. This research indicates
that currently, firms with different types of categories do not vary on their organizational
performances. Regardless of SCS category type, no differences in levels of firm, market,
customer, and supply chain performance were found. Following their operationalization
of strategy, Lehmann and Winer (2008) suggest that strategies lead to superior market
position. In this research, however, the SCS categories do not result in any favorable
market position. This contradicts the suggestion that categories may not in fact always
lead to superior market position. In the case of SCS categories, the lack of support for
impact on performance is that may be due to the lack of implementation time. Firms
have had little time to formalize SCS since initiating them.
This research does somewhat refute and further explain the findings by PelegGillai, Bhat, and Sept (2006) in that no relationship between SCS and performance was
found. Peleg et al. (2006) found that the SCS experts were realizing many organizational
performance increases. In this research, SCS experts would be considered the category
labeled SCS Pros. Their performance was not different from any other category type.
Thus, further evaluation of the Peleg et al. (2006) research indicates that different SCS
categories do not result in different organizational performance outcomes.
The final theoretical contribution is established by identifying organizational
perceptions of security categories and their impact on performance. This is critical as
prior research suggests that the role of management is to develop strategies that lead to
organizational performance (Hunt and Morgan 1997). Gaining insight into the
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relationship between SCS categories and organizational performance is critical to strategy
research. Further, it is suggested that strategies should 1) enhance coordination, 2)
define resource allocation, and 3) lead to superior market position (Lehmann and Winer
2008). As a result, it is important that strategy research understand the relationships
between strategies and outcomes. Specifically, the current study contributes to
theoretical knowledge by understanding the relationship between SCS and organizational
performances.
Managerial Contributions
As supply chains increasingly become global, firms will be forced to adopt
strategies for the secure flow of goods from raw material to end consumer. Furthermore,
security issues are increasingly atop the minds of many end consumers, which will
require all supply chain members to take a new look at security measures. The
contributions of this research are needed as organizations increasingly implement
strategies for SCS.
First, this research describes SCS categories that organizations implement to
create security in the supply chain. Supply chain research has viewed security from
many views, including normative and static. In a normative manner, it is suggested that
firms need to approach SCS from a strategic perspective (Sarathy 2006). Yet, to date,
research had not provided specific strategic options for firms to adopt to secure their
supply chain. From the qualitative research two general approaches to SCS were
identified and named intra- and interorganizational. Within each approach, numerous
activities were identified. This research is one of the first to identify and describe
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detailed activities and overall SCS categories. Strategy focused research is founded on
identifying and describing approaches to strategic issues through typologies (e.g.,
Galbraith and Schendel 1983; Hawes and Crittenden 1984; Lassar and Kerr 1996) and
archetypes (e.g., McDougall and Robinson 1990). Managers can benefit by the
identification of the taxonomy identified in this research. This research identifies three
main ways that firms can approach securing the supply chain. These approaches were
named: Security Pros, Follow-the-Leaders, and Necessary Evils.
By identifying these categories, practioners should be able to understand their
own SCS activities better. This may result in the ability to market these SCS efforts.
The qualitative research suggested that marketing security was going to become a key
attribute to acquiring and retaining customers in the future. Also, even though the
empirical results indicate that competitors are not yet a cause for SCS categories, at some
point in the future, firms will be conducting environmental scans which include
competitor assessments. By identifying SCS categories, the environmental scanning
process will be easier as firms will be able to recognize similar firms and distinguish very
different firms in terms of SCS categories. Importantly, this will allow firms the ability
to benchmark SCS categories and organizational performances. Also, this will become
more beneficial as customers continue to push for security efforts. If SCS strategies
change over time they may eventually lead to a strategic competitive advantage.
SCS for man-made disasters should help firms prepare for and respond to all
types of disasters. The research here indicates that firms are dedicating many resources
to preventing and reacting to such disasters. The research also indicates that these types
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of disasters are top of mind to many executives. It is likely that the resources being
dedicated to prevent and react to man-made disasters are also having an impact on how
firms approach other types of disasters. Further by discovering how firms approach SCS,
this research may help firms improve their prevention and response to all types of
disasters.
Through the empirical research, it was also determined that customers are the
primary reason that SCS categories are implemented. This is valuable information for
organizations. Knowing that the customers are driving the security efforts, supplying
firms should consider using this information as a segmenting technique. By better
understanding customer needs for SCS, supplying firms can use security requirements to
develop tailored security programs. By developing tailored SCS programs for customer
segments, firms will be more likely to realize increased performance.
Through identifying the relationship between different SCS categories and
organizational performances, this research provides a foundation for practioners to
identify their own category and assess strengths within that category. This is a priority as
organizations are pressured from the external environment to adopt SCS practices that
can result in substantial capital expenditures. Identifying how different categories affect
different organizational performance measures is critical for practioners to continue
efforts to effectively secure their supply chains.
Practioners are also impacted by the findings on organizational performance. The
results indicate that different SCS categories do not have different levels of performance.
The increase in security demands and security expenditures over the coming years will
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likely be profound. This research should help executives justify their expenditures on
security efforts. Further, with no linkage to performance, this indicates that there may
not be any ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way to develop an overall SCS strategy. Rather, it means
that firms should be working closely with customers to make sure their security
requirements are being met. Also, firms should be taking efforts to make sure that their
security efforts are appropriate for keeping society in general safe.
Limitations
Several limitations for this dissertation should be mentioned. First, due to scope,
this research is focused on the security of the physical flow of goods throughout a supply
chain. While it recognized that other things, such as information and finances, flow
through the supply chain, this current study is limited to physical security practices.
Second, following other research (e.g., Matsuno, Mentzer, and Rentz 2000) all
performance measures were captured using perceptual measures and in comparison to the
organizations’ closest competitor. Using actual performance measures is ideal, but can
be difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain.
Third, the overall response rate to the main study was low (3.6%). The low
response rate can be attributed to a number of reasons, likely including: sensitive topic,
length of survey, career level of respondents, and over surveyed samples. In addition, a
web-based survey was conducted. In a recent meta-analysis, marketing researchers found
that web-based surveys resulted in an 11% lower response rate in comparison to other
modes of survey delivery (Manfreda, Bosnjak, Berzelak, Haas, and Vehovar 2008). As a
result, one can speculate that different survey delivery modes may have increased
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response rates for this research. Efforts were taken to assess the possible problem with
non-response bias, a potentially serious issue when response rates are low. The results of
this analysis indicated that non-response bias was likely not an issue. However, even
with the indication that non-response bias was not an issue, the generalizability of this
research is limited by its low number of responses and the response rate (especially
relative to the large number of issues and constructs investigated).
Fourth, this research is designed to use key informants from an organization to
represent that organization. As such, executive level personnel are desired as they are
likely to have the capability to answers questions about security activities and
organizational performance. However, using key informants to represent their
organizations and answer all independent and dependent variables can be problematic,
specifically in terms of common method variance bias. By conducting research in this
manner, common method variance (CMV) bias, which is the systematic error introduced
by a single source, may be an issue relative to this research. Further, CMV greatly limits
the casual inference (the ability to infer causality from empirical observation) of research
(Rindfleisch, Malter, Ganesan, and Moorman Forthcoming).
Also, CMV is thought to be further influenced by cross sectional and single
informant surveys (Jap and Anderson 2004), single scale formats (Likert 1-7), and
common scale anchors (agreement scale) (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This research utilized
all of the above.
Many possible ways to avoid CMV have been offered (cf. Podsakoff 2003).
However, this research did not incorporate these into the research. For example, one
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popular tactic is to follow-up with respondents and ask them re-respond to the survey.
Because the respondents to this survey were anonymous, no follow ups with them could
be made. Further, because they were anonymous, no other representative from their
respective organization could be contacted for cross-validation.
Fifth, another type of bias that may be evident in this research is social
desirability. Specifically, the items created to measure societal pressures could have been
answered in a manner which respondents thought others would. Due to the length of the
questionnaire, no measures were taken to assess social desirability. The responses may
also have suffered from yeasaying, whereby respondents have a general tendency to
agree or disagree with questions, regardless of what is being asked of them (Couch and
Keniston 1960). For more on yeasaying, see Greenleaf (1992).
The sixth limitation with this research involved the construct of societal pressure.
Not being specifically measured previously, other similar constructs were reviewed to
create items of measurement. The evaluation of convergent and discriminant validity
through CFA indicated that the measurement items for social pressure were associated
with all other drivers of SCS. This may indicate that societal pressure is a higher order
construct of the other types of SCS pressures identified in this research. However, this
limitation was mitigated by other tests of validity, such as exploratory PCA and
AVE/shared variance.
Seventh, the findings indicated that none of the SCS categories have a
relationship with various performance levels of the firm. However, it is also likely that
many other factors, including internal (such as other organizational strategies) and
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external (such as the economy) can impact firm performance. While this research helps
to extend knowledge into the relationship between SCS and performance, it should be
used cautiously. This research failed to control for the many other variables that may
have an impact on organizational performance in addition to SCS. Also, the results of
this research may have been very different had performance been captured with different
measurement items. For instance, instead of capturing performance using comparisons to
competitors, asking respondents to evaluate their firm, customer, market, and supply
chain performance since implementing SCS might have been more effective. This might
have lead to a more salient understanding of the direct linkage between SCS and
performance.
Finally, it is noted that there are many types of disasters that can negatively affect
a supply chain exist. However, this research is focused solely on man-made disasters.
As a result, the findings cannot be generalized to other disasters, such as natural disasters.
Future Research
As the expectations for security become greater, SCS should be viewed as an
intraorganizational boundary spanning activity. For example, SCS may very well span
from supply chain operations into marketing. Marketing may play multiple roles with
SCS. First, they should have the ability to use SCS activities as a marketing tool. During
the qualitative interviews, it was suggested that SCS would soon become a marketing
tactic. Second, marketing may also play a big role in SCS. As indicated in this research,
customers are a key driver of initiating SCS, thus, marketing may have a large role to
play in working with customers to satisfy their SCS needs. In addition, marketing and
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supply chain research would each benefit from investigating SCS as a segmentation
technique.
This research made some initial evaluations of SCS efforts and organizational
performance. However, further research is needed in this area. As SCS expectations
continue to grow, there will be a greater need to understand the relationship between
security and performance. One suggested way to better understand these relationships
would be through in-depth case studies. The in-depth case studies would allow one to
gain a deeper understanding of specific SCS activities, high level SCS strategies, the
linkages to performance, and the cost structures surrounding such activities. Research on
SCS needs to develop a total security cost perspective. This will require a deeper
understanding of the true costs of security, which will likely come from rich case studies.
During the qualitative research, it was suggested that SCS needs to have a “voice”
within the organization. In other words, the respondents indicated that SCS needs to have
internal recognition and support for its importance. This often comes in the form of an
internal champion placing the emphasis on SCS. Further research is needed to better
understand how SCS voice impacts SCS activities and possibly performance.
It is clear that many public and private initiatives are in place to create SCS.
While this research does discuss government involvement in SCS, the empirical
evaluation only comes from one perspective: the private sector. Therefore, future
research should work with the public sector to gain a holistic view of SCS. For example,
research many try to work with government agents to gather a best practice list for public
entities importing and exporting goods.
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Further research should look at the areas started here – particularly in retail supply
chains. Future research needs to further evaluate security issues relative to retailer SCS.
Retailers are the last link before consumers in the supply chain. The recent barrage of
consumer recalls (toys, food, etc.) indicates that consumers are susceptible to being
impacted by goods distributed through retail outlets. As a result, retailers may have more
security requirements placed on them because they engage in providing goods to the
general public. Their drivers, strategies, and outcomes are likely to be very different
from other supply chain members.
In the future, research on SCS should investigate dyadic SCS relationships. For
example, firm A may indicate that their security efforts are above average. However,
firm B with a standing relationship with A may have a very different view of the security
efforts. Further, when it comes to relationships and security, additional research is
needed to better understand how security impacts organizational relationships (i.e., the
interaction with trust and commitment).
This research focuses on the physical security of goods. However, supply chains
consist of more than just goods; information flow is a critical piece of effective supply
chain management. For example, greater emphasis has recently been placed on the
importance of securing data as it passes through the supply chain. Therefore, additional
research is needed in terms of how information security is part of overall SCS
management. This may also require boundary spanning efforts with supply chain and
information technology.
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Developing and understanding strategy is fundamental to organizational research.
This research acknowledges the seminal work put forth by Oliver (1991). Her work
suggests there are strategic responses to institutional pressures (acquiescence, etc). Those
specific responses were not evaluated as part of this research. As a result, those strategies
should be specifically evaluated in terms of SCS in future research. In addition, the highlevel strategies presented by Oliver (1991) should also be compared to the specific SCS
security activities suggested in this research. Also, one of the most popular business
strategy typologies is that set forth by Miles and Snow (1978), who classified firms as
prospectors, defenders, analyzers, and reactors. Additional research into SCS should
evaluate in conjunction the Miles and Snow typology and the SCS security efforts of
organizations. Finally, there may be a need to simply better understand SCS as they are
being developed. This will require more inductive research to assist in building a theory
of SCS strategy.
As the empirical results indicate that societal pressure is a reason that some firms
initiate SCS activities, the relationship with corporate social responsibility (CSR) should
be investigated further. For example, are some firms more likely to be aware of their
social responsibility of SCS? If so, what firms are they? What activities do they
participate in? These are just a few of the questions that should be researched with CSR
and SCS.
Finally, from a strategy research standpoint, researchers should investigate how
people respond to email survey requests when they are out of the office. In the initial
survey request sent out, over 80 “out of office” automatic replies were returned to the
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researcher. How do these people react to this email when they return to the office and
check their email? Future research should investigate how respondents react to survey
requests when the request is stale.
Conclusion
This dissertation has supplied contributions to the SCM knowledge base and in
particular to the knowledge around supply chain security. Following the suggestion of
Dunn, Seaker, and Waller (1994), this research included both inductive and deductive
methods. In an inductive manner, in-depth interviews revealed various activities that
firms partake in to create a secure supply chain. Also, the interviews revealed that
institutional pressures are causing firms to start SCS. The deductive approach was an
empirical investigation to better understand SCS categories, their causes, and how they
impact organizational performances. The empirical investigation found that more than
one type of supply chain security category exists, customers and society are causing the
categories, and supply chain security does not have a relationship with organizational
performance.
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Qualitative Interview Guide
1. How important is supply chain security management at your organization?
2. How would you describe the security strategy at your organization?
a. [Probing: within your strategy, does your organization feel they can
convince potential perpetrators to not even attempt to breach your supply
chain?]
b. [Probing: within your strategy, does your organization attempt to create
barriers that would make it difficult to breach your supply chain? How?]
c. [Probing: within your strategy, does your organization attempt detect a
supply chain security breach? How?]
d. [Probing: within your strategy, does your organization feel that they ready
to respond to a supply chain security breach?]
3. Does your organization track expenditures on supply chain security efforts? If so,
how?
4. Have there been any unexpected benefits to your organization as the result of your
security initiatives?
5. What activities make your organization a leader in supply chain security
management?
6. The following are various performance measures of the firm. Describe how you
feel your organization has benefited or suffered in each of the following areas as a
result of your supply chain security efforts:
a. Firm performance
i. [Probing: Profit Margins]
ii. [Probing: ROI]
iii. [Probing: Sales Growth]
b. Supply chain performance
i. [Probing: Responsiveness]
ii. [Probing: Product Availability]
iii. [Probing: Optimized Inventory]
iv. [Probing: Efficiency in the flow of goods]
c. Market Performance
i. [Probing: Market Share]
ii. [Probing: Product Quality]
iii. [Probing: Product Development]
iv. [Probing: Relationships with suppliers]
d. Customer Performance
i. [Probing: Customer Retention]
ii. [Probing: Customer Satisfaction]
iii. [Probing: Customer Loyalty]

360

APPENDIX B
FINAL SURVEY

361

SECTION 1: DRIVERS OF SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
The questions in this section are to determine why companies have become interested in
supply chain security. Therefore, you will be presented with several statements
concerning the causes of your supply chain security efforts.
Directions: For each of the following questions, please indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each of the listed causes as having impact on your company's
supply chain security activities.
IMPORTANT NOTES: Each of these activities is referring to the PHYSICAL
security of goods in the supply chain. Also, if your company is involved in multiple
supply chains, please think about your most important while responding to the
questions in this section.
NOTE: Likert scaling 1-7 (Completely Disagree; Mostly Disagree; Slightly Disagree;
Neither Agree nor Disagree; Slightly Agree; Mostly Agree; Completely Agree)
Customers
Our customers that are crucial to us…
Cust_1 Require us to develop supply chain security activities.
Are likely to leave us if we do not develop supply chain security
Cust_2 activities.
Cust_3 Encourage us to create supply chain security activities.
Cust_4 Pressure us into adopting supply chain security activities.
Government
The U.S. Government…
Gov_1
Requires us to adopt security activities.
Gov_2
Pressures us into adopting its supply chain security activities.
Is likely to deploy sanctions if we do not develop supply chain
Gov_3
security activities.
Competitors
Our primary competitors that have adopted supply chain security practices…
Are responsible for making supply chain security a priority to our
Com_1
organization.
Com_2
Create the need for us to copy their supply chain security efforts.
Are more competitive, which has resulted our mimicking of their
Com_3
supply chain security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by customers, which has resulted our
Com_4
mimicking of their supply chain security activities.
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Com_5
Com_6

Are perceived more favorably by suppliers, which has resulted our
mimicking of their supply chain security activities.
Are perceived more favorably by others in the same industry, which
has resulted our mimicking of their supply chain security activities.

Society
In general, society…
Soc_1
Benefits from our supply chain security activities.
Soc_2
Requires us to develop supply chain security activities.
Is considered when our organization thinks about supply chain
Soc_3
security.
Soc_4
Is a driving force behind our supply chain security activities
SECTION 2: SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY STRATEGIES
The questions in this section are to understand organizational supply chain security
strategies. Therefore, you will be asked a series of questions concerning activities in
supply chain security.
Directions: For each of the following questions, please indicate the degree to which you
agree or disagree that the listed activity is part of overall supply chain security strategy at
your organization.
IMPORTANT NOTES: Each of these activities is referring to the PHYSICAL
security of goods in the supply chain. Also, if your company is involved in multiple
supply chains, please think about your most important while responding to the
questions in this section.
NOTE: Likert scaling 1-7 (Completely Disagree; Mostly Disagree; Slightly Disagree;
Neither Agree nor Disagree; Slightly Agree; Mostly Agree; Completely Agree)
SCS Culture
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
SCSC_1 Creates a supply chain security focus among all employees.
Makes sure that supply chain security is the first thing on the mind
SCSC_2 of all employees.
SCSC_3 Makes supply chain security the norm for all employees.
Dedicates efforts to create a supply chain security-focused
SCSC_4 workforce.
Makes sure that all employees are vigilant toward supply chain
SCSC_5 security.
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Avoidance
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company avoids…
Avoid_1 Risky supply chain situations.
Avoid_2 Anything that may cause harm to our supply chain.
Avoid_3 Suppliers who present high risk.
Avoid_4 Customers who present high risk.
Avoid_5 Conducting business in parts of the world that present high risk
Operation Modification
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company makes changes to…
OM_1
The way our supply chain operates.
OM_2
Specific supply chain activities.
OM_3
How our supply chain operates with suppliers.
OM_4
How our supply chain operates with customers.
Quality
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Focuses on building quality supply chain security activities into
Qual_1
supply chain operations.
Makes sure all of our supply chain security processes/procedures
Qual_2
are the best they can be.
Qual_3
Procures best in class supply chain security products and services.
Spends the extra money to make sure that supply chain security
Qual_4
best in class products and services are procured.
Makes sure everything with supply chain security is done to the
Qual_5
best of our ability.
Facilities Hardening
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Considers how our facilities might be breached and cause harm to
our supply chain.
FH_1
Considers how to prevent supply chain security breaches at our
FH_2
facilities.
Creates physical facilities that will not suffer a supply chain
FH_3
security breach.
FH_4
Makes our facilities secure from supply chain breaches.
Access Restriction
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
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AR_1
AR_2
AR_3

Creates restricted access areas at our facilities.
Creates designated areas where visitors are allowed within our
facilities.
Strictly controls all access to our facilities.

Combating Complacency
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
Makes employees continuously engage in supply chain security
CC_1
activities.
Finds ways to eliminate supply chain security complacency
CC_2
among our employees.
Never allows our employees to let their guard down when it
CC_3
comes to supply chain security.
Keeps our employees motivated toward creating supply chain
CC_4
security.
Security Services
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Chooses to work with specialized security firms to create supply
SS_1
chain security.
Creates security in the supply chain by working with external
SS_2
security firms.
Chooses to place the responsibility of supply chain security on
SS_3
external security firms.
Outsources supply chain security activities to external security
SS_4
firms.
Monitoring
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Keeps a very close watch on everything in an effort to know when
Mon_1
a potential breach may be occurring.
Conducts continuous analysis to make sure everything is normal
Mon_2
(or within predetermined ranges).
Mon_3
Knows that all operations are going as planned.
Has the ability to immediately know when something is not going
Mon_4
as planned.
Inspection
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
Checks for any contraband in our product/services to prevent them
Insp_1
from being distributed.
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Insp_2
Insp_3

Takes efforts to check for potential security breaches before our
product/service is delivered.
Diligently looks at products and processes before being delivered
to prevent security breaches.

Security Departments
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
Dedicates internal departments to exclusively work on supply
SD_1
chain security.
SD_2
Involves upper management to deal with supply chain security.
SD_3
Dedicates a senior management position solely to security efforts.
Allocates resources for full time employment for supply chain
SD_4
security efforts.
Provides full-time internal employees to manage supply chain
SD_5
security.
Sourcing Security Audits
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Creates a supply base that fits with our supply chain security
SSA_1
strategy.
Develops a supply base that is dedicated to our supply chain
SSA_2
security initiatives.
Uses detailed audit to assess supplier supply chain security
SSA_3
capabilities.
Dedicates resources to finding suppliers who fit with our supply
SSA_4
chain security strategy.
Partnerships
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company…
Shares supply chain security responsibilities with other members
Part_1
of our supply chain.
Dedicates supply chain security assets with other supply chain
Part_2
members.
Part_3
Cultivates deep relationships for supply chain security purposes.
Partners with other members in our supply chain for supply chain
Part_4
security purposes.
Learning
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company...
Understands exactly what other firms expect from us in terms of
Learn_1 supply chain security.
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Learn_2
Learn_3

Makes sure supply chain members know about the nature of our
supply chain security requirements.
Learns about supply chain security requirements from other
supply chain members.

Adopting
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company...
Incorporates our supply chain partner's security practices into our
Adopt_1 own actions, when they are determined to be effective.
Adopt_2 Integrates existing and new supply chain security measures.
Brings together new supply chain security practices with existing
Adopt_3 measures.
Adopts supply chain security practices of our supply chain
Adopt_4 members that are determined to be effective.
Collaboration
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company works with…
Other members of our supply chain to exploit security
Coll_1
opportunities.
Coll_2
Other supply chain members to enhance supply chain security.
Supply chain members to look for synergistic ways to create
Coll_3
security.
Coll_4
Supply chain members to develop new security efforts.
Compromises
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
Takes efforts to stop unreasonable supply chain security activities
Comp_1 with a supply chain member.
Works with other supply chain members to establish supply chain
Comp_2 security activities that all members agree to.
Works with other supply chain members to determine acceptable
Comp_3 supply chain security activities.
Communication
In regard to our supply chain strategy, our company makes sure…
Our supply chain members keep us informed of new supply chain
Comm_1 security developments.
Our supply chain members communicate their supply chain
Comm_2 security expectations clearly.
Our supply chain members let each other know as soon as
Comm_3 possible of any unexpected problems with supply chain security.
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Our supply chain members agree to share critical information
Comm_4 among all chain members to ensure supply chain security.
To communicate with other supply chain members to ensure
Comm_5 supply chain security
Camaraderie
Thinking about our supply chain strategy, our company…
Will work with our competition in order to make our supply
Cam_1
chain more secure.
Cooperates with competing organizations to make supply chains
Cam_2
more secure.
Will work with our competition in order to make our supply
Cam_3
chain more secure.
Will share information with competitors when it helps to make
Cam_4
all supply chains more secure.
SECTION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
The questions in this section are to determine organizational performance. Therefore, you
will be asked a series of questions concerning various performance measures.
Directions: For each of the following performance measures, please indicate the degree
to which you feel your organization performs in comparison to your main competitors.
In your best judgment, with respect to each of the following criteria, how do you feel
your company performs relative to your main competitors?
NOTE: Likert scaling 1-7 (Well behind the competition; Behind the competition; Slightly
Behind the competition; Same as the competition; Slightly ahead of the competition;
Ahead of the competition; Well ahead of the competition)
Firm Performance
In your best judgment, with respect to each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative to your main competitors?
FP_1 Percentage of sales generated by new products/service
FP_2 Return on investment
FP_3 Profitability
FP_4 Sales growth
FP_5 Return on assets
Customer Performance
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In your best judgment, with respect to each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative to your main competitors?
CP_1 Customer loyalty
CP_2 Customer satisfaction
CP_3 Customer commitment
Market Performance
In your best judgment, with respect to each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative to your main competitors?
MP_1 Sales volume
MP_2 Market share
MP_3 Market development
MP_4 New product/Service development
MP_5 Brand equity
SC Performance
In your best judgment, with respect to each of the following criteria, how do
you feel your company performs relative to your main competitors?
SCP_1 Purchasing costs for raw materials (N/A for service providers)
Overall inventory management of all inventory (N/A for service
SCP_2 providers)
Defect rate on production of new products (N/A for service
SCP_3 providers)
SCP_4 Order processing time
SCP_5 Delivery failure of goods/service
SCP_6 Nonvalue-added time
SCP_7 Cycle time
SCP_8 Shipment accuracy
SCP_9 Inventory turns
SECTION 4: INFORMATION ABOUT THE FIRM
Finally, the questions in this section are to determine some general information.
Directions: Please select the best answer to each question.
Position in the SC
Which term best describes your firm’s primary position in the supply chain?
1 Manufacturer
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Carrier
Wholesaler/Distributor
Freight Forwarder
Third Party Logistics Provider
Warehouser
Retailer
Other

Industry Type
Which term best describes your firm's primary industry?
1 Automotive
2 Medical/Pharmaceutical
3 Apparel/Textiles
4 Electronics
5 Industrial Products
6 Consumer Packaged Goods
7 Chemical/Plastics
8 Appliances
9 Apparel/textiles
10 Agriculture
11 Other
Sales
What is your business unit’s approximate annual sales revenue?
1 Less than $100 thousand
2 $101 thousand-$200 thousand
3 $201 thousand-$300 thousand
4 $301 thousand-$400 thousand
5 $401 thousand-$500 thousand
6 $501 thousand-$1 million
7 $2-$25 million
8 $26-$100 million
9 $101-$200 million
10 $201-$300 million
11 $301-$400 million
12 $401-$500 million
13 $501-$600 million
14 $601-$700 million
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15
16
17
18

$701-$800 million
$801-$900 million
$901 million-$1 billion
Greater than $1 billion

Resiliency
Our firm would quickly bounce back from a serious breach to our
Res_1 supply chain.
If a serious supply chain breach were to happen, our firm would
Res_1 return to normal operations in short order.
Res_3 Our firm is prepared for major unexpected supply chain disruptions.
Our firm would not have problems with supply chain operations in
Res_4 the event of a significant supply chain breach.
A serious breach in our supply chain breach would have little effect
Res_5 on our long-term supply chain operations.
A significant breach in our supply chain would have a very big
Res_6 impact on our short-term operations.
Additional questions for verification:
What is your title?:
Approximately how many employees report to you?
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APPENDIX C
POST-HOC MULTIPLE REGRESSION
ANALYSIS ON SCS ACTIVITIES
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Post-hoc analyses were conducted on the intra- and interorganizational activities
using multiple regression to understand the possible impact that the SCS activities might
have on organizational performances. More specifically, four separate multiple
regression analyses were conducted with the nineteen SCS activities (12 intra- and 7
interorganizational) used as independent variables and with each of the performance
measures as dependent variables. This technique was used to better understand which, if
any, of the many SCS activities were significant predictors of various organizational
performances.
First, for the dependent outcome of firm performance the results indicate that the
model is significant, although the R2 is low. The results of the ANOVA indicate a ρvalue of 0.026 as shown in Table 62, while Table 63 shows the individual coeffecients
for each of the individual SCS activities.
Table 62
Model Summary and ANOVA Results
R2
0.232

F-value
1.843
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ρ-value
0.026

Table 63
Coefficients for SCS Activities on Firm Performance

t-value
2.079
SCSC
1.061
Avoid
0.955
Op_Mod
-0.214
Quality
-0.401
Fac_Hard
-0.221
Acc_Restr
Comb_Comp -3.287
0.063
Sec_Serv
0.647
Monitor
-0.052
Inspec
1.248
Sec_Dep
-0.205
Sec_Audit
-0.413
Partner
1.370
Learn
0.589
Adopt
0.217
Collab
-0.252
Compro
1.473
Commun
-2.056
Camar
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ρvalue
0.040
0.291
0.341
0.831
0.689
0.826
0.001
0.950
0.519
0.959
0.215
0.838
0.680
0.173
0.557
0.828
0.801
0.143
0.042

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient
0.333
0.106
0.102
-0.045
-0.063
-0.026
-0.640
0.006
0.089
-0.007
0.141
-0.033
-0.082
0.209
0.136
0.043
-0.038
0.262
-0.209

Of interest are the SCS activities that are significant predictors of firm
performance. The results indicate that three variables are significant predictors of firm
performance: supply chain security culture (ρ-value =0.040), combating complacency (ρvalue =0.001), and camaraderie (ρ-value =0.042). Also of interest are the standardized
coefficients. This coefficient can be used to determine the ‘importance’ of the
independent variables in predicting the dependent variables (Pallant 2005). In other
words, multiple regression can be used to better understand the strongest contribution in
determining the dependent variable.
The next multiple regression analysis was conducted using market performance as
the dependent variable, with all SCS activities as the independents. The results indicate
that the model is significant, at the 0.05 level of significance. Complete model results are
shown in Table 64 and the coefficients are shown in Table 65.
Table 64
Model Summary and ANOVA Results for Market Performance
R2

F-value ρ-value
0.225
1.722
0.042
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Table 65
Coefficients for SCS Activities on Market Performance

t-value
1.107
SCSC
0.267
Avoid
1.323
Op_Mod
0.433
Quality
-0.262
Fac_Hard
0.416
Acc_Restr
Comb_Comp -2.243
-1.764
Sec_Serv
0.331
Monitor
0.184
Inspec
2.944
Sec_Dep
-0.983
Sec_Audit
-0.781
Partner
0.474
Learn
1.324
Adopt
-1.081
Collab
-0.200
Compro
1.662
Commun
-1.467
Camar

ρvalue
0.271
0.790
0.188
0.666
0.794
0.678
0.027
0.080
0.741
0.855
0.004
0.328
0.437
0.636
0.188
0.282
0.842
0.099
0.145

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient
0.182
0.027
0.143
0.098
-0.042
0.049
-0.436
-0.180
0.046
0.026
0.339
-0.162
-0.159
0.074
0.315
-0.219
-0.031
0.279
-0.150

These regression results indicate that combating complacency (ρ-value=0.027)
and security departments (ρ-value=0.004) were the only SCS activities there were
significant predictors of market performance.
Next, multiple regression analysis was conducted with customer performance as
the dependent variable, with the 19 SCS activities as independent variables. At the 0.05
level of significance, the ANOVA results indicate that the model is significant (ρ-

376

value=0.042), with a very low R2 value. Complete model results are shown in Table 66
and Table 67 shows the coefficients.
Table 66
Model Summary and ANOVA Results for Customer Performance
F-value ρ-value
R2
0.199
1.558
0.078
Table 67
Coefficients for SCS Activities on Customer Performance

t-value
1.671
SCSC
0.823
Avoid
1.642
Op_Mod
-0.190
Quality
0.038
Fac_Hard
-0.494
Acc_Restr
Comb_Comp -1.019
-0.912
Sec_Serv
-0.846
Monitor
0.757
Inspec
-0.033
Sec_Dep
0.317
Sec_Audit
-1.190
Partner
0.492
Learn
0.929
Adopt
0.157
Collab
-0.921
Compro
1.492
Commun
-2.754
Camar
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ρvalue
0.097
0.412
0.103
0.850
0.970
0.623
0.310
0.364
0.399
0.451
0.973
0.752
0.237
0.624
0.355
0.875
0.359
0.138
0.007

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient
0.272
0.082
0.175
-0.040
0.006
-0.058
-0.196
-0.092
-0.117
0.105
-0.004
0.052
-0.239
0.075
0.215
0.030
-0.139
0.248
-0.278

Only one variable is a significant predictor of market performance: camaraderie
(ρ-value =0.007). Also of interest are the standardized coefficients. The standardized
coefficient for camaraderie is -.278. All results are shown in Table 67.
Finally, multiple regression analysis was conducted with supply chain
performance as the dependent variable, with the 19 SCS activities as the independent
variables. At the .05 level of significance, the ANOVA results indicate that the model is
significant (ρ-value of 0.003), although the R2 value is again low. Complete model
results are shown in Tables 68 and the coefficients in Table 69.
Table 68
Model Summary and ANOVA Results for Supply Chain Performance
R2
0.310

F-value
2.369
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ρ-value
0.003

Table 69
Coefficients for SCS Activities on Supply Chain Performance

t-value
1.436
SCSC
0.141
Avoid
2.293
Op_Mod
0.380
Quality
0.052
Fac_Hard
1.310
Acc_Restr
1.187
Comb_Comp
-0.975
Sec_Serv
-1.579
Monitor
0.376
Inspec
-1.161
Sec_Dep
-0.075
Sec_Audit
0.552
Partner
0.222
Learn
-3.231
Adopt
2.071
Collab
-2.653
Compro
2.367
Commun
-2.422
Camar
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ρvalue
0.154
0.888
0.024
0.705
0.958
0.193
0.238
0.332
0.118
0.708
0.249
0.940
0.582
0.825
0.002
0.041
0.009
0.020
0.017

Standardized
Beta
Coefficient
0.232
0.014
0.250
0.086
0.009
0.154
0.238
-0.101
-0.225
0.053
-0.132
-0.012
0.110
0.036
-0.739
0.410
-0.397
0.419
-0.250

Five variables are significant predictors of supply chain performance: operation
modification (ρ-value =0.024), adoption (ρ-value =0.002), collaboration (ρ-value
=0.041), compromise (ρ-value =0.009), communication (ρ-value =0.020), and
camaraderie (ρ-value =0.017). The standardized coefficients for each of these significant
variables are: operation modification (0.250), adoption (0.739), collaboration (0.410),
compromise (0.397), communication (0.419), camaraderie (0.250).
Across all four regression analyses, eleven SCS activities (nine distinct) were
identified as significant predictors of one or more organizational performances. These
variables are shown in a rank order by their standardized beta coefficients in Table 70.
Table 70
SCS Activities Significant Predictors of Organizational Performances

Activity
Commun
Collab
Sec_Dep
SCSC
Op_Mod
Camar
Camar
Compro
Comb_Comp
Comb_Comp
Adopt
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Standardized
Beta
Coefficient
0.419
0.410
0.339
0.333
0.250
-0.209
-0.250
-0.397
-0.436
-0.640
-0.739

Conclusion
Overall, the multiple regression analyses results presented in this appendix
indicate that not all 19 identified intra- and interorganizational SCS activities were
adequate predictors of various components of organizational performance. Of the 19
SCS activities, nine were shown to be significant predictors to some degree.
This multiple regression analysis assisted in determining the variables that are the
most important in determining organizational performance. This reduced set of variables
was then used to determine SCS category types. These results are presented in Appendix
D.
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APPENDIX D
POST-HOC DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SCS CATEGORIES
BASED ON MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
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In the main dissertation analysis, 19 intra- and interorganizational SCS activities
were used to develop three SCS categories. However, not all of these activities are
necessarily ‘important’ in determining SCS categories. Therefore, in this appendix, a
reduced set of the 19 activities were used to develop SCS categories. In particular, the
nine distinct activities from Appendix C (those that were found to be significant
predictors of organizational performances using multiple regression analysis) were
evaluated for this analysis.
In order of by strongest beta weights, the nine SCS activities are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Adoption (Inter)
Combating Complacency (Intra)
Communication (Inter)
Collaboration (Inter)
Compromise (Inter)
Security Departments (Intra)
Supply Chain Security Culture (Intra)
Camaraderie (Inter)
Operation Modification (Intra)

This set of SCS activities was further evaluated before conducting cluster analysis
to create SCS categories. On the intraorganizational side, the activity of operation
modification was chosen to be left out of the analysis. Operation modification is a very
general risk reduction technique that is not necessarily tied to security efforts. General
risk reduction (similar to the activity of avoidance) is the activities that are partaken to
remain competitive. In other words, firms would not generally initiate an operation that
they knew would intentionally impact the security to their operations. In addition, the
other three intraorganizational activities from the list above are all much focused on
internal employees and culture.
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From the interorganizational activities, two activities were not used in the
analysis. First, adoption was not used because the process of adoption is not truly a core
supply chain relational activity. Also, in reviewing the measurement items, it was
determined that these items may not be truly measuring the process of physical supply
chain security adoption. In the main dissertation, it was shown that customers are the
driving force behind firms initiating SCS activities. Customers likely hold the power in
the relationship, thus, the supplying firms have to make a compromise in choosing to
adopt the SCS requirements. In this case, it is argued that the compromise, the
communication of the requirements, and the collaboration to achieve SCS are the
strongest, more global, interorganizational activities. While the multiple regression
analysis suggests that adoption is important in determining performance, adoption is left
out of the analysis as it not a primary supply chain relationship variable and is a
subcategory of more prominent relationship variables.
The second activity not used was camaraderie as it is an activity that is specific to
firms who are not part of the supply chain. The camaraderie element focuses on efforts
that firms undertake for SCS with firms who are competitors. As such, the camaraderie
activity is not truly an interorganizational activity because it involves firms that are not
working together for the flow of goods, information, or finances. Rather, the definition
of camaraderie is relationships that are built with competing firms outside of the supply
chain to create security. As such, a competitor relationship is not part of a supply chain
in this research, because physical goods are not being traded.
The following presents similar analysis that was presented in Chapter V. First,
using the ‘important’ SCS activities, cluster analysis was conducted to determine SCS
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categories. Next, MDA was used to determine what drivers were important in
determining those SCS categories. Finally, MANOVA was conducted to determine if
SCS categories had differences on any of the organizational performances.
Research Question 1: What are various types of SCS categories?
A three-step process as used to create and accurately identify the SCS categories.
First, a general rule of thumb was used to determined that three to six clusters is deemed
to be appropriate for this analysis (n/60 and n/30 =162/60 and 162/30). The results
indicate that three to six clusters are appropriate. Second, hierarchical cluster analysis
was used to identify the number of clusters, based on the Ward’s method, with a squared
Euclidian distance measure. In particular, this technique creates an agglomeration
coefficient, which was used to determine clusters. The largest percentage change in the
agglomeration coefficients indicates that two dissimilar clusters have been combined
(Hair et al. 2006). Thus, the largest percentage change in the agglomeration schedule
was evaluated for clusters between three and six. The results indicate that a three cluster
solution may be optimal. Results are shown in Table 71.
Table 71
Agglomeration Schedule from Hierarchal Cluster Analysis

Stage
149
150
151
152

Start
End
Number Number
Agglomeration
of
of
Coefficient
Clusters Clusters
776.32
6
5
881.65
5
4
1055.15
4
3
1475.74
3
2
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Agglomeration
Coefficient Percent
Change
13.57%
19.68%
39.86%

According to this result, the largest change in the agglomeration schedule comes
when three clusters are emerged into two. This indicates that three clusters are the most
appropriate for this sample. The case memberships of the clusters were saved in SPSS as
new variable.
Next, MDA was used to help verify the number of clusters by predicting group
membership. The grouping variable was set to the three clusters derived in the
hierarchical clustering procedure. The independent variables were the remaining six SCS
intra- and interorganizational activities and were used to derive the clusters. This
technique is used to determine how accurate group membership is predicted based on the
variables.
The Tests Equality of Group Means was evaluated to determine which variables
are good at discriminating among the different groups. In this three cluster solution, all
six variables indicated significance.
The main output of interest is the percentage of cases classified correctly. Using
MDA, 92.2% of the cases were correctly classified into the clusters. The classification
results are shown in Table 72.
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Table 72
Classification Results from MDA
Classification Results
Predicted Group Membership Total
Ward Method
1
2
3
64
7
3
78
1
2
60
0
62
2
0
0
14
14
3
92.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified
89.6% of the cross-validated groups correctly classified
N=154
Press’s Q was calculated for both the original classification and the crossvalidated groups. For the original cases, Press’s Q was 240.21 and for the cross-validated
cases, it was 219.48. Both are considered to be extremely significant. Finally, 89.6% of
the cross validated cases were correctly classified. This is only slightly less than the
92.2% of the original cases correctly classified, which also lends strong support for the
existence for a three cluster solution.
After hierarchal cluster analysis and MDA were used to indicate how many
clusters exist, a non-hierarchal cluster analysis was used again to finalize clusters.
Specifically, the K-means clustering technique was used. The K-means cluster analysis
results provided three clusters with sizes of 39, 56, and 59 respectively.
The results of the cluster analysis, where multiple SCS activities emerged from
intra- and interorganizational SCS activities, suggests that Hypothesis 1a is supported –
there are in fact multiple SCS categories. In this case, the clustering technique indicates
and supports the notion of three distinct SCS categories.
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According to Hair et al. (2006), all clusters should be significantly different on all
clustering variables. Therefore, with three clusters established, a test was conducted to
determine if differences among the clusters on all clustering variables were evident.
Thus, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with the three clusters as independent variables
and the six SCS activities as the dependent variables. At the .001 level of significance,
the ANOVA results indicated that there were differences among the clusters on all
clustering variables. The F and ρ-values among all variables are shown in Table 73.
Table 73
ANOVA Results for Between Cluster Differences on Clustering Variables
FValue
SCSC
72.93
COMB_COMP 104.82
SEC_DEP
80.87
COLLAB
62.33
COMPRO
75.26
COMMUN
66.17

ρvalue
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Further post-hoc analysis of ANOVA using a Bonferroni correction indicated that
there were differences between all groups on all SCS activities. This finding indicates
that a three cluster solution represents unique SCS categories. As a result, Hypothesis 1b
is supported. The results for hypotheses 1a and1b are presented in Table 74.
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Table 74
Outcomes for Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Hypothesis
Number

Hypothesis

Outcome

Hypothesis 1a

A multi-categorical supply chain security taxonomy
exists.
Supported

Hypothesis 1b

Taxonomy categories based on the firms’ supply
chain security activities are significantly different
from one another.

Supported

Initial Cluster Interpretation and Profile
From the ANOVA results, it was indicated that the clusters have different mean
values on six SCS variables. The next step was to better understand the within cluster
priorities and compare them between clusters. To gain this understanding, mean values
for the activities were evaluated to help establish an order of prevalence between the
clusters. Then, the prevalence was also assessed within each cluster. The results are
below.
Overall, communication, compromise, and collaboration were the highest scoring
of all the SCS activities, with Cluster 1 scoring highest on these exact activities.
Combating complacency was tied for third with collaboration. SCSC ranked fourth and
security departments last. Cluster 2 scored very high on security departments. This was
followed by interorganizational activities of compromising and communication.
Colloboration, combating complacency, and SCSC rounded out the rank order of SCS
activities. Finally, Cluster 3 scored combating complacency the highest, with
compromising and communication tied for second most important. SCSC was third,
while collaboration and security departments were scored the lowest.
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A summary of all the SCS activities is shown in Table 75.
Table 75
Prevalence of SCS Activities among Clusters
Cluster

Intra- and Interorg SCS Activities
Supply Chain Security Culture
Within Cluster Rank
Combating Complacency
Within Cluster Rank
Security Departments
Within Cluster Rank
Collaboration
Within Cluster Rank
Compromising
Within Cluster Rank
Communication
Within Cluster Rank

1
2.82
4
3.22
3
1.60
5
3.22
3
3.44
2
3.60
1

2
4.70
6
5.05
5
5.50
1
5.09
4
5.12
2
5.11
3

3
5.80
3
6.07
1
3.80
5
5.73
4
5.97
2
5.97
2

The clusters were interpreted as follows (noting all clusters are significantly
different from one another on each of their mean activity scores):
•

“Relational Securers” (Cluster 1): This group of firms ranks the three
interorganizational activities the highest (noting that combating complacency is
tied for third). This group focuses on security by working with others throughout
the supply chain. This may help explain the ranking of the interorganizational
activities as highest: these firms are not focused on SCS, so, they require the
assistance of other firms to achieve SCS.

•

“SCS Police” (Cluster 2): This group ranks security departments as its highest
SCS activity, followed by interorganizational activities of compromising and
communication. Security departments are the crux of this SCS category. It is
likely that these security departments are cross-functional and have their own
resources (budgets) to establish policies and procedures for the movement of
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goods. Security departments may have many security responsibilities, but, they
have likely been tapped to also handle SCS.
•

“SCS Superheroes” (Cluster 3): This group of firms seems to take all SCS efforts
very seriously. In particular, their number one priority is combating
complacency. As the title for this indicates, this group of firms takes an
intraorganizational approach to security with reducing complacency among its
employees. This approach to security assumes that SCS is never achieved; there
will always be more security challenges ahead. This type of mentality earned this
group its name, because like a superhero, they never assume that total security is
achieved.
Next, demographic data was analyzed among cluster members to help build

profiles. Results are shown in Table 76
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Table 76
Cluster Profiles Based on Demographic Information
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Position in the Supply Chain
Manufacturer
59%
54%
29%
Carrier
8%
5%
9%
Wholesaler/Distributor
3%
13%
5%
Freight Forwarder
2%
5%
Third Party Logistics
Provider
10%
20%
26%
Warehouser
8%
4%
10%
Retailer
10%
12%
Other
3%
4%
7%
Industry Grouping
Automotive
3%
4%
5%
Medical/Pharmaceutical
8%
7%
7%
Apparel/Textiles
4%
5%
Electronics
10%
11%
17%
Industrial Products
5%
4%
7%
Consumer Packaged Goods
15%
29%
29%
Chemical/Plastics
7%
7%
Appliances
4%
2%
Apparel/textiles
4%
Agriculture
3%
6%
2%
Other
56%
36%
32%
Annual Sales
Less than $100 thousand
$101 thousand-$200
thousand
$201 thousand-$300
thousand
$301 thousand-$400
thousand
2%
$401 thousand-$500
thousand
2%
$501 thousand-$1 million
$2-$25 million
16%
9%
29%
$26-$100 million
27%
13%
17%
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Table 76 continued
$101-$200 million
$201-$300 million
$301-$400 million
$401-$500 million
$501-$600 million
$601-$700 million
$701-$800 million
$801-$900 million
$901 million-$1 billion
Greater than $1 billion

11%
5%
2%
5%
5%

2%
4%
4%

2%

2%
5%

24%

62%

2%
4%
4%
5%
4%
5%
4%
5%
22%

The first category named “Relational Securers” are primarily composed of
manufacturers (59%) and carriers (8%), are focused on other industries (56%) and
consumer package goods (15%), and include medium (27%=$26-$100 million in annual
sales) and large firms (24%= greater than $1 billion in annual sales).
The second category, named the “SCS Police” is primarily made up of
manufacturers (54%) and 3PLs (20%), is focused in a variety of industries (other =36%)
and consumer packaged goods (29%), and is dominated by large firms (62%= greater
than $1 billion in annual sales). It is without surprise that this category type, the SCS
Police, consist of large corporations in terms of sales. The sales are partly responsible for
the creation and support of the security departments.
Finally, the last category named “SCS Superheroes” is made up of manufacturers
(29%), 3PLs (26%) and retailers (12%). They operate in a lot of industries (other=32%),
but have representation in consumer packaged goods (29%) and electronics (17%). Their
firm sizes are made up medium (29%=$2-$25 million in annual sales; 17%=$26-$100
million in annual sales) and large firms (22%=greater than $1 billion in annual sales).
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Research Question 2: What causes organizations to partake in specific SCS
taxonomy categories?
To answer this question and test the specified hypotheses, the clusters formed in
the previous step will serve as dependent variables in MDA. The independent variables
are customers, government, competitors, and society.
First, all assumptions need first be satisfied. The assumption of the equality of the
variance/covariance was assessed, looking for non-significance in the Box’s M statistic to
support this assumption (Hair et al. 2006). In this analysis, the calculated significance
level was 0.400 and as a result, this assumption is considered satisfied and further MDA
was conducted.
Second, the estimation of the discriminant model and overall fit were analyzed.
This allows for identification of discriminating independent variables for the dependent
categorical variables. This is determined through evaluating the Wilks’ Lambda statistic.
In this instance, the calculated Wilks’ Lambda was 0.664, with a ρ-value of 0.000, thus
indicating significance.
A stepwise procedure was used to eliminate any variable that did not contribute
statistically in describing the groups. Since there are three groups, two discriminant
functions were generated to discriminate between the groups. The results of that test
indicate that only one function is significant. The first function explains 99.8 percent of
the variance, which explains how much variance in the dependent variable was explained
by the functions. Results are presented in Table 77 and Table 78.
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Table 77
Test of Function Significance
Test of
Wilks'
ChiFunction(s)
Lambda
Square
df Sig
1 through 2
0.664
59.525 4 0.000
2
0.999
0.181 1 0.670
Table 78
Function Eigenvalues
Function Eigenvalue
1
0.504
2
0.001

% of
Variance
Cumulative %
99.8
99.8
0.2
100

Canonical
Correlation
0.579
0.035

Next, the standardized discriminant coefficients were evaluated to determine the
largest contribution in determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant function.
Table 79 is presents the standardized and unstandardized discriminant coefficients for the
variables used in the analysis.
Table 79
Standardized and Unstandardized Discriminant Coefficients
Standardized
Unstandardized
Descriptor
Variable Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2
Customers
0.743
-0.696
0.500
-0.468
Society
0.545
0.860
0.474
0.748
Constant
-4.458
-1.601
As shown in that table, customers (β=0.743) have the largest impact in
determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant function. Impact of society has
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the second highest (β=0.545). Similar to the results presented in the main dissertation,
customers and society are significant in determining SCS categories. Finally, the
structure matrix is presented which identifies which predictor variables have the greatest
contribution to the function (in other words, where would the discrimination occur if all
variables were in the model) (Hair et al. 2006). Results are shown in Table 80.
Table 80
Structure Coefficients Matrix
Function
Descriptor
Variable
1
2
CUST
0.845* -0.535
COMPET** 0.308* 0.152
GOV**
0.292* -0.072
SOC
0.684 0.730*
*Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any
discriminant function
**Variable not used in the analysis

Validation of Results
The final step of evaluating model accuracy is to assess how well the developed
function predicts group membership. First, the hit ration of the original cases is
reviewed. Second, the cross validated cases are investigated.
The hit ratio is the percentage of cases correctly classified. In the original
classification, the MDA results suggest that 53.6 percent of the cases can be classified as
member of Categories 1, 2, or 3 based on the discriminant function. The results are
shown in Table 81.
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Table 81
MDA Original Classification Results
Predicted Group
Membership
1
2
3
24
10
4
1
14
22
20
2
7
15
35
3
Ungrouped Cases
0
2
5
53.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified
N=149

Total
38
56
57
7

The calculated Press’s Q was 60.1, well above the critical value suggested by Hair
et al (2005). This suggests that the discriminant function can classify cases better than
chance.
Another approach to verifying classification is using a “leave one out” procedure.
In this case, the cross-validated groups are classified correctly 49 percent of the time.
This is only slightly below the classification of the original results. The cross-validated
results are presented in Table 82.
Table 82
Results of Cross Validated Classification Results
Predicted Group
Membership
Total
1
2
3
24
10
4
38
1
18
16
22
56
2
7
16
34
57
3
49.0% of the cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified
N=149
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The calculated Press’s Q was again calculated at 36.3, which is also well above
the critical value suggested by Hair et al (2005). This suggests that the cross-validated
group can classify cases better than chance. As a result of these tests, it is concluded that
the discriminant function does accurately classify cases into one of three clusters.

Interpretation of the MDA Results and Hypothesis Outcomes
The MDA results suggest that one discriminant function, which is a combination
of the independent variables, is appropriate for classifying respondents into Clusters
(categories) 1, 2, or 3. The total variance explained indicated that almost all (99.8
percent) of the variance in the clusters can be explained by the first function. The
standardized and unstandardized coefficients indicated that customers had the largest
contribution in determining discriminant scores on the first discriminant function. Also,
societal impacts of security are an important discriminator of group member
classification.
Through the MDA, it is suggested that customers and societal impacts are the
greatest causes for firms enacting SCS. The other factors investigated here, competitors
and the government, did not significantly impact the prediction of group membership. As
a result, Hypotheses two and four were not supported, while three and five were. The
results are shown in Table 83.
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Table 83
Outcomes for Hypotheses 2-5
Hypothesis
Number
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis
Government pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Customer pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Competitive pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.
Societal pressures result in organizations
engaging in a level of SCS activity congruent
with their taxonomy category.

Outcome
Not
Supported
Supported
Not
Supported
Supported

Research Question 3: Do different SCS categories result in different organizational
performances?
To answer the third research question, multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was used. The categorical independent variables were derived from the cluster analysis
discussed earlier. The continuous dependent variables are firm, customer, market, and
supply chain performance. The MANOVA was conducted to understand if different
types of SCS categories result in significant differences across the four measures of
organizational performance.

Assessing the Differences among Clusters: A Multivariate Test of Overall Fit
There are many different test statistics to use in determining significance. Wilks’
Lambda is a popular measure. With a 0.05 level of significance, Wilks’ Lambda
indicated that there was a statistically significance difference between category types in
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terms of performance (F (df=8, 240)=1.40; p=0.010; Wilks’ Lambda=0.848; partial eta
squared=0.079; observed power=0.915). This suggests that at least one measure of
organizational performance is significantly different among various types of SCS
categories.
The next step is to determine which performance measure is significantly
different. Therefore, the results of a univariate test across each of the four dependent
variables were conducted next. Given the potential for Type 1 error inflation, a
Bonferroni’s adjusted alpha level of 0.013 was used, which was determined by the
traditional alpha level of 0.05 divided by the number of dependent variables, as suggested
by Pallant (2005). The results were considered significant if the ρ-value was less than
.013. Using the corrected level of significance, the Tests of Between-Subject Effects
indicated a significant difference in supply chain performance (ρ-value=0.006) across the
various category types. Table 84 shows the results.
Table 84
Results of Test of Between Subject Effects

Dependent
Variable
Firm Perf
Cust Perf
Market Perf
Supply Chain Perf

Type III
Sum of
Squares
df
3.967 2
5.219 2
6.304 2
10.418 2

Mean
Square
1.981
2.610
3.152
5.209

F
1.444
2.363
2.310
5.330

Sig.
0.240
0.098
0.104
0.006

Partial
Eta
Squared
0.023
0.037
0.036
0.08

Once it was determined that supply chain performance varied among the three
SCS categories, further analysis was conducted to determine which categories were
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different from one another. This was done through evaluating the post-hoc Bonferroni
output. At the 0.05 level of significance, the differences were shown between SCS
categories two (SCS Police) and three (SCS Superheroes) on supply chain performance
(ρ-value=0.006). Category three has a significantly higher level mean value (5.19) than
category two (4.54). A comparison of all organizational performance means across each
SCS category is presented in Table 85.
Table 85
Descriptive Statistics for Organizational Performance Variables
Dependent
Variable
Category
1
2
3

Mean
4.59
5.02
4.98

SD
1.32
1.05
1.18

N
32
46
48

Customer
Performance

1
2
3

5.43
5.41
5.83

1.10
1.13
.94

32
46
48

Market
Performance

1
2
3

4.53
5.08
4.98

1.28
1.14
1.11

32
46
48

Supply Chain
Performance

1
2
3

4.71
4.54
5.19

.93
1.04
.97

32
46
48

Firm
Performance

Interpretation of the MANOVA Results and Hypotheses Outcomes
The first step of the MANOVA procedure was to evaluate the overall model fit
statistics. The Wilks’ Lambda statistic indicated that the model was significant, thus
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indicating that a difference between SCS category types and various organizational
performances exists. Further evaluation of the between subjects effects indicate that the
difference existed on the supply chain performance variable. Specifically, it was
determined that the difference in category types existed between SCS Police and SCS
Superheroes. The SCS Superheroes have an overall higher level of performance. The
results for hypotheses 6-9 are presented in Table 86.
Table 86
Outcomes for Hypotheses 6-9
Hypothesis
Number

Hypothesis

Outcome

Hypothesis 6

Firm performance varies depending on the
supply chain security taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 7

Organizational market performance varies
depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 8

Organizational market performance will vary
depending on the supply chain security strategy Not
deployed.
Supported

Hypothesis 9

Organizational supply chain performance
varies depending on the supply chain security
taxonomy category.

Supported

Conclusion
This appendix was a replication of the analysis from the main dissertation. The
main difference as that a subset of SCS activities were used to create SCS categories.
The subset of SCS variables came from Appendix C, whereby multiple regression
analysis was to determine which of the 19 variables were significant in predicting
organizational performances.
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Six SCS activities (three intra- and three interorganizational activities) were
selected for the basis of creating SCS categories. From the clustering analysis, it was
determined that three SCS categories exist. These SCS categories were interpreted and
labeled: Relational Securers, SCS Police, and SCS Superheroes. Each category was
deemed to be unique in comparison to one another.
Like the main dissertation, MDA was used to evaluate what the causes of the SCS
categories were. And, like the main dissertation, customers and society were determined
to be the main drivers of SCS categories.
Finally, the last analysis, MANOVA, was done to understand if the three SCS
activities resulted in any type of organizational performance. In the main dissertation, it
was determined that performances did not vary among category type. In this instance,
there was a difference on one level of performance: supply chain performance. Through
the analysis, it was determined that supply chain performance was significantly different
among the SCS Police and SCS Superheroes. In particular, the SCS Superheroes had a
much higher mean value on supply chain performance than did the SCS police.
Managerial Contributions
The contributions of the additional research presented in Appendix D are
important as organizations increasingly implement strategies for SCS. The results
presented here contribute important findings for practioners. These are discussed below.
First, managers can benefit from the identification of the category types in this
research. This research identifies three main ways that firms can approach securing the
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supply chain. These approaches were named: Relational Securers, SCS Police, and SCS
Superhereos.
The “Relational Securers” are focused on the interorganizational activites. These
firms are approaching security in the supply chain as a true multi-firm effort. As such, if
a firm identifies themselves as a Relational Securer, then they should also make sure that
they have supply chain partners who are also dedicated to SCS.
The “SCS Police” are primarily focused on creating internal security departments.
This group of firms has approached SCS with cross-functional internal departments.
These firms are likely to dedicate resources and create budgets for their internal security
departments. Also, given that SCS presents many new challenges, as compared to IT
security for example, extra training or the hiring of specific personnel should be
conducted.
Finally, the “SCS Superheroes” were the highest scoring firms. On all the SCS
activities, these firms scored the highest mean values (with the exception of security
departments). These firms dedicate many efforts to internal, organizational culture
activities and promote those internal SCS activities among their SCS partners.
Practioners would benefit from identifying themselves as a “SCS Superhero” because all
security efforts are a primary activity, specifically the internal cultural activities. As
such, these firms need to spend extra efforts in hiring, training, and rewarding activities
around SCS.
As with the initial analysis, the empirical analysis in this appendix suggests that
customers and society are the primary reason that SCS initiatives are started. Even
though the categories are different, the drivers of those categories remain the same in
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both analyses. Organizations can use this information to develop specific SCS programs
to satisfy their customers.
The most important contribution to practioners is the finding that supply chain
performance can differ based on the SCS category deployed. Specifically, it was
determined that “SCS Superheroes” have significantly higher supply chain performance
levels than do the “SCS Police.” This is important as firms continually look to streamline
supply chains and improve performance, dedicating effort to SCS may provide an
opportunity to improve. Further, the programs that the “SCS Superheroes” are
implementing are activities that many firms can do: developing a culture of SCS,
combating complacency, internal security departments, collaboration, communication,
and compromise. The key to each of these activities is that the “SCS Superheroes” are
doing all of those activities very well. Other firms who are looking for improvements in
supply chain performance should consider developing and dedicating resources to
making the supply chain more secure. It should be noted that these activities do not
necessarily constitute a “quick fix,” but they do offer possible reward for those that
partake.
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